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THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN HUNGARY AND THE LESSONS OF THE 1956 STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

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This presentation will discuss why Hungary has experienced a rather inordinate number of both bloodless and violent revolutions, encompassing urban uprisings as those of 1918 and 1919, and national struggles for independence in 1703–1711, 1848–1849, and 1956. The explanation may lie in the fact that the country has had a long tradition of absolute sovereignty under the leadership of a powerful nobility; yet, because it lies on the crossroads of great migrations and invasions, it was often subjugated by great powers. Remarkably, in each case the national cause was combined with a strong movement for social justice.

Keywords: Hungarian revolutions, 1703–1711, 1848–1849, 1918–1919, 1956

Revolutionary tradition in Hungary, which is what our gracious hosts have asked me to discuss, is an exciting topic. Undoubtedly, it has also caused me a great deal of headache because the more I thought about it, the more I realized that what was expected from me was to furnish an explanation why Hungarians fought and lost their revolutions during the last three centuries. I wonder whether such an explanation is possible.

Please note at this point that I do not consider the peasant revolts of earlier centuries, revolutions.

In my presentation, I'll try to show that the Hungarian revolutions invariably originate from the real or perceived grievances of the social elite. Even though the grievances were directed primarily at the foreign power that held sway over the country, every one of these movements also contained a demand for substantial domestic reform. In each case, however, the movement for reform was hijacked, we might say, by people outside the social elite who turned it into a violent upheaval. This, then, caused an ever-growing section of the elite to demand the restoration of law and order by the very same foreign power against which the social elite had rebelled in the first place.

And now for a bit of an explanation.

Like Poland, its historic soul brother, Hungary was a respected and dynamic middle-sized kingdom in medieval times. Later, however, both kingdoms fell on hard times. In the mid-sixteenth century, Hungary was divided into three parts, regaining its unity and political sovereignty only in 1867; Poland, which was literally abolished late in the eighteenth century, did not regain its unity and independence until 1918. Yet throughout the centuries of division and foreign rule, the existence of these nations was never in doubt for the simple reason that within both countries the historic landowning nobility remained firmly in control. This nobility arrogated to itself the very concept of the nation: they were the populus, the gens, the natio, the citizens, the tribe, the nation; the others were the misera plebs contribuens, the poor tax-paying population. The traditional concept of Hungary and Poland as two noble, warrior nations remained alive over the centuries, and once foreign rule had come to an end, both countries became militantly nationalistic states. Thus we must consider that the reform movements in Hungary and Poland invariably aimed not only at freeing the country from foreign domination but also at tackling the problem of noble rule. Some in the reform movements wished to overthrow the ruling elite; others hoped to make the country free and more prosperous in co-operation with the old elite, and again others fought for liberty and reform in order to perpetuate the predominant position of the old elite.

What complicated matters enormously was the practical absence of a native urban middle class, which meant that the reformers themselves generally stemmed from the noble estate. Thus, with every radical action the reformers threatened the welfare of their own families and friends. As a consequence, most of the noble revolutionaries were eager to achieve national independence as well as to improve conditions in their country without thereby fatally endangering the pre-eminent position of their own class. The effort wasn't always successful because, inevitably, the continued pre-eminence of the old social elite was endangered by new elements of society who had come to the fore as a result of the upheavals.

It is an irony of history that the revolution of 1956 in some ways represented a repetition of the old pattern: namely, progressive members of the old elite, in this case dissident Communist intellectuals, had created a radical reformist movement which, in turn, brought forward such elements from other strata of society who had new and very different goals, and who threatened the security and welfare of the Communist cadres. These new elements, mostly workers and students, brought the conflict into the streets thereby precipitating armed intervention from abroad. Foreign intervention then put an end to both domestic reform and the nation's striving for political independence. As in the early 1700s, in 1848–1849, and in 1919, armed intervention from abroad dissipated the dreams of the elite reformers while simultaneously securing the future of the elite to which the reformers belonged.

Now one more general remark: even though the word "revolution" has been endlessly debased and abused, witness such terms as "revolution in the making of false eyelashes," one of the more viable definitions of the revolution is a violent attempt, by a large number of people, to institute drastic changes through the overthrow of the political system and of the prevailing social order. Measured by this definition, not all of the great historical events I have mentioned qualify as revolutions. Certainly, October 1918 and October 1956 were true revolutions because of their mass character and their overarching aims, but the proper characterization of the other great events is debatable. Consider that the professed aim of the Rákóczi and the Kossuth rebellions was not to overthrow the existing social and political order but to put an end to the abuses perpetrated by the king's evil advisers and to restore the ancient rights of the nation. And as far as the events of March 1919 are concerned, while it is true that Béla Kun and his companions advocated the annihilation of the existing social order, for which they were able to mobilize a considerable number of people, the Communists had come to power through peaceful negotiations. No matter, in my talk I'll treat the Rákóczi Rebellion of 1703–1711; the War of Independence in 1848–1849; the democratic and Communist takeovers in 1918–1919, and the events of 1956 as revolutions.

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Prince Ferenc Rákóczi's rebellion or uprising against Habsburg rule marked the culmination of growing public discontent with the way the Habsburg dynasty treated Hungary, or rather its ruling elite. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hungary was divided between an Ottoman dominated center, an autonomous Principality of Transylvania, and a rather small sliver in the west, called Royal Hungary. Until the 1680s, only the latter part recognized a Habsburg king as its ruler but then, in an extraordinary effort, Europeans combined their forces to rid Central Europe of the Ottomans. By 1699, almost all of Hungary, including Transylvania, had fallen into the hands of European history's last crusaders.

The campaign represented a great victory for Western Christianity, to which Hungary belonged, but the crusaders extracted a heavy price from the Hungarians for their liberation. As a result, Hungarians in 1699 were no more grateful to their Christian liberators than their descendants were to the Red Army in 1945. Among other things, the Hungarian Diet had to recognize the Habsburgs' hereditary right to the Hungarian crown; the nobility had to give up its right to resist an unlawfully acting ruler; much of the devastated countryside was ceded to foreign money lenders and purveyors; and Catholicism, the religion of the Habsburgs, was force-fed to the mostly Protestant Hungarian nobility. On the opposite side, the Habsburg administration saw little reason for treating the Hungarians any better:

the country was infested with bandits and was economically almost worthless; moreover, the Hungarian nobles had proven themselves most fickle in their loyalties. During the previous two centuries, the greatest dignitaries in the realm switched sides again and again from Turks to Habsburgs to Transylvanian princes, often immensely benefiting from the change of loyalties. How could one forget the Turkish and Tatar marauders of the great Hungarian magnate Count Imre Thököly who had repeatedly invaded and devastated the country? Or that the Hungarian hussars, who had participated in the Christian re-conquest of Buda Castle in 1686 from the Turks, had fought on the kuruc, that is on the Turkish side, just a few weeks earlier. Similarly, in February 1945, some Hungarian troops participated bravely in the Soviet siege of Buda Castle, but the Soviets would not easily forget that the same Hungarians had been serving on the German side only a few days earlier.

Hungarians at the turn of eighteenth century regarded every Habsburg move as a humiliation and a mark of oppression. At last, a countrywide rebellion broke out under Prince Rákóczi, a Catholic magnate, who led an army made up of mostly Protestant nobles and of peasants of all nationalities and denominations. The peasants or better, serfs, had been suffering much less from Habsburg rule than from their heavy feudal obligations and the near-total devastation of the land. True, Prince Rákóczi now proclaimed the unity of all the estates and promised freedom to the serfs who had served him well; still, when the other kuruc leaders spoke of the grievances of the "noble Hungarian nation", they meant precisely that: the injustices that had been visited on the nobility, which alone constituted the nation.

It would be good to know how many people in the country sympathized with the imperial Austrian and how many with the revolutionary Hungarian side. Thousands of Hungarian subjects of the Habsburg emperor-king served in both armies, but we must keep in mind that more than half of the king's Hungarian subjects were not Magyar-speakers. In any case, in those times, nationality counted for next-to-nothing and membership in one or another estate for nearly everything. Young men had become soldiers so as not to be killed by the marauding military, or in order not to starve to death, or simply, because they had been pressed into service. The pattern would be repeated in every revolution. Still, it is also certain that a good number of young men joined the Hungarian ranks voluntarily in order to fight "Pro Libertate", for freedom. Only that for noble recruits freedom meant national independence and the preservation of noble privilege, whereas for the serfs in the revolutionary ranks, it meant freedom from feudal dues and services as well as, hopefully, a piece of land to be held in hereditary tenure. The two different goals were not really reconcilable.

Habsburg military victories as well as the devastation of the land and terrible human losses because of the plague caused Rákóczi's followers gradually to

abandon his flag. The rebellion ended in 1711 in a great compromise, certainly not the last in Hungarian revolutionary history. According to the terms of Hungarian surrender no rebel soldier was punished; the kuruc troops were to swear fealty to the emperor-king, and the nobility was to be confirmed in its privileges and rights. Yet one of the country's main problem remained unresolved, namely the complex relationship between the center of power in Vienna and the periphery, that is the fifty odd Hungarian counties dominated by the landowning nobility. The question throughout the century was who would reform the country: the central bureaucracy or enlightened elements among the nobility. Co-operation between the two was not inconceivable, but it occurred rarely. More often, the grievances of the county nobility and the arbitrariness of the Court in Vienna paralyzed each other.

Things changed fundamentally with the rise of European nationalisms and the growing conviction within the Hungarian elite that the nation would perish unless Hungarian was established as the language of official communications, and when all the inhabitants of the realm accepted the notion that they were Hungarian patriots, irrespective of the language they were speaking. Moreover, all the inhabitants of the kingdom were to be given the rights and privileges of the nobility so that together they might constitute a great nation.

Reforms came gradually until events sped up immeasurably with the outbreak of the European revolutions in 1848, which temporarily paralyzed Vienna and allowed the more radical elements in the Hungarian noble establishment to introduce drastic reforms. Even though the Hungarian reformers exploited the temporary weakness of the central power in Vienna, the liberal constitution of March–April 1848 marked the triumph of legality; theirs was a bloodless revolution, or as I like to say, a lawful revolution. Bloodshed came several months later because Vienna wished to undo some of the concessions it had made to the Hungarians, concessions that, it is true, had made the efficient governing of the Monarchy very difficult. In addition, during the summer of 1848, Lajos Kossuth and his colleagues considerably sharpened Hungarian governmental policy toward the Court, the Austrian government, Croatia, and the national minorities. On the other side, the national minorities, who together constituted an absolute majority of the kingdom's inhabitants, wished to achieve some of the same liberties and privileges that the Hungarians had wrested from the king. In other words, the ethnic minorities opposed the centralizing policy of the Hungarian leaders in the same way that the Hungarians opposed the centralizing tendencies of Vienna. The result was war between Hungary and the rest of the Monarchy as well as a civil war within Hungary.

By the time the followers of Kossuth were definitely defeated, in August 1848, most Hungarians had abandoned his cause. But the revolution had not been fought in vain; the Hungarians had lost the war but they would win the peace for the simple reason that the Habsburg Monarchy of that time was no longer a great power.

Rather, it was a combination of many territorial entities, which could function only if these entities were willing to co-operate. Because without Hungary the Habsburg Monarchy was inoperable, a compromise agreement became inevitable, and it was concluded, in 1867, making Hungary an equal partner with the rest of the Monarchy.

The ensuing liberal era allowed for unprecedented prosperity and progress. At the same time the liberal government's tough nationalist policy exasperated the increasingly dynamic ethnic minorities. Moreover, the Monarchy's shortsighted foreign policy as well as the aggressive hostility of some of Austria-Hungary's neighbors led to World War I; here, the Dual Monarchy could not but lose.

The democratic "Chrysanthemum Revolution", at the end of October 1918, represented a dramatic departure from Hungary's entire political and social tradition. Hungary became a democratic republic that hoped to align itself not with Germany, its traditional protector, but with the Western democracies. The revolution also brought into the government, besides the usual nobles and bureaucrats of gentry origin, a good number of Social Democrats and radically-inclined Jewish intellectuals.

The republic of the Red Count, Mihály Károlyi, ended within a few months for such reasons as the incompetence of Károlyi; the utopian ideas of some of his underlings; the rapaciousness of Hungary's neighbors; and the narrow-minded hostility of the Western democracies. A take-over by the Communists and left-wing Social Democrats, in March 1919, was as inevitable as their ultimate collapse a mere four months later. The causes of that debacle were, again, the incompetence and utopian ideas of the Bolshevik leadership, the rapaciousness of Hungary's neighbors, and the hostility of the Western democracies. But there was one more important force to cause the collapse, namely the implacable hostility of the Hungarian social, business, and political elite toward the Republic of Soviets. Counts István Bethlen and Pál Teleki, not to speak of Admiral Miklós Horthy, would rather have Romanian and French colonial troops occupy the country than to tolerate Reds in power.

The conservatives' dream of violently restoring the status-quo-ante proved to be just a dream. During the counter-revolution, new, dubious elements came to the fore whom the old elite both needed and treated with contempt. These newcomers on the political scene wished to discard the Hungarian liberal-conservative constitutional tradition and to replace it with some kind of an anti-Semitic dictatorship. Although this extreme right was never able completely to overcome the resistance of the conservative establishment, it succeeded in bringing about a fundamental social change by gradually expropriating the wealth of Hungary's Jewish population. This way, between 1938 and 1944, approximately one fourth of the national wealth changed hands. Add to this the utter destruction wrought by the war and then it becomes clear that the post-1945 democratic regime con-

fronted a tabula rasa situation. Consequently, when the Communists seized power, in 1947–1948, they had a relatively easy time in expropriating whatever had not already been plundered.

What took place between 1938 and approximately 1952 was a genuine social revolution. True, rather than having been brought about by mass upheaval, it was the work of relatively small domestic forces operating under the tutelage of two successive great powers. The German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, and the Soviet liberation in the spring of 1945 allowed for more changes: political, cultural, social, and economic, than all the previous and later revolutions combined. In all this, the Hungarian people played mostly a passive role, either as beneficiaries of plunder or as the victims of plunder.

In 1953 attempts began to remedy some of the economic and moral damage caused to national life by the Nazi and Soviet takeovers and the cruel as well as often mindless social revolution. The summer and early fall of 1956 represented the culmination of the attempt to undo the damage and to institute a more humane form of Communist government. But again, as after 1703, in 1849, and in 1919, political developments took such a turn as to cause many within the reforming elite to fear for their welfare and dominant position. Therefore, they silently or not so silently welcomed the decision of an outside power to put a violent end to the revolution.

Back in the summer of 1849, much of the Hungarian elite quietly welcomed the law and order brought back by the invading Austrian and Russian armies. In 1919, the Romanian occupation of Budapest enabled the counter-revolutionary Whites to punish the unruly elements among the rural population and to make scapegoats out of the Jews. Finally on November 4, 1956, many sighed in relief that law and order was being re-established. Let us remember that the hundreds of thousands who marched carrying red flags on May 1, 1957 had not all been coerced to do so by the Communist authorities.

Yet let us also remember that it was always a foreign power that put an end to the revolutions: at the Battle of Trencsén, on August 3, 1708, where Habsburg troops irrevocably defeated Prince Ferenc Rákóczi's forces; at Temesvár, on August 9, 1849, where General Haynau triumphed over Kossuth's honvéd army; on August 1, 1919, when Romanian troops crossed the Tisza River and wiped out the Hungarian Red Army, and on November 4, 1956, when Soviet tanks rolled into the Hungarian capital. Nor were the Hungarian revolutions completely unsuccessful because, with or without a compromise agreement, many of the revolutionary ideas were gradually translated into reality, whether under Maria Theresa and Leopold II in the second half of the eighteenth century, or in 1867, or in 1945 or, finally, in 1989.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ONSET OF
THE CRISES IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

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This article looks at Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in 1953–1956, prior to the start of the Hungarian revolution. It shows that the leadership succession struggle in Moscow often caused sharp, and undesirable, fluctuations in Soviet relations with Hungary and the other East European countries. Abrupt shifts in Soviet policy, stemming mainly from internal political maneuvering, helped to produce a volatile situation in both Hungary and Poland in 1956. Soviet leaders were so preoccupied by domestic concerns that they failed to take timely action to cope with the deepening instability in Hungary and Poland. By the time events came to a head in October 1956, the Soviet Union was faced with the prospect of the collapse of Communist rule in Hungary.

Keywords: Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary, Soviet Union, Soviet foreign policy

The death of the long-time ruler of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, in March 1953 soon led to momentous changes in the Communist bloc. Within weeks of Stalin's death, his successors encouraged (and, when necessary, ordered) the East European governments to enact wide-ranging "New Courses" of political and economic reforms. The abrupt introduction of these changes, and the sharp rise of public expectations in Eastern Europe, spawned strikes and mass demonstrations in Bulgaria in May 1953, a rebellion in Czechoslovakia in early June, and a much larger uprising in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) two weeks later.[1] The Czechoslovak authorities succeeded in quelling a violent revolt in Plzeň and mass unrest in other Czechoslovak cities on 1–2 June, but in East Germany the government and security forces quickly lost control of the situation on 17 June when hundreds of thousands of people rose up against Communist rule. Faced with the prospect of "losing" a vital ally, Soviet troops and security forces in the GDR had to intervene on a massive scale to crush the rebellion and restore a modicum of public order.

The Soviet Union's decisive response to the East German crisis was motivated in part by a concern that destabilizing unrest could spread to other East European

countries and even to the USSR itself unless urgent steps were taken. The spate of protests and strikes in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in the spring of 1953, and the much larger uprising in Czechoslovakia in early June, had demonstrated the potential for wider turmoil. As soon as the East German rebellion began, the head of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lavrentii Beria, contacted the Soviet foreign intelligence chiefs elsewhere in Eastern Europe and warned them that they would "pay with [their] heads if anything like this happens" in their assigned countries.[2] He ordered them to send status reports directly to him every few hours and to work with the local governments to prevent mass unrest and subdue any demonstrations supporting the East German protesters.

The use of Soviet military power in the GDR eliminated the immediate problem facing the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, but the suppression of the East German uprising did not impart greater consistency to Soviet policy or eliminate the prospect of further turmoil in the Soviet bloc. Although the downfall of Beria in late June 1953 and the formal appointment of Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in September 1953 helped mitigate the instability in Soviet domestic politics, the leadership struggle in Moscow continued to buffet Soviet-East European relations over the next few years.[3] During the brief tenure of Georgii Malenkov as Soviet prime minister from March 1953 to February 1955, the Soviet government encouraged a significant relaxation of economic and political controls in Eastern Europe, similar to the changes that were being adopted in the USSR itself. Violent mass terror in the region came to an end, and vast numbers of political prisoners were released. The reforms in the East-bloc countries after June 1953 were not as far-reaching as those proposed before Beria's ouster, but they still represented a notable departure from Stalinism. In a region like Eastern Europe, which had been so tightly compressed during the Stalin era, the sudden adoption of New Courses greatly magnified the potential for social and political upheaval. The leaders in Moscow, however, were still preoccupied with domestic affairs and the ongoing struggle for power, and they failed to appreciate the increasingly volatile conditions in the Eastern bloc.[4] Most of them simply hoped that the uprisings in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in June 1953 were an anomaly and not a portent of more explosive unrest to come.

The extent to which Soviet leaders misjudged the situation in Eastern Europe was evidenced by the confused approach that Malenkov's chief rival, Nikita Khrushchev, initially adopted. To outflank Malenkov in the leadership struggle in late 1954 and early 1955, Khrushchev had temporarily sided with the hardliners, and this shift was promptly reflected throughout the bloc. At Khrushchev's behest, the East European governments slowed or reversed many of the economic and political reforms they had implemented after Stalin's death, and in Hungary the reformist prime minister, Imre Nagy, was removed in April 1955 by the

neo-Stalinist leader of the Hungarian Workers' Party, Mátyás Rákosi, who had been forced to yield the prime ministerial post to Nagy two years earlier under Soviet pressure. Because the new Hungarian prime minister, András Hegedüs, was a much weaker figure than Nagy, Rákosi was able to reacquire a dominant political role in the country and to undo many of the recently enacted reforms. Khrushchev later acknowledged, in a conversation with Chinese leaders, that one of his "most serious mistakes" in 1955 was to have gone back to "supporting that idiot Rákosi".[5]

The sudden dampening of popular expectations in Hungary and other East European countries – expectations that had been raised by the New Courses of the previous two years – helped generate strong currents of public discontent. Malenkov had been able to avoid the emergence of widespread unrest in Eastern Europe after June 1953 by pressing ahead with steps to improve living conditions, boost consumer output, and provide for greater responsiveness to public concerns; but after Khrushchev forced Malenkov to the sidelines in early 1955 (replacing him as prime minister with Nikolai Bulganin) and began curtailing the scope and pace of the post-Stalin reforms, he inadvertently heightened the potential for destabilizing turmoil in Eastern Europe.

The threat of instability in Eastern Europe was not as easy to defuse as it had been during the Stalin era. The Soviet Union no longer had recourse to Stalinist methods of ensuring bloc conformity. Although economic retrenchment had been possible, a return to pervasive terror was not; nor would Khrushchev and his colleagues have desired it. Hence, Khrushchev altered his approach somewhat as he sought to replace the political subordination of Eastern Europe, which had been possible in Stalin's time, with economic and ideological cohesion. He advanced the concept of a "socialist commonwealth" *(sotsialisticheskoe sodruzhestvo)* in which the East European Communist parties would have the right to follow their "own paths to socialism" – that is, to have somewhat greater leeway on internal matters – so long as they continued to "base all their activities on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism".[6] Khrushchev apparently believed that popular support for the East European governments would increase if they were given greater independence in domestic policymaking, but he wanted to ensure that the Soviet Union would maintain long-term control of the bloc by promoting economic and military integration. In keeping with these goals, Khrushchev attempted to mend relations with Yugoslavia and bring it closer to the Soviet camp, give greater substance to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and foster a more concrete Soviet–East European military relationship, most notably through the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May 1955.

The bid for a rapprochement with Yugoslavia was of particular importance to Khrushchev, in part because he was able to use the issue as a wedge against one of his domestic rivals, Vyacheslav Molotov. Stalin and Molotov had provoked a bit-

ter split with Yugoslavia in 1948 and had subsequently tried to get rid of the Yu-
goslav leader, Josip Broz Tito. Various efforts to remove Tito ultimately proved
futile, but Stalin remained fiercely hostile toward Yugoslavia to the very end.
Within a few months of Stalin's death, however, on 16 June 1953, his successors
agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. This gesture marked the
first attempt to end some five years of polemics and recriminations. Nevertheless,
the significance of the move was limited because it did not yet entail a resumption
of ties between the two countries' Communist parties. Molotov and a few other
hardliners in the CPSU remained adamantly opposed to any suggestion of pursu-
ing a reconciliation with the Yugoslav Communists.

Khrushchev began laying the groundwork in 1954 for a much fuller rapproche-
ment with Yugoslavia, and he stepped up his efforts in the spring of 1955 to over-
come the opposition posed by Molotov. On 26 May 1955, ten days after Khrush-
chev had returned from Poland for the signing of the Warsaw Pact, he traveled to
Belgrade and held an extended series of meetings with Tito. The communiqué is-
sued by the two sides on 2 June at the end of the meetings – a document that came
to be known as the Belgrade Declaration – pledged respect for their "differences
in internal complexion, social systems, and forms of socialist development".[7] The
declaration also committed each side not to interfere in the other's internal affairs
"for any reason whatsoever". The visit and the joint declaration were valuable for
Khrushchev not only in giving him another conspicuous foreign policy accom-
plishment, but also in allowing him to step up his attacks against Molotov. At a
CPSU Central Committee plenum in July 1955, which Khrushchev convened
shortly after returning from Belgrade, the delegates voiced a torrent of criticism
about Molotov's "ridiculous", "deeply misguided", and "erroneous" views on re-
lations with Yugoslavia.[8]

Soviet-Yugoslav relations continued to improve over the next several months
as a result of Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in
February 1956 in which he explicitly condemned Stalin's policy toward Yugosla-
via, describing it as "arbitrary" and "mistaken".[9] A summary of the secret speech,
along with highly favorable commentary, was published in the main Yugoslav
daily, *Borba*, on 20 March. The following month, Khrushchev agreed to dissolve
the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), from which Yugoslavia had
been expelled by Stalin in 1948. Although the Cominform had become mostly a
figurehead organization after Yugoslavia's expulsion, the dismantling of it was
clearly aimed at alleviating Yugoslav leaders' concerns about "future excommu-
nications".[10] By the time Tito paid a lengthy reciprocating visit to the Soviet Un-
ion in June 1956, the reconciliation between the two sides had proceeded far
enough that they could issue a joint communiqué praising the "diversity of forms
of socialist development" and affirming the "right of different countries to pursue
different paths of socialist development". The communiqué repudiated the Stalin-

ist legacy by indicating that neither side would "attempt to impose its own views about ... socialist development on the other side".[11]

Khrushchev proved equally successful in achieving a settlement in Austria, a country that had been a major point of contention between East and West since the end of World War II. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union had consistently linked proposals for an Austrian peace treaty with other issues such as a settlement of the Trieste dispute and a resolution of the German question. The option of neutrality for Austria, which was first floated in the 1940s, was attractive to some officials in Moscow and in most Western capitals as well as in Austria itself.[12] But hardliners in Moscow like Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich were firmly opposed to the idea if it meant that the Soviet Union would have to pull all its troops out of Austria.[13] Khrushchev, too, initially had been unwilling to accept proposals for Austrian neutrality and a troop withdrawal, but by early 1955 he had come to view a settlement of the Austrian question as a way of defusing a potential East-West flashpoint, eliminating the U.S., British, and French troop presence in Central Europe, and spurring progress in the long-stalled East-West negotiations on Germany by using the Austrian case as an example of how neutrality could be applied to a united German state.

In closed forums Molotov and other Soviet officials still heatedly opposed the prospective withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Austria, and Molotov sought to derail the whole question of an Austrian treaty in early 1955 when the CPSU Presidium discussed it.[14] In the end, however, Khrushchev and his supporters were able to face down the hardliners, arguing that the removal of U.S., British, and French troops from Austria would more than compensate for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Khrushchev alleged that Molotov's "insistence on keeping our troops in Austria" must stem from "a desire to start a war".[15] Having overcome the main domestic obstacles, the Soviet authorities pursued bilateral talks with the Austrian government in March and April 1955, ironing out what neutrality would mean. Those bilateral talks were soon followed by a four-power conference and the formal signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May 1955.[16] The settlement marked a triumph for Khrushchev personally as well as for Soviet foreign policy.

Moreover, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955, the day before the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, forestalled any concerns that Khrushchev's domestic opponents might have raised about the implications of the Soviet troop pullout from Austria.[17] Until May 1955, the ostensible justification for Soviet military deployments in both Hungary and Romania had been that they were needed to preserve logistical and communications links with Soviet forces in Austria. The creation of the Warsaw Pact provided a rationale for maintaining the deployments in Hungary and Romania even after all Soviet troops were gone from Austria. The signing of the Pact was intended mainly as a symbolic counter to the

admission of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but the legitimacy it conferred on the Soviet troop presence was part of a larger Soviet effort to codify the basic political and military structures of Soviet-East European relations. Rather than simply preserving the mechanisms devised by Stalin, who had relied disproportionately on terror and coercion, Khrushchev sought a less domineering approach that, he hoped, would permit greater domestic "viability" in Eastern Europe.

Despite the successful overtures to Yugoslavia, the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, and the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev's policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole remained erratic. The Soviet Union's vacillations between reform and retrenchment both at home and abroad, far from promoting either the "viability" or "cohesion" of the Eastern bloc, directly contributed to instability in the region, especially in Hungary and Poland. By early 1956, sociopolitical pressures in Eastern Europe had reached a dangerous point, and they increased still further as a result of the unintended spillover from Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress. Although the speech was geared overwhelmingly toward developments within the Soviet Union, it could not help but undercut the position of many East European leaders who had adhered rigidly to Stalinist principles, as Mátyás Rákosi and Bolesław Bierut had done in Hungary and Poland.[18] (Rákosi was ousted for good in July 1956 and had to take permanent refuge in the Soviet Union, and Bierut might have met the same fate had he not suddenly died in March 1956, apparently of heart failure and pneumonia.) Khrushchev's speech also emboldened dissenters and critics of the East European regimes, leading to open hints of unrest in Communist ranks. The widespread popularity of one of the victims of the Stalin-era purges in Poland, Władysław Gomułka, and the continued influence of the erstwhile prime minister in Hungary, Imre Nagy, merely heightened the instability. Political unrest thus became intertwined with the economic discontent that had followed the re-imposition of harsh economic policies.

When the unrest turned violent in the Polish city of Poznań in late June 1956, it ushered in a four-month period of growing turmoil. The Polish army and security forces managed to crush the uprising in Poznań, but the two days of fighting left at least 73 people dead and more than 700 seriously wounded.[19] The clashes also caused tens of millions of złotys' worth of damage to buildings, transportation systems, and other state property. At least thirty of the Polish army's tanks, ten of its armored personnel carriers, and dozens of its military trucks were destroyed or rendered unusable during the operation – an indication of how intense the fighting was. It is now known that a few Polish officers tried to resist the decision to open fire, but their opposition proved futile because the security forces were willing to

carry out the orders and because Soviet commanders (and their Polish allies) still dominated the Polish military establishment.[20]

The lessons that Soviet leaders drew from the Poznañ crisis were decidedly mixed. At a CPSU Presidium meeting on 12 July 1956, Khrushchev claimed that the rebellion had been instigated by the "subversive activities of the imperialists, [who] want to foment disunity and destroy [the socialist countries] one by one".[21] On the other hand, the notes from the meeting show that Khrushchev and his colleagues were well aware of the explosive situation that was developing in both Hungary and Poland. The CPSU Presidium dispatched a senior Presidium member, Anastas Mikoyan, to Budapest on 13 July for a first-hand assessment of the growing political ferment in Hungary. Soon after arriving in Hungary, Mikoyan, who was one of Khrushchev's closest aides, oversaw the removal of Rákosi and his replacement by Ernő Gerő, who Soviet leaders hoped would be better able to defuse the mounting discontent.[22]

Khrushchev and his colleagues also sent a group of high-ranking Soviet officers to Hungary to inspect Soviet forces based there (the so-called Special Corps).[23] The officers, led by General Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, discovered that the command staff of the Special Corps had not yet worked out a secret plan to prepare for large-scale internal disturbances in Hungary. (In the wake of the 1953 East German uprising, the commanders of all Soviet forces in Eastern Europe had been ordered by the CPSU leadership to devise appropriate plans for anti-riot and counterinsurgency operations.) When this omission was reported to Soviet defense minister Marshal Georgii Zhukov, he ordered that the requisite documents be compiled immediately. The visiting Soviet generals helped the commander of Soviet forces in Hungary, General Lashchenko, put together a "Plan of Operations for the Special Corps to Restore Public Order on the Territory of Hungary", which was signed on 20 July.[24] This plan, codenamed *Volna* (Wave), envisaged the use of tens of thousands of Soviet troops at very short notice (within three to six hours) to "uphold and restore public order" in Hungary. The plan required a special signal (known as *Kompas*) to be put into effect, but the formulation of *Volna* at this stage indicates that Soviet leaders wanted a reliable fall-back option in case their attempts to bolster political stability in Hungary did not pan out.

Despite these precautions and the growing recognition in Moscow of the unstable situation in Eastern Europe, Soviet policy in the region remained hesitant and uncertain over the next few months, in part because Khrushchev was still under pressure at home from hardliners in the CPSU, who had forged close links with old-line Stalinist leaders in Eastern Europe. Fluctuations in Soviet domestic politics thus continued to roil intra-bloc ties. This internal-external dynamic helped to precipitate the crises that erupted in Poland and Hungary in October 1956 – crises that are discussed at length elsewhere in this special issue.

Notes

[1] For more on this unrest, see Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-external Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 1)", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1999): 3–55.

[2] These directives were recounted by Vitalii Chernyavskii, who served as the Soviet intelligence station chief in Bucharest in June 1953, in a lengthy interview in 2005. See Leonid Mlechin, "Moi pervyi nachal'nik podpolkovnik Chernyavskii", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie* (Moscow), No. 26 (15 July 2005): 7.

[3] On the general course of the Soviet leadership struggle, see William C. Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 256–269.

[4] See Yurii Aksyutin, "Pyatyi prem'er, ili Pochemu Malenkov ne uderzhal bremya vlasti", *Rodina* (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1994): 81–88.

[5] "Zapis' besedy tovarishcha Khrushcheva N. S. s Predsedatelem TsK KPK Mao Tsze-Dunom, zamestitelyami Predsedatelya TsK KPS Lyu Shao-tsi, Chzou En'-Laem, Czhu De, Lin' Byao, chlenami Politbyuro TsK KPK Pyn Czhenem, Chen' I i chlenom Sekretariata Van Tszya-syanom 2 oktyabrya 1959 goda", Osobaya papka (Strictly Secret/Special Dossier), 2 October 1959, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), Moscow, Fond (F.) 45, Opis' (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 331, Listy (Ll.) 12–13.

[6] "Zayavlenie tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva na aerodrome v Belgrade", *Pravda* (Moscow), 27 May 1955, 1.

[7] "Deklaratsiya Pravitel'stv Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Federativnoi Narodnoi Respubliki Yugoslavii", *Pravda* (Moscow), 3 June 1955, 1–2.

[8] "Plenum TsK KPSS – XIX Sozyv, 4–12 iyulya 1955 g." 4–12 July 1955 (Strictly Secret), in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), F. 2, Op. 1, Dd. 139–180.

[9] The text of the speech appeared promptly in the West but was not published in the Soviet Union until 1989. See "O kul'te lichnosti i ego posledstviyakh: Doklad pervogo sekretarya TsK KPSS tov. Khrushcheva N. S. XX S'ezdu Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza", *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil* (Moscow), No. 11 (June 1989): 63–92.

[10] "Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o prekrashchenii deyatel'nosti Informatsionnogo Byuro kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii", *Pravda* (Moscow), 18 April 1956, 3.

[11] "Pust' zhivet i protsvetaet bratskaya sovetsko-yugoslavskaya druzhba!" *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 June 1956, 1.

[12] For an analysis of this issue, see Michael Gehler, "From Non-alignment to Neutrality: Austria's Transformation during the First East-West Détente", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 2005): 104–136.

[13] See, for example, the large volume of documents on this matter in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. 06, Op. 14, Papka (Pap.) 9, Dd. 107 and 116.

[14] "Plenum TsK KPSS – XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma trinadtsatogo zasedaniya 11 iyulya 1955 g. (vechernogo)", 11 July 1955 (Strictly Secret), in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 175, L. 178. See also A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), 95.

[15] "Plenum TsK KPSS – XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma trinadtsatogo zasedaniya 11 iyulya 1955 g. (vechernogo)", L. 178.

[16] For an analysis of Soviet policy in the lead-up to the treaty (though focusing predominantly on the Stalin period), based in part on declassified Soviet documentation, see Wolfgang Mueller, *Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945–1955 und ihre politische Mission* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005). See also the valuable collection of declassified Soviet documents pertaining to Soviet policy vis-à-vis Austria from 1945 to 1955, edited by Wolfgang Mueller et al.,

Sowjetische Politik in Österreich 1945–1955: Dokumente aus russischen Archiven (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005). Unfortunately, the relatively small number of documents in this book from the post-Stalin era shed almost no light on Soviet policymaking and high-level debates. A forthcoming essay on this topic by Aleksei Filitov, "The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Austrian State Treaty", to be published in Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller, eds., *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2006), is intriguing and insightful, but a good deal of murkiness remains. For a definitive history of the Austrian State Treaty, along with documentation and an extensive bibliography, see Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945–1955*, 4th ed. (Vienna: Böhlau, 1999).

[17] "Podpisanie dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi pomoshchi", *Pravda* (Moscow), 15 May 1955, p. 1, and the text of the treaty on p. 2.

[18] For the effects on Rákosi's position, see "Shifrtelegramma", from Yu. V. Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Hungary, to the CPSU Presidium, 29 April 1956 (Strictly Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 1. For the effects in Poland, see the two reports from P. Turpit'ko, counselor at the Soviet embassy in Poland, in AVPRF, F. Referentura po Pol'she, Op. 38, Por. 42, Pa. No. 127, D. 178, Ll. 1–11 and 12–24.

[19] Some estimates of the death toll range as high as 120. The most reliable and detailed discussion of the varying estimates is in Edmund Makowski, *Poznański Czerwiec 1956: Pierwszy bunt społeczeństwa w PRL* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2001), pp. 165–171. Estimates of the number of wounded and of the extent of material damage also vary considerably. See ibid., 171–174.

[20] See the analysis and valuable collection of declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, *Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w Czerwca 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992), 72–74, 111–120.

[21] "Rabochaya zapis' Zasedaniya ot 9-ogo i 12-ogo iyulya 1956 g.", in RGANI, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 2-2ob.

[22] See Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1998).

[23] Lieutenant-General E. I. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta (Part 1)", *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 10 (October 1993), pp. 23–24. Malashenko, who in 1956 was a colonel, was the commander of the Special Corps.

[24] "Plan deistvii Osobogo korpusa po vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poryadka na territorii Vengrii", 20 July 1956 (Strictly Secret), as recorded in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130–131.

HUNGARY IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE 1945–1956

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This paper will analyze Hungary's political, military and economic role in the So-
viet Empire and the implications of this for the Soviet Union's response to the 1956
revolution and war of independence. The paper will review Soviet politics within
the imperial-ideological paradigm and will argue that Hungary served as a Marx-
ist-Leninist client state that fits the description given by Edward Luttwak with the
exception that economics played a hitherto unappreciated, crucial role in Soviet ex-
pansion. Ideology shaped in the Kremlin's perception of the Hungarian scene as
well as world politics.

Keywords: Hungary, Soviet Union, expansionism, ideology, empire

This paper will not attempt to provide a systematic narrative of Soviet-Hungar-
ian relations. Instead we shall attempt to provide a framework of analysis in which
to discuss it. Therefore our treatment of the topic will discuss a historical problem
with the methods and the vocabulary of political science. To some extent at least,
it is hoped that this approach will help remedy the problem arising from perspec-
tives, namely, that a great power, in our case Russian view of Soviet role in East-
ern Europe,[1] may differ significantly from the way a small power like Hungary
may tell the same story. Not to mention the fact that – absurd as it was – the USSR
was the victim of Hungarian aggression in 1941 while Hungary suffered the same
from the Soviet part in 1945. Needless to say, the aggressor-victim role introduces
further elements of divergence.[2] This is not to mention ideologically motivated
explanations, which ascribed a messianic role to the Soviet Union's postwar poli-
cies. Hopefully then, the methods and language of international relations theory
will help overcome at least some of these difficulties.

Two inextricably linked questions are to be answered: why was Hungary
Sovietized and what was its position and function within the Soviet empire? An-
swering these basic questions will address the relationship between ideological
and imperial aspects of Soviet conduct.[3] Such discussion cannot escape dealing
with the various forms of power as it is exercised in interstate relations. With Ger-

many's collapse the states of Soviet occupied Eastern Europe had no choice but to align themselves with the Soviet Union, the region's most threatening and only military great power. International relations theory actually predicts that weak states tend to bandwagon when allies are not available.[4] It is easy to demonstrate that virtually all responsible Hungarian politicians and political movements wished to pursue a pro-Soviet political line as evidenced by the discussion on the Soviet-Hungarian economic treaty of 1945. The only question was whether this should be an all out pro-Soviet line, or whether friendly terms should be maintained with the Western world as well. Even the historian Gyula Szekfű in his capacity as Hungarian minister in Moscow advocated a unilateral Soviet line. The question we shall attempt to answer is why this fell short of Soviet expectations.

Recently scholars have pointed out that Stalin regarded conquered territories as war trophies. Stalin thought that each victor's share should be proportionate to the number of soldiers "spent" and enemy killed in the war.[5] On the fiftieth anniversary of victory day the side of GUM overlooking the Red Square a gigantic image of Marshall Zhukov, the victor of Berlin was displayed. Clad in Marshall's uniform Zhukov was depicted riding a white horse.[6] In fact the Red Army "spent" 44 thousand Soviets (plus 26 thousand Romanians) and killed 48 thousand enemy troops in the fighting in and around Budapest alone,[7] meaning that Red Army losses exceeded 10 percent of the total US losses in World War II. Recent scholarship has shown that the Hungarian occupation units committed massive atrocities against the civilian population in Ukraine.[8] Hungary was a country to be conquered, not liberated. The Soviet position was clearly formulated by Vladimir Dekanozov the deputy director of the State Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad, the former minister of foreign affairs, Beria's close associate, who explained Hungary's economic subjugation along the following lines: "the victorious country demands to assert its rights for the reason that the vanquished country started war against it."[9]

That Hungary was a closed zone in the 1950s, with human, commodity and other types of exchange reduced to a bare minimum towards the Western world should come as no surprise to anyone even vaguely familiar with the history of the Soviet bloc. But the fact that this was so right from the outset has not been adequately noted. As Chairman of the Allied Control Commission Kliment Voroshilov put it: "This is our zone of occupation and we are going to ask information on every person that comes in."[10] Indeed for foreign travel the same rules were applied in Hungary as in the Soviet Union itself. Soviet authorities determined access to Hungary and granted exit visas for Hungarian officials that wished to travel abroad. Even the allied members of the ACC needed Soviet clearance to enter, which on quite a few occasions they did not get. Airspace was (and remained) under Soviet military control. When prime minister Ferenc Nagy sought landing rights for US civilian airlines on behalf of the Truman administra-

tion, the Soviet diplomatic representative, Georgii Pushkin, who regarded the American request as a question of military bases, asserted that "it would be easier for the US to get landing rights in the USSR itself."[11] In fact Hungarian airspace remained under the control of the Soviet military authorities seated in Wiesbaden even after the peace treaty came into effect.

The armistice agreement signed with Hungary on January 20, 1945 provided the Soviet armed forces freedom of maneuvering on Hungarian territory without any measure of Hungarian oversight and this provision was never lifted in the period under examination. In fact this state of affairs was reaffirmed by the bilateral military treaties signed in 1948. That is, Hungary became part of the Soviet military space. Moreover as a result of Moscow's unilateral decision the Hungarian budget financed the whole of the Soviet occupation costs, including transportation, industrial supplies, food and pay. This came to 511 million forints (50 million dollars) in 14 months from 1946,[12] meaning that Soviet occupation cost at least 150 million, almost the same amount as the official reparations to the USSR.

From 1945 onwards Hungary was both the Soviet Union's military and economic space. As a result of the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 the Soviet Union established an economic empire in occupied territories, meaning that it seized allegedly German owned, in reality property of all kinds of ownership in key branches of the economy and transferred them under the State Directorate of Soviet Property abroad. In Hungary alone 400 companies came fully or partly under Soviet ownership. These were taken out of the jurisdiction of local authorities and were exempted from local dues and taxes. In Hungary Soviet or Soviet-Hungarian joint companies established in 1946 controlled much of the mining, machine and heavy industries, Danube shipping and air traffic. Most importantly perhaps for the Soviets, they controlled the strategic aluminum and bauxite industry. In fact Moscow controlled all natural resources in occupied territories it wished to acquire without legal or political constraint. This and other means of economic penetration such as foreign trade furthered political expansion as well. This fits well into theoretical constructs of economic imperialism. The structural realist Kenneth Waltz's definition is an apt description of the Hungarian scene: "states use economic means for military and political ends and political means for economic ends." For Waltz then economic imperialism is both means and an end.[13] In fact states like Germany in the 1930s used economic penetration to create virtual colonies or economic satellites.[14] Special mention needs to be made of reparations, which together with other payments such as the maintenance of the Soviet army destroyed Hungary's prewar economic structure by generating the worst hyperinflation in history. Reparations, inflated by the arbitrary nature of Soviet pricing of commodities took up 29–32 percent of the national income between 1945 and 1947. In 1947 reparations consumed 18 percent of the national income, but all international obligations, the vast majority of which went to the USSR, the same

figure is 42 percent. In a matter of only three years Hungary serviced its full repa-
rations to the USSR, although the armistice envisioned six years in January 1945,
and even this figure was considered to be the absolute limit of the Hungarian
economy. If one looks at the financial indicators of 1945 and 1946, there is no
doubt about the causal relationship between reparation shipments and hyperinfla-
tion.[15] It is interesting to note that the second largest hyperinflation in history, the
German one of 1923 was caused by reparation payments as well, and coincided
with the French occupation of the Ruhr region. The problem was not the fact that
reparations were being paid, but by their unbridled nature, which exceeded the
economy's capacity to pay. Shortly after the stabilization of the forint inflation got
under way again – we don't read about it in the textbooks because this state of af-
fairs was top secret – and as an emergency measure the Hungarian gold reserve
held in Switzerland was used to curb another runaway price hike.[16]

Historians still debate whether Stalin intended the Sovietization of Eastern Eu-
rope, when he made the decision or whether it was a result of external influence.
We may never know the definitive answer, or an answer possibly does not even
exist. Similar debates are pursued around the origins of other momentous events.
In the literature of the Holocaust for instance scholars still argue whether Hitler in-
tended the destruction of Jews from the very outset, and if not, when exactly the
Nazi leadership opted for the genocidal solution.[17] Over half a century after the
events there is still no consensus on this basic score. Moscow regarded Eastern
Europe as a buffer shielding it form imperialist expansion. As the Novikov tele-
gram of 1946 put it, the Soviet Union's influence in the countries of South Eastern
Europe was an "obstacle in the path of the expansionist policy of the United
States".[18] Initial communist moderation in Hungary was a tactical measure as both
Révai and Rákosi readily admitted. In his memoirs Rákosi claimed that "even at
the party Congress we talked about the socialist nature of people's democracy in
generalities ... this ... was not because we ourselves were unclear which way we
were heading ... but because tactically this was correct at the time. We agreed to
avoid the term dictatorship of the proletariat, which would have made it only
harder for us domestically and internationally ... But for the politically literate
what we said at the Congress was enough."[19] Having met Stalin in April, in his se-
cret speech of May 1946 Rákosi announced the construction of a proletarian dic-
tatorship irrespectively of the domestic or international conditions. "Whenever a
country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat or for social-
ism this will be carried out."[20] The statement that there was a causal relationship
between the Marshall Plan and Sovietization cannot be substantiated with docu-
mentary evidence. It is also illogical in the sense of arguing post hoc ergo propter
hoc and goes against counterfactual arguing – foreign aid seldom triggers political
expansion. By the time it was announced the USSR was in absolute control of
Eastern Europe politically, economically and militarily. The existence of a coali-

tion government explains very little since its scope of authority was so severely impaired that it had virtually no control on formulating policy. Moscow exercised external authority, and changed the makeup of the Hungarian government at will – a case in point was Molotov's intervention into the coalition arrangement as a result of which the Ministry of the Interior was given to the Communist Party. Soviet authorities also exercised police functions in Hungary and arrested the general secretary of the Smallholder Party in February 1947.

If, in Geir Lundestad's definition the American empire in Western Europe was an "empire by invitation",[21] the Soviet Union's was undoubtedly an empire by coercion. Moscow enjoyed both power and influence having had the ability to exercise influence and the ability to prevent influence from being exercised over itself. But because its presence was uninvited, Moscow's power was limited to coercion and lacked a crucial component of power: the ability to attract.[22] Hungary's function in the Soviet empire can be described within the paradigm offered by Edward Luttwak: "it was a Leninist client state which satisfied a growing hierarchy of Soviet imperial needs".[23]

It has long been speculated that Eastern Europe served the Soviet Union's security. The Hungarian budget covered most, if not all occupation costs and provided unrestricted use of Hungarian territory for the Soviet military. The USSR paid an annual fee of less than two hundred dollars for all the Hungarian military installations used by the occupation army. The Hungarian army adopted the Soviet military doctrine and threat perception, thereby extending the Soviet defensive perimeter to Hungary (the Hungarian authorities were not even informed of the size of the Soviet army stationed there); contributed financially to Soviet military build-up: in 1951 at Stalin's instruction the plans for heavy industrialization were raised three fold in preparation for war; the size of the Hungarian army reached 240 000, the largest standing peacetime army in its history, a cost born by the domestic budget. Thus super industrialization can be explained only in part with ideological considerations, but perhaps more powerfully with the military and foreign policy needs of the hegemonic power.[24]

Military services were intertwined with economic ones – maintenance of oversized armed forces plus the Soviet military (e.g., construction costs of airfields, facilities for occupation forces removed from Austria in 1955), war preparation, militarization of the economy; forced investments, such as the construction of an aluminum-oxide plant at Almásfüzitő in 1949–1950, where two-thirds of the 235 million forint construction cost was to be shouldered by the Hungarian budget. The investment was undertaken because the USSR signed a bauxite agreement with Yugoslavia.[25] Similarly, the expansion of the aluminum oxide plant of Ajka was undertaken under Soviet instruction, where 63 per cent of the 600 million forint construction cost plus the construction of a 30 km railroad line leading to it was financed by the Hungarian treasury.[26]

There was also a considerable transfer of wealth: reparations (the very lowest figure can be estimated at 385 million dollars), other payments, such as Hungarian debts to Germany (over 45 million), share transfer, 1949 (15 million), compensation for damage to German property (up to 180 million), sale of Soviet companies in 1952 (165 million in commodities and cca. 110 million in investment); sale of mixed companies in 1954 (cca. 150 million, the rest of that payment was cancelled), war trophies (whole industrial plants, inventories, food, livestock, grain, art treasures, etc. – the value of this is impossible to quantify, Tungsram alone was worth $12 million). Industrial removals involved the flagships of industry: Tungsram, Hofherr and Schrantz, Felten and Guillaume, Goldberger, Ganz, Weiss Manfred, MOM. 1200 tons of Neményi paper work machinery as packed up by 350 people. Moscow also benefited from preferential trade agreements; the transfer of dividends and profits made by the Soviet companies (in 1950 alone 138 million forints worth of commodities were taken to the USSR under this heading, including 25.8 million tons of bauxite); forced labor (the value of which cannot be quantified), maintenance of the Soviet army (cca. 150 million up to 1948 alone). Moscow continued to enjoy unlimited access to Hungarian natural resources even after 1954: the Soviet imposed uranium agreement of 1955 provided full access: sole purchaser under production costs – while Hungary paid for the bulk of the required investments, the amount being 380 million forints in the first year alone. Thus the USSR, if we include military costs took approximately 1.3 billion dollars up to 1956 excluding the many items which cannot be quantified. This roughly equals the Austrian figure, which in turn was compensated by US aid. The Hungarian figures show that the estimate of 22 billion dollars of Soviet compensation from occupied territories will probably have to be modified significantly upward.

Bilateral trade relations became a source of coercive power. In 1953 the USSR accounted for 34 percent of Hungarian foreign trade and then declined somewhat to 22 per cent in 1955. The Hungarian economy was so reliant on Soviet commodities to keep its economy going and on the Soviet market to be able to pay for its imports that this in itself provided a leverage of political control. Foreign trade becomes a source of power if other countries become economically dependent on the dominant state and thus provide it with an instrument of coercion. The power to interrupt and redefine commercial relations with any country helps provide the power position the dominant state acquires over other countries. This ability is achieved through the creation of exclusive complementarity.[27] This effect became apparent in 1955 when the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade refused to accept the list of goods Hungary desired to sell to and purchase from, the Soviet Union. The situation was so threatening to Hungarian economy that after an unsuccessful mission to Moscow by minister of foreign trade László Háy, Rákosi took the matter up himself but was able to achieve only a modification of the Soviet list of commodities.[28]

During the 1950s Hungary arguably was not a sovereign state. Hedley Bull described the relationship between the USSR and its satellites as hegemonic in the descending hierarchy of dominance, hegemony and primacy. But considering that the Kremlin changed the Hungarian leadership in 1953 without having to resort to violence and used it to extract a variety of imperial services, this relationship may have constituted a stronger form of mastery, a most flagrant "exploitation of preponderance, dominance".[29] Stephen Krasner articulated the Westphalian definition of sovereignty as an "institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external factors from domestic structures", which is violated either by voluntary or coercive action, that is intervention and invitation.[30] Based on these criteria Hungary's sovereignty was violated because it was subjected to external sources of authority. Similarly, according to Kenneth Waltz "to say that a nation is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its external and internal problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom of action by making commitments to them". That is to say sovereignty is violated by coercion. While Waltz appreciates that there could be normally constraints on nations' freedom of action, he does not regard a nation as sovereign unless it surrendered its freedom of action voluntarily.[31] Although Hungary's communist leaders sought Soviet political and even military intervention of their own accord, it is questionable that in this instance "voluntary" had any significance since the Hungarian leadership owed its very existence to the Soviet Union in the first place.

The importance of voluntary obedience to the USSR, stemming from the identification of Hungarian interest with the world communist movement and its leader, the USSR cannot be overestimated from the perspective of Soviet dominance. Hungarian leaders such as Nagy and Rákosi sought consultations to settle domestic disputes. When the danger of Soviet troop withdrawal resulting from the Austrian state treaty came up, the Political Committee resolved to petition the Soviets to stay. Hungarian leaders actually requested Soviet advisors they were not always imposed from Moscow. Occasionally the Soviets failed to send their advisors on time and the Hungarians had to urge them to do so.[32] Soviet participation in domestic affairs was hence needed only at critical junctures. Thus for example Anastas Mikoyan participated in the decision making process on Rákosi's removal in the summer of 1956, or appointment of Imre Nagy at the consultations in Moscow in June 1953. On some economic matters the Hungarian leadership did occasionally challenge the Soviets. In 1949 for instance Hungary rejected a Soviet proposal for the bilateral coordination of planning and prices. In 1954 a significant dispute emerged over the price Hungary was to pay the Soviet Union for the joint companies.

Soviet presence was in part of a traditional, imperial in nature in an effort to maximize political, economic and military power. Bolshevik regimes may have been introduced for the unhindered satisfaction of these needs, rather than, or beside ideological proselytism. Military occupation coupled with the ideologically motivated loyalty and voluntary obedience of the Hungarian leadership were the key factors in the maintenance of Soviet rule. Practice and ideology sustained each other. It seems that as many times before mundane imperial purposes were disguised under the mantle of ideological salvation, which is not to deny the messianic pretenses of powers like the Ottoman Empire, the United States or Soviet Russia. Moscow paid little attention to the projection of soft power, i.e., the internalization of its ideology or the dissemination of its culture. Cultural exchanges were kept on a minimum. Indeed, Soviet participants of cultural exchange programs sometimes did not show up in Hungary because they did not receive their exit permits in time. Poorly trained Hungarian cadres instructed Marxism-Leninism. The ubiquitous nature of Communist symbols underlined the weakness of the official ideology.

Eastern Europe was never integrated into the USSR. As far as we can tell this prospect was never seriously considered. But even from the Soviet perspective such a move would have been counterproductive. Hence Moscow got the best of all worlds: obedient sources economic and military power for a minimal outlay of economic and political capital.

These structural aspects of Soviet policies may explain not only why Eastern Europe was Bolshevized in the first place, but also the reason for surrendering it in 1989/1990. By then Eastern Europe was a political, economic and military liability – no longer an asset. Although I attempted to provide a framework of interpretation, lacking crucial Soviet sources much cannot be understood. But it seems from the evidence above that in 1956 even slight modifications in the status of bloc countries within the Soviet international system were barely conceivable. This gives meaning to Khrushchev's statement to Tito in 1956 that the USSR would go to any lengths to keep Hungary.

Notes

[1]   The best known Russian account was published in English and I read it as a subtle attempt to restore the prestige of the Soviet Union which was out only to maximize its defense. Vladislav Zubok–Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War – From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

[2]   The classic exposition of the divergent victim-aggressor account of expansionism can be found in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian war.

[3]   In his seminal explanation of Soviet foreign policy George F. Kennan failed to clarify the *relationship* between ideology and power. On a recent discussion of ideology and power in Soviet

foreign policy see Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstrech. Germany in Soviet Foreign Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998).

[4]   When the offensive power permits rapid conquest, vulnerable states may see little hope in resisting, and bandwagon because balancing alliances are not viable; the more aggressive a state's perceived intention is, the less likely others will align against it. Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 25–34.

[5]   Ralph B. Levering, Vladimir O. Pechatnov, Verena Botzenhart-Viehe, Earl C. Edmodson, *Debating the Origins of the Cold War. American and Russian Perspectives* (Lanham, Boulder, Oxford, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002, pp. 92–93).

[6]   Interestingly a similar image exists of Hitler except that the Fuehrer is shown in a knight's armor.

[7]   For the figures, which include operations Konrad I-III designed to relieve Budapest, see Krisztián Ungváry, *The Siege of Budapest – 100 Days in World War II* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), appendix.

[8]   Truman O. Anderson, "A Hungarian Vernichtungskrieg? Hungarian Troops and the Soviet Partisan War in Ukraine, 1942" *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* Vol. 58 (1999) Heft 2; Krisztián Ungváry, *Magyarország a második világháborúban* (Budapest: Osiris, 2005).

[9]   A Magyar–szovjet gazdasági bizottság második, moszkvai ülésszaka. Az Állandó Bizottság második ülése, 11 April 1949. Magyar Országos Levéltár, Küm, Szu tük, XIX-J-1-j, IV-510, 26. doboz, sz. n.

[10] Minutes of a normal Meeting of the ACC, 6 September 1945. In Cseh, Gergő Bendegúz ed.: *Documents of the Meetings of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary* (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor-kutató Bizottság, 2000), p. 78.

[11] Questions Pertaining to the Economic Situation in Hungary. Congressional Hearing of Ferenc Nagy, 1947. Szegedy-Maszák Collection, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár Kézirattár.

[12] See Borhi, László, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban – Az Egyesült Államok és a Szovjetunió között* (Budapest: Corvina, 2005), pp. 152–153.

[13] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Random House, 1979), p. 94. Hans Morgenthau in his classic work listed economic imperialism as a tool and rarely as an end for conquest, stating that the common characteristics of economic imperialism are "on one hand to overthrow the status quo by changing the power relations between the imperialist nation and the other, and on the other hand not to do so through the conquest of territory, but by the way of economic control." Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson) (New York: Knopf, 1985).

[14] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics – A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), 292 pp. See also Ránki György, *Mozgásterek, kényszerpályák – válogatott tanulmányok* (Budapest: Magvető, 1983).

[15] For the full argument see Borhi, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban,* pp. 154–159. The passage also contains the appropriate archival references.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] For a good presentation of these arguments on the basis of archival evidence see Mark Roseman, *The Wannsee Conference and the Final Solution* (New York: Picador, 2003). The book shows that with all the tremendous array of archival evidence available we cannot establish the decisive point when Germany opted for the genocidal final solution.

[18] The Novikov telegram, Washington, September 27 1946. *Diplomatic History,* no. 3, 1996 (Summer).

[19] Rákosi, Mátyás, *Visszaemlékezések 1940–1956.* Vol. 1, edited by István Feitl et al. (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1997), p. 325.

[20] Rákosi beszámolója az MKP Politikai Bizottságának ülésén, 17 May 1946. Politikatörténeti Intézet Levéltára, 274. f., 2. cs., 34. őe.

[21] See Geir Lundestad, *The American "Empire" and Other Studies in U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1990).

[22] On such definition of power see Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers – The Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: The Free Press, London: Collier-MacMillan Limited, 1972), pp. 54–59.

[23] Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 177.

[24] In stark contrast with the Soviet practice the US shouldered the costs of the military build-up if its allies. From 1950 to 1962 Western Europe received 15 billion dollars in military assistance directly from the United States. Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 71.

[25] See Borhi, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban,* pp. 182–183.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 235.

[27] Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1945).

[28] For details see Borhi, *Magyarország a hidegháborúban,* pp. 219–220; Urbán, Károly, *Sztálin halálától a forradalom kitöréséig. A magyar–szovjet kapcsolatok története* (Budapest, unpublished manuscript, 1995).

[29] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 213–217.

[30] Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty – Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 20.

[31] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* p. 96. On the other hand Martin Wight argued that a nation can be sovereign without full national independence. Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1946).

[32] Hence for example the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers resolved to send forty-five advisors to such ministries as Heavy Industry, Agriculture, etc. at the request of the Hungarian government. Postanovlenie Sovieta Ministrov SSSR, 30 April 1951. Galina P. Murashko, ed., *Vostochnaia Evropa v Dokumentakh Rossiskikh Arkhivov,* Vol. 2 (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Hronograf, 1998), pp. 296–297, document 96. In the same year Rákosi requested the sending of six experts to the oil industry. Pismo Rakosi Stalinu s informatsiei o merakh po ukrepleniiu armii i oboronosposobnosti Vengrii i s prosboi prislat spetsialistov po dobiche nefti, 31 October 1951. *Ibid.,* pp. 437–439, document 147. On the urging of the arrival of advisors already promised see Pismo Rakosi sekretariiu Ts. K. VKP(b) M. Suslovu s informatsiei o podgotovke k viboram, vengero-chekhoslovatskikh otnosheniakh i sotrudnichestve s SSSR po oboronnim voprosam, 13 April 1949. *Ibid.,* pp. 70–74, document 22.

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR MILITARY CONFRONTATION

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This paper will look at the East-West military balance in 1956 and at each side's (i.e., Moscow's and Washington's) understanding of the balance. It will look also at the way in which each side regarded the danger of nuclear war, and at how each side regarded the other's approach to nuclear war. Finally, the paper will address Moscow and Washington's views of the danger that the Hungarian revolution might escalate to general war, and at the communication between the two sides on that score during the revolution.

Keywords: Hungarian revolution, Cold War, nuclear weapons, general war, communication

Introduction

The United States and its NATO allies took no military action in 1956 to help the Hungarian revolution. Many participants in the revolution felt betrayed by this lack of help, especially because the Eisenhower Administration had espoused the language of liberation for the countries of Eastern Europe. Not only did the United States not attempt to provide military support to the revolution; President Eisenhower and his top advisors did not even think of providing such support. They did not ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the question of employing military force to aid the revolution.[1] The Soviet leaders, for their part, did not expect the West to intervene with military force. The Soviet leaders mentioned the possibility of a wider war only to dismiss it, according to the notes we now have of their deliberations in the Central Committee Presidium.

Eisenhower in his memoirs recalls that the Soviet military operation in Hungary "almost automatically had posed to us the question of employing force to oppose this barbaric invasion", but geographical and political factors made a military response impracticable. Hungary was a landlocked state that could be reached only by crossing the territory of neutral Austria, Titoist Yugoslavia, or communist Czechoslovakia. Britain and France could not have joined in such an operation,

because they were preoccupied with the Suez crisis, and it would have been un-
thinkable to use Italian or West German forces. "I still wonder", Eisenhower
wrote,

> what would have been my recommendation to the Congress and the
> American people had Hungary been accessible by sea or through the
> territory of allies who might have agreed to react positively to the
> tragic fate of the Hungarian people ... Sending United States troops
> alone into Hungary through hostile or neutral territory would have
> involved us in general war.[2]

Khrushchev's son, Sergei Khrushchev, recalls that on November 4, 1956 he
asked his father why the Americans had not intervened with military force in Hun-
gary. Khrushchev's reply was:

> Everything happened so quickly that possibly they simply did not
> have time to do so. The Americans cannot, of course, be taken at their
> word, they respect only force, but unofficially they told us that they
> would not interfere in Hungarian affairs with their armed forces or
> with direct deliveries of arms. They consider Hungary to be in our
> sphere of interests.[3]

The absence of any serious discussion of Western military intervention in ei-
ther Washington or Moscow is an important aspect of the Hungarian revolution.
In this paper we explore the military-political context of the revolution and how it
may have shaped the responses of both the Soviet Union and the United States to
the revolution.

The Military-Political Context

Significant changes were taking place in the East-West military balance in the
mid-1950s. First and foremost, a relationship of mutual deterrence was beginning
to emerge between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States had
lost its atomic monopoly in 1949. In 1956 it still enjoyed considerable numerical
superiority in nuclear weapons – about 4,600 to an estimated 400 for the Soviet
Union. (Besides, Britain had tested a fission bomb in 1952 and was acquiring a
nuclear arsenal of its own.) Nevertheless, the Soviet nuclear arsenal was growing,
and with it the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons against targets in the
United States and Western Europe.

The US capacity to strike the Soviet Union was much greater than the Soviet
ability to strike the United States. US Strategic Air Command had more and better
bombers than the Soviet Long Range Air Force. Besides, the United States had
bases in Europe, North Africa, and Asia from which bombers could take off on

bombing raids against the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union had no equivalent bases close to the United States. Nevertheless, by 1956 the Soviet Union did have a substantial force of medium bombers, which could strike targets in Europe, including US air bases, and in that year the Miasishchev M-4 intercontinental bomber entered service with the Long-Range Air Force.

The Eisenhower Administration took the view that Soviet capabilities were already sufficient to inflict considerable damage on the United States and its European allies. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", adopted on 7 January 1955 by the National Security Council, concluded: "Soviet air-atomic capabilities are rapidly increasing. Already the USSR has the capacity to inflict widespread devastion [sic] on major free world countries allied to the U.S. and serious damage to the U.S. itself."[4]

A second development of great importance took place in the mid-1950s, reinforcing the emergence of mutual deterrence. The United States and the Soviet Union tested thermonuclear weapons with explosive yields very much greater than those of the fission bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In November 1952 the United States tested (in the "Mike" shot) a device that showed it had mastered the design of a "superbomb" that could produce almost infinite explosive yields. In the spring of 1954 it conducted a series of tests in the South Pacific. One of those tests produced a yield of 15 megatons – more than 1,000 times greater than the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In November 1955 the Soviet Union tested a bomb that showed that it too had mastered the design of the superbomb. Each side could now inflict enormous damage on the other by dropping a small number of bombs.[5]

These tests shocked public opinion around the world. They also shook the political leaders of the three nuclear powers. After his election as president, Eisenhower received a report on the US Mike shot. He was troubled by the report and in his inaugural address declared: "science seems ready to confer upon us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life from this planet."[6] On March 9, 1954 Churchill wrote to Eisenhower after reading an account of that same Mike shot: "You can imagine what my thoughts are about London. I am told that several million people would certainly be obliterated by four or five of the latest H Bombs."[7] On March 12, 1954 the Soviet Premier, G. M. Malenkov, made a speech in which he said that "a new world war ... with modern weapons means the end of world civilization".[8] Khrushchev too had been briefed about nuclear weapons when he was appointed First Secretary of the CPSU in September 1953. "When I ... learned all the facts about nuclear power", he recalled some years later, "I couldn't sleep for several days. Then I became convinced that we could never possibly use these weapons, and when I realized that I was able to sleep again."[9]

The third important development followed from the first two: the emergence of "common knowledge" about the unacceptability of nuclear war. Eisenhower was

convinced that the Soviet leaders did not want war, because war would put at risk their hold on power, but the prospect of growing Soviet nuclear strength impelled him to make sure that the Soviet leaders understood just how destructive a nuclear war would be. At the Geneva Summit in July 1955 – the first since Potsdam – he made a special effort to impress upon them the terrible consequences of a nuclear war, pointing in particular to the danger of nuclear fallout. At dinner one evening he explained with great earnestness that the development of modern weapons was such that the country that used them "genuinely risked destroying itself". Because of the prevailing winds, he added, a major war would destroy the Northern Hemisphere.[10]

The Geneva Summit did not yield any major agreements, but Eisenhower returned to Washington believing, as he put it in a television broadcast, "there seems to be a growing realization by all that nuclear warfare, pursued to the ultimate, could be practically race suicide".[11] Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, drew very much the same conclusion: "Each country present learnt that no country attending wanted war and each understood why. The Russians realized, as we did, that this situation had been created by the deterrent power of thermo-nuclear weapons."[12] Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that he returned from Geneva "encouraged, realizing that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared them".[13] Khrushchev apparently saw Eisenhower's homily on nuclear war as evidence that the United States was as anxious as the Soviet Union to avoid such a war.

By the mid-1950s the political leaders of each of the nuclear states understood that nuclear war was unacceptable in some profound, if ill-defined, way. Each of them knew that the others understood this too, and each of them knew that each knew that the others understood it, and so on. The unacceptability of nuclear war had thus become "common knowledge" among those who had the authority to use nuclear weapons.[14] Khrushchev summed this up neatly in a conversation with Harold Stassen, Eisenhower's special assistant on disarmament, during his visit to London in April 1956. Stassen said to Khrushchev "it was evident, as President Eisenhower had pointed out, that a war would be very adverse to both systems, to both nations, and to a great portion of the world. Khrushchev said he agreed, that he knew that there was only a small percentage of madmen in both countries who think otherwise. Nearly everyone knew that war was unacceptable and that coexistence was elementary."[15]

The American and Soviet leaders converged upon this common knowledge from different points of departure. For Washington it meant accepting the loss of an atomic monopoly and recognizing that the Soviet Union could now inflict nuclear devastation on the United States. Eisenhower rejected the option of preventive war against the Soviet Union. In doing so, he was making the judgment that it would be possible for the United States to live with a Soviet Union that possessed

thermonuclear weapons. His basic national security document, NSC 162/2, adopted in October 1953, emphasized the need to be ready for rivalry "over the long pull".[16]

For Moscow the common knowledge about nuclear war meant that Washington recognized growing Soviet nuclear might. Khrushchev returned from Geneva in July 1955 "encouraged" because the United States and Britain now recognized the Soviet capacity to inflict devastation on the United States and its allies. He received new boost to his confidence in November, when the Soviet Union tested its first "superbomb", and in February 1956, when the R-5 missile, which had a range of 1,200 km, was flight-tested with a nuclear warhead.[17]

At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 Khrushchev rejected the Leninist thesis that war was inevitable as long as imperialism existed. In an obvious reference to nuclear weapons, he declared that "today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war and, if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans". "Either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history", he told the Congress, "There is no third way."[18] The Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence" was Khrushchev's counterpart to Eisenhower's idea of rivalry "over the long pull".

The changing strategic balance had important consequences for military relationships in Europe. In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the NATO had committed itself to a large buildup of ground and air forces to match what it saw as conventional superiority on the part of the Soviet Union and the East European states. Eisenhower decided that such a policy was not feasible in economic terms, and in 1953 he adopted a policy that placed a heavy reliance on nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet aggression wherever it might occur. In line with this policy, the NATO adopted MC 48 in December 1954; this was a new strategy that placed primary reliance on nuclear weapons and on combat forces in being. The aim of the strategy was to convince the Soviet Union that "in the event of aggression [it] will be subjected immediately to devastating counter-attack employing atomic weapons".[19] West Germany was admitted into the NATO in 1955 and had begun to organize the *Bundeswehr* helping to offset Soviet conventional superiority. Nevertheless, US and the NATO strategy continued to rely heavily on nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, which the United States had begun to deploy in Europe in the mid 1950s.

Eisenhower did not believe that war in Europe could be limited. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 1956 that "any war in which Russian troops were involved directly against United States forces or the United States" would be general war, and any Soviet attack would be met by launching SAC [Strategic Air Command] "as soon as he found out that Russian troops were on the move".[20] The aim of his national security doctrine was to use the threat of nuclear war to deter

aggression on a local scale. In other words, he aimed to deter the Soviet Union by threatening rapid escalation from local conventional war to general nuclear war in the event of a Soviet attack.

Similar, though less far-reaching, changes were taking place in Eastern Europe. Soviet military doctrine was adapting to the nuclear age. The Soviet Union had begun to train its forces for operations on the "nuclear battlefield". In September 1954 it conducted an exercise at Totskoe, in the province of Orenburg in the South Urals Military District, in which an atomic bomb was detonated. The 1955 Field Regulations of the Soviet Army assumed that nuclear weapons would be used on the battlefield as well as against strategic targets. Soviet military thinking now stressed the importance of surprise and envisaged the possible use of weapons of all kinds from the very beginning of a war.[21] The Warsaw Treaty was signed in May 1955, the same month as the Austrian State Treaty, but the Warsaw Treaty Organization had as yet no real substance as a military alliance. Soviet control over the armed forces of Eastern Europe was still bilateral, exercised through Soviet military "advisors".[22]

By 1956 the military balance in Europe had attained a certain kind of stability, but – notwithstanding the withdrawal of forces following the Austrian State Treaty the year before – that stability rested on a confrontation in which large numbers of Soviet and US forces, along with those of their allies, faced one another across the central front, equipped not only with conventional arms but with nuclear weapons too. Any military clash in Europe would run the risk of escalation to general war, which neither side wanted and each understood the other did not want, and each understood that the other understood it did not want it either.

There remained, however, the danger of war by miscalculation. NSC 5501 pointed out in January 1955 that, in the context of emerging mutual deterrence, the one remaining possible cause of general war (besides the highly unlikely possibility of a dramatic technological breakthrough by the Soviet Union) was the possibility of war by miscalculation: "war would remain a possibility, if only because of the element of miscalculation by either side or because of a technological break-through by the Soviets leading them to believe they could destroy the U.S. without effective retaliation".[23] The same document made the argument that the Soviet leaders would risk war only if the United States posed a fundamental threat to Soviet security: "they probably would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking military counter-action against Western actions considered to be an imminent threat to their security". It warned: "general war might occur as the climax of a series of actions and counter-actions which neither side originally intended to lead to that result".[24]

"Common knowledge" that nuclear war was unacceptable did not completely rule out the possibility of such a war. Other conventions, understandings, or rules of the game were needed if the two sides were not to stumble into war by accident

or miscalculation. That was particularly true of Central Europe where the two alliances confronted each other with huge forces equipped with nuclear weapons. The discussions in the National Security Council in 1955 and 1956 point to an appreciation by the Eisenhower Administration of two important "rules of the game:" neither side should try to pose an "imminent threat" to the other's security; and US and Soviet forces should not fight each other directly. To cross either of those barriers would be to run the risk of escalation to general war.

The Soviet Decision to Use Force

In 1956 Soviet forces in Hungary comprised two mechanized divisions and two air divisions (one fighter division and one bomber division) as well as air defense artillery, a bridging regiment, and logistics groups. This group of forces was known as the "Special Corps". Its mission was to cooperate with units of the Hungarian People's Army to cover the border with Austria and to secure the most important communications in case Soviet forces should need to advance from the territory of the Soviet Union.

In July 1956, shortly after the large protests in Poznań, the Special Corps was instructed to develop a plan of action for maintaining and restoring public order in Budapest. The Special Corps was subordinated to the Soviet Ministry of Defense through the General Staff, and Lieutenant-General P. Lashchenko was appointed commander. The plan was approved on July 20. It was given the codename "Volna" (wave) and was to be initiated with the codeword "Kompass".

At 11 p.m. on October 23 the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to move troops into Budapest, where they were to take control of key buildings and locations in the city and restore public order. A small number of troops was sent to the border with Austria. The Soviet forces began to move at midnight. At the same time one Soviet mechanized division deployed in Romania, and two divisions (one rifle and one mechanized) in the Carpathian Military District of the Soviet Union, began to move to the Hungarian border; these forces crossed into Hungary on the 24th. Fighter and bomber divisions were made combat ready, as well as an anti-air division from the Carpathian Military District. The total number of troops involved in the operation was 31,550, with about 6,000 entering Budapest.[25]

There is no mention of the possibility of military intervention by the Western powers in any of the discussions among Soviet leaders – in the Central Committee Presidium meeting on the evening of October 23, in the situation report from Budapest by A. I. Mikoian and M. A. Suslov on October 24, or in the meeting on October 24 in which Khrushchev informed East European leaders about the situation in Poland and Hungary.[26] The Soviet leaders clearly regarded the revolution in

Hungary as an internal affair of the socialist camp, and they evidently believed that that was how Western leaders regarded it too. One interesting aspect of the Soviet deployment is that the number of troops sent to border with Austria was too small to seal the border. Opening of the border had begun in the spring of 1956, and it was this that made it possible for 190,000 people to flee to the West when the Revolution failed.[27]

Operation "Volna" proved to be counterproductive. Opposition to the Hungarian government increased. On October 24 Ernő Gerő, first secretary of the Hungarian Party, told the Soviet leaders by telephone that the "arrival of Soviet troops into the city has had a negative effect on the mood of the residents".[28] The situation grew worse, with hundreds of Hungarians and Soviet soldiers killed in the fighting. Splits emerged in the Soviet leadership, which was uncertain how to act. The tensions were especially apparent in the Central Committee Presidium discussion on October 28.[29] Two days later, on October 30, Khrushchev noted at the conclusion of the Presidium meeting that there were two courses of action: "the military – the path of occupation; the peaceful – withdrawal of forces, negotiations".[30] The Soviet leadership opted for the latter. Orders were sent to withdraw Soviet forces from Budapest, and this was done on October 31. Those forces then concentrated about 15–20 kilometers from the capital.[31]

On the following day, October 31, the Presidium changed its mind. Khrushchev stated his position as follows, after reporting on a telephone conversation with Władislaw Gomulka: "Reexamine our assessment, do not withdraw troops from Hungary and Budapest, and take the initiative in restoring order in Hungary." The reasons he gave for this decision are worth quoting:

> If we leave Hungary, that will encourage the Americans, the British,
> and the French, the imperialists. They will see it as our weakness and
> they will take the offensive. We would then expose the weakness of
> our positions.

He went on to say that the Party would not understand if that happened. "We would then add Hungary to Egypt for them", he said. After proposing that a provisional revolutionary government be formed under János Kádár, he returned to the international dimensions of the crisis: they would have to talk it over with Tito and inform the Chinese, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians. "There will not be a big war", he concluded.[32] Khrushchev's proposal was approved by the Presidium.

Soviet forces were continuing to enter Hungary, mainly from the Carpathian Military District, though one mechanized division came through Romania from the Odessa Military District. Between October 27 and November 4 five mechanized divisions, one tank division, and two airborne divisions crossed the border into Hungary.[33] On the morning of November 4 Soviet forces launched Operation

"Vikhr'" (Whirlwind), under the overall command of Marshal I. Konev, commander-in-chief of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact. This time the military operation was more successful. Open armed resistance ended within a week, and a new government, under János Kádár, was imposed on Hungary.

Our aim in this paper is not to explain the shifts in Soviet policy or the ultimate decision to suppress the Hungarian revolution by force. It was clear to the Soviet leaders that the revolution posed a profound challenge to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and to the Soviet model of socialism. There was no disagreement among the Soviet leaders about the need to keep Hungary in the socialist camp. Even Anastas Mikoian, who consistently opposed the use of force throughout the crisis, told the Central Committee Presidium on November 1: "Hungary cannot be permitted to leave the camp."[34] The disagreements and hesitations in the Soviet leadership centered on the means to be employed, not on the ultimate goal to be attained.

When Khrushchev presented to the Central Committee Presidium, on October 31, his decision to use military force to restore order, he drew attention to the international dimensions of the crisis. If Hungary quit the socialist camp, that would be a huge loss for the Soviet Union. The Western powers would gain new heart and would pursue a more aggressive strategy against the Soviet Union. Britain and France had just begun military operations against Egypt, and Khrushchev evidently thought that they would succeed in regaining control over the Suez Canal. If the Soviet Union lost Hungary and the Western powers defeated Egypt, it would be a double blow, and Soviet policy would be very much on the defensive.

Khrushchev's comment that there would not be a "big war" indicates that he was not concerned about the possibility of Western military intervention in response to Soviet action to "restore order". Charles Bohlen, the US Ambassador to Moscow during the crisis was asked in an oral history project in 1970: "Was there ever any genuine fear on the part of the Russians that you could determine that the US might intervene in Hungary?" Bohlen replied: "You never saw any sign of that. As an American I knew perfectly well that it would have been impossible for us really. The Russians must have known this."[35]

Any thought of military intervention by the United States or the NATO would have had to face the fact of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, and more specifically the presence of Soviet forces in Hungary, Romania, and in the adjoining parts of the Soviet Union. Intervention would have involved direct clashes between Soviet and NATO forces, thereby risking escalation to general war. Nor, as Bohlen later pointed out, was there any thought of trying to deter Soviet military action by making nuclear threats: "Nothing would have deterred them from going in there. We didn't have any force in Europe to do it. Nobody was thinking of atomic weapons, for God's sake. But the Russians would pour in any number of divisions right from a common border with the Soviet Union."[36]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not asked to consider military options for intervening in Hungary. Eisenhower did, however, ask them in November to study whether the United States should support the United Nations in using force to prevent the Soviet Union from suppressing the Gomulka regime in Poland. The Joint Chiefs concluded that military intervention in Poland was feasible, but that it ran the risk of leading to general war.[37] US policy during the Hungarian crisis was shaped not only by the military balance in and around Hungary, but also by the fear that a local conflict could lead to general war.

On November 12 Khrushchev told the Yugoslav ambassador, Veljko Micunovic:

> The Russians knew there had been real fear in the NATO about the more serious steps the Soviet Army might take in Europe. The Soviet armed forces in Eastern Germany alone were stronger than what NATO had at its disposal at the moment in Europe. This had been stated to a group of NATO experts, Khrushchev said.

> The Americans had forbidden any movement of the NATO forces in Europe during the latest armed intervention by the Soviet Union in Hungary so as not to provoke the Russians, Khrushchev said.[38]

Khrushchev understood that the combination of local Soviet military superiority and the risk of nuclear war would restrain the West from military intervention.

The American Reaction

When word of the Hungarian revolution reached Washington, it caught the Eisenhower Administration by surprise.[39] The events of October 1956 contradicted previous American assumptions about the durability of Communist rule in the satellites and the ability of Soviet forces to suppress immediately any outbreak of resistance. In January 1956 a National Intelligence Estimate had concluded: "the military, political, and economic significance of the Satellites to the USSR is so great that Moscow almost certainly regards the maintenance of control over the area as an essential element of the power position". The Soviet Union, it argued, was unlikely to allow any East European state to exit the Warsaw Pact or assume a non-Communist form of government.[40] An NSC report of July 1956 argued that "Soviet political domination of the satellites remains a basic fact", unaffected by the opening in Soviet policy following Stalin's death and the 20th Party Congress. These conclusions applied as much to Hungary as to the Warsaw Pact in general. "The Kremlin will take all measures necessary to keep Hungary within the Bloc", a 1955 intelligence report concluded. If an open revolt did break out, the combina-

tion of Hungarian Communist and Soviet forces would be "sufficient to cope with any active resistance" and would assure that there was "little likelihood that Communist control over Hungary will be jeopardized" at any time during the mid-to-late-1950s.[41]

Washington understood at once the seriousness of the crisis in Hungary. At a meeting of the National Security Council on the morning of October 26, Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, asserted that "the revolt in Hungary constituted the most serious threat yet to be posed to continued Soviet control of the satellites". The Soviet leadership had been thrown on the defensive, and Khrushchev's position as leader in Moscow might even be threatened. Rather than viewing Allen Dulles' report as an opportunity to put the rhetoric of liberation into action, Eisenhower's response was to worry about the possibility of general war. Faced with the prospect of losing their satellites in Eastern Europe, he worried, might the Soviets not "be tempted to resort to very extreme measures and even to precipitate global war?"[42] Eisenhower's diary for October 26 records that he "warned both the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to be unusually watchful and alert during the crisis occasioned by the Hungarian revolt". A central consideration in Eisenhower's mind during the Hungarian crisis was the necessity of preventing nuclear war between the US and the USSR. It would be dangerous, he believed, to press the Soviet leaders while they felt threatened by developments in Eastern Europe.

Harold Stassen, special assistant to the President for disarmament, spoke up in response to Eisenhower's warning about inadvertent war. Stassen argued that the Soviet leadership would soon have to make a choice between allowing liberalization in Hungary, and suppressing the rebellion by force. He also suggested that the US might influence this decision by contacting the Soviet military leadership:

> Stassen wondered if it would not be prudent to try to get some message to Marshal Zhukov indicating that the achievement of freedom in the Soviet satellites should not be considered by the Soviet Union as posing any real threat to the national security of the USSR. We should make it clear that this development would not impel the Western powers to make any warlike move against the Soviet Union.[43]

Stassen's proposal carried with it a certain degree of ambiguity. It may have been intended to convince the Soviet leaders that an independent Hungary would not pose any threat to the security of the Soviet Union. If successful, such a reassurance might convince the Soviet leadership not to suppress the revolution. The circumstances of the proposal, however, suggest an alternative explanation, more in keeping with Eisenhower's fear that the Hungarian crisis might develop into general war. The Stassen proposal may have been intended as a reassurance to

Moscow that the US would not intervene in the Hungarian conflict. This US message to Moscow would prevent the Soviet leaders from overreacting to an imagined American threat, and thus forestall the danger of nuclear war.

Stassen's proposal initially did not meet with an enthusiastic reception from Eisenhower. The President declared "that he did not believe such a move would be worthwhile. He doubted if the Soviet leaders genuinely feared an invasion by the Western powers".[44] Eisenhower's statement is an illustration of "common knowledge" during the Hungarian crisis. Not only did the US never plan to intervene; the Soviet leaders knew they did not plan to intervene; and US leaders knew that the Soviet leaders understood that there was no possibility of US intervention – hence no message of reassurance to Moscow was needed. What we now know about decision-making on the Soviet side shows that Eisenhower was right in his evaluation of the Soviet leaders' assessment of the possibility of Western intervention.

Stassen revised his proposal in a conversation with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the afternoon of October 26. He suggested that the US "let the Russians know that we would accept for the satellites some neutralized status like that of Austria". Stassen apparently hoped to convince Moscow that Hungary should be allowed to become an independent and neutral state that would pose no military threat to the USSR. Eisenhower also spoke with Dulles later that afternoon, and made it known that he favored Hungarian neutralization. If the Soviet leaders feared that an independent Hungary would be incorporated into NATO, the President thought, they would be forced to crush the uprising quickly and completely. Allaying this Soviet fear might ensure that the Hungarian people might not "get such a hard time of it". Self-determination for Hungary and neutralization on the Austrian model, Eisenhower thought, might be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and would help to reduce tensions between the Communist bloc and the West. If the Hungarians could "choose their own government", the President told Dulles, "this would be of far greater effect than any alliance".[45]

Dulles responded unenthusiastically to the idea of neutrality for Hungary and the other states of Eastern Europe. He told Eisenhower that he doubted that "we should go so far as to seem to commit these countries to an Austria-style neutralization". The US should not place itself in a position of appearing to conduct "backstage talks" with the Soviets, he said to Eisenhower.[46] Dulles may have feared that negotiating with Moscow during the crisis would give the appearance that the US was deciding the future of Hungary without reference to the wishes of the Hungarian people themselves.

Dulles did include a version of the Stassen proposal in his speech in Dallas, Texas, on October 27. This speech is the source of the much-cited statement that the US did not regard the nations of Eastern Europe as potential allies. The Dallas

speech, however, did not propose the formal neutralization of Hungary, and its overall meaning was unclear. The relevant paragraph of the speech reads:

> The United States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries. Our unadulterated wish is that these peoples, from whom so much of our own national life derives, should have sovereignty restored to them and that they should have governments of their own free choosing. We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies. We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer divided Europe. We are confident that their independence, if promptly accorded, will contribute immediately to stabilize peace throughout all of Europe, West and East.[47]

It is not clear why Dulles failed to include the proposal of Austrian-style neutralization, a proposal that was apparently supported by both Stassen and President Eisenhower himself. Dulles may have believed that it was more important to reassure the Soviet Union that no American intervention in Hungary was forthcoming, a meaning that Moscow could read into the speech he delivered at Dallas. If Dulles' statement had been more explicit in proposing Hungarian neutrality, the Soviet leaders might have interpreted it as interference in the affairs of the Warsaw Pact rather than as a disavowal of American interest in Hungary.

The idea of Hungarian neutrality also met opposition elsewhere in the US leadership. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected immediately when the NSC Planning Board proposed, on October 31, 1956, that the US provide Moscow with assurances that the United States did not view Hungary as a potential ally. The Joint Chiefs declared that such assurances would "tend to undermine such influence as the United States may have on the government which is established in Hungary, and could in the future operate to our military disadvantage". They evidently believed that the US should not foreclose the option of incorporating Hungary into NATO at some point in the future. They may also have worried that a US proposal for Hungarian neutralization would be countered by a Soviet proposal for the neutralization of Germany or the withdrawal of American troops from the NATO nations. This fear may help account for the reluctance of the Joint Chiefs, Dulles, and others, to support Stassen's proposal for the formal neutralization of Hungary.[48]

Following Dulles's speech, the Administration decided to convey his assurance privately to the Soviet leadership. On October 29 Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that Charles Bohlen should transmit a message to the Soviet leaders. He warned, however, that the US "would have to be very careful not to do anything that would look to the satellite world as though we were selling them out".[49] Eisenhower agreed, and later that day Dulles cabled Bohlen, sending him the relevant passage from the Dallas speech and telling him that "we would like this to come to attention of highest Soviet authorities, including Zhukov, and to know

that they appreciate it is a high level policy statement". Dulles warned, again, that the proposal needed to be kept confidential, telling Bohlen that "it is of course highly important that nothing done under this authorization should emerge publicly as a demarche attributable to Washington".[50] It is perhaps significant that Dulles specifically asked Bohlen to bring the matter to the attention of Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet Minister of Defense. This may indicate that Dulles believed the primary purpose of the proposal was to reassure the Soviet military leadership that the US would not exploit Hungary's independence for its own military advantage.

Bohlen transmitted Dulles' message to Zhukov and Molotov at a reception in Moscow on October 30. Bohlen reported to Dulles as follows:

> I told Zhukov and Molotov I wanted to direct their attention to your Dallas speech and paragraph in it concerning our policy in regard to Eastern European countries and gave them from memory translation text paragraph.
>
> Molotov listened and made no particular comment, but said he would look up speech in question, which he felt sure they had from press reports. Zhukov, however, said that he found difficult to reconcile this statement with President's encouragement of "rebels" in Hungary, which he thought represented interference Hungarian internal affairs. I said President's statement was general and reflected feelings American people and in any case words were less of intervention than bullets, to which Zhukov made no reply.[51]

Bohlen's telegram is revealing. It is clear that Zhukov interpreted the passage in Dulles' speech of October 27 not as a proposal for the neutralization of Hungary, but as an American disclaimer of any intention to interfere in Hungarian affairs. Bohlen did nothing to disabuse Zhukov of this notion, but instead implied that while Eisenhower and others in the US government might make rhetorical statements about freedom in Hungary, there would be no American military support ("bullets") for the revolutionaries. Khrushchev's comment to his son, quoted in the introduction to this paper, indicates that the Soviet leaders did indeed understand Bohlen's communication in this way. That is also the interpretation of the Russian historians V. T. Sereda and A. S. Stykalin, who write that Bohlen "informed the Soviet leaders that the United States had no particular interests in Hungary".[52]

A further indication that the Eisenhower Administration's policy during the Hungarian crisis was heavily influenced by a fear of sparking nuclear war is provided by an exchange between Eisenhower and C.D. Jackson, his former Special Assistant on international affairs and psychological warfare. In a telegram to the President on November 8, Jackson wrote: "Under cover of United Nations total preoccupation with Middle Eastern problems and the new general war threat, the

Russians are getting away with murder in Hungary." He told Eisenhower that action was urgently needed to protect the Hungarian people, and that much stronger international pressure should be put on Moscow. Eisenhower responded with a lecture on the evils of nuclear war. "To annihilate Hungary", Eisenhower argued, "should it become the scene of a bitter conflict, is in no way to help her." A general war triggered by the Hungarian crisis, he continued, would be "so terrible that the human mind cannot comprehend it".[53]

Eisenhower's response is illuminating, because it reveals the degree to which the fear of nuclear war shaped his thinking during the Hungarian crisis. He apparently believed that even pressuring Moscow through the UN would pose the risk of sparking general war between the US and the USSR.

Conclusion

The United States did not consider intervening with military force in the Hungarian revolution, and the Soviet leadership did not think that the United States would intervene. In this paper we have explored why that was so. This of course is only one of the international aspects of the crisis, but it is an important one, and the behavior of the two sides provides insight into the way in which they understood the military confrontation at the time.

The most obvious explanation lies in the military balance in Europe – and specifically in and around Hungary – which greatly restricted Western military options and made it very likely that any military intervention would escalate, perhaps to the use of nuclear weapons. Each side wanted to avoid general war, each side understood that the other wanted to avoid it, and so on; and, as a consequence, each side wanted to avoid a local conflict that might escalate to general war, and each side understood that the other wanted to avoid it, and so on. That seems to provide a sufficient explanation for the US non-intervention. It is true that the West was in disarray over the Suez crisis, but it is not at all clear that the West would have taken military action over Hungary even if it had not been divided over Suez. It seems therefore disingenuous of Eisenhower, in his memoirs, to place part of the blame on Britain and France for US inaction – though there are of course other reasons to criticize Britain and France for the Suez crisis.

Common knowledge about the unacceptability of nuclear war became an important element in the US-Soviet relationship in the mid-1950s. It needed to be complemented, however, by other conventions and guidelines if the two superpowers were not to stumble into war by accident or miscalculation. It was already clear before the Hungarian crisis that the Eisenhower Administration regarded domination of Eastern Europe as a vital Soviet interest, which it would do everything to defend; to challenge it by military means would therefore create a risk of

general war. The Soviet leaders took the same view. The recognition by both sides of spheres of interest in Europe was all the easier to accept because powerful military forces demarcated the borders of those spheres.

During the Hungarian crisis Washington and Moscow showed a reasonably clear understanding of each other's policies and of the dangers that would arise if the conflict were to escalate. The Stassen proposal is particularly interesting in that regard. It appears to have meant different things to different people at different times, but was the product of two main impulses:

1. To reassure the Soviet Union that the US would not intervene in Hungary. This reassurance would reduce the danger of general war arising from the crisis.
2. To propose a compromise over Hungary's status, denying any American desire to incorporate Hungary into NATO, and establishing Hungary as a neutral nation similar to Austria.

These two impulses do not appear as distinct formulations in the FRUS documents or Eisenhower's papers, but were instead blended together in the minds of US decision-makers (or at least, do not appear ever to have been debated as competing proposals). The message that was eventually delivered to Soviet leaders was much closer to a military reassurance than a political proposal for Hungarian neutralization. Did Khrushchev have Bohlen's message in mind when he told the Presidium on October 31 that "there will not be a big war?" Did that message make a difference? Probably not, because the Soviet leaders seem to have been secure in their minds already that the West would not intervene militarily.

The Hungarian crisis is a revealing illustration of the effect that fear of inadvertent war had on US policymakers. The national security framework they had erected as a way of deterring Soviet aggression also deterred them from taking aggressive action to support the Hungarian revolution. Deterrence was balanced by self-deterrence. The fear of escalation was supposed to deter Soviet aggression in Europe, but it also served to inhibit the United States. The Eisenhower Administration was self-deterred, not only by the lack of good military options for US intervention in Hungary, but also by the fear that a larger war could result from the crisis. Even though the Soviets never issued an explicit warning to Washington, the implicit threat of nuclear war was enough to prevent any thought of intervention on the US side.

We have focused in this paper on the United States and the Soviet Union rather than on Hungary itself, even though the revolution was above all about the future of Hungary. This was not the first time – nor the last – that the independence of a small state was sacrificed on the altar of an international order defined by the great powers. Knowing that does not, however, make it any more agreeable to contemplate.

Notes

1 Kenneth Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 126.

2 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (New York, 1965), pp. 88–89.

3 Sergei Khrushchev, *Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: kniga ob otse* (Moscow: Vremia, 2000), p. 182.

4 NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", 7 January 1955, from Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1955–1957 XIX (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 25.

5 Herbert York, *The Advisors. Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).

6 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 3–4, 34.

7 Churchill to Eisenhower, March 9, 1954, in Peter G. Boyle (ed.), *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence 1953–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 123.

8 'Rech' tovarishcha G. M. Malenkova', *Izvestiia,* March 13, 1954, p. 2.

9 Mohammed Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Third World* (London: Collins, 1978), p. 129.

10 "Memorandum for the Record of the President's Dinner, President's Villa, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 8 p.m.", FRUS 1955–1957 V, p. 376.

11 Quoted by McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 302.

12 Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 306.

13 N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* Vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 427.

14 Something is "common knowledge" in a group if each member knows it, knows that the others know it, knows that each one knows that the others know it, and so on. It is important for coordinated action. See David K. Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) pp. 52–60. Lewis acknowledges (on p. 3) his intellectual debt to Thomas C. Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Galaxy Books, 1963).

15 "Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State", FRUS 1955–1957 XX (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 380.

16 NSC 162/2 "Basic National Security Policy", FRUS 1952–1954, II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 582.

17 David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 343; Pavel Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), p. 178.

18 Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb,* pp. 343–344.

19 Gregory W. Pedlow (ed.), *NATO Strategy Documents 1945–1969,* p. 232. Accessed at www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm.

20 David Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill", *International Security* 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), p. 42.

21 Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb,* pp. 326–333.

22 Vojech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds), *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955–1991* (Budapest: Central European Press, 2005).

23 NSC 5501, FRUS 1955–1957, XIX, p. 26.

24 NSC 5501, FRUS 1955–1957, XIX, p. 29.

25 V. A. Zolotarev (ed.), *Rossiia (SSSR) v lokal'nykh voinakh* (Moscow: Kuchkovo polie; Poligrafresursy, 2000), pp. 139–148, 238–239; "Dokladnaia zapiska Ministerstva oborony SSSR v TsK KPSS o deistviiakh sovetskikh voisk 'po pokazaniiu pomoshchi Pravitelstvu

VNR v sviazi s voznikshimi v strane besporiadkami'", in *Sovetskii Soiuz i vengerskii krizis 1956 goda: Dokumenty* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998), pp. 367–368; Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth, *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956* (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999), p. 7. The Soviet divisions must have been at no more that two-thirds combat strength for five divisions to amount to 31,550 men.

[26] Csaba Békés, Malcom Byrne, János M. Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002), pp. 216–227.

[27] We are grateful to Csaba Békés for this point.

[28] Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises", *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* Issues 8–9 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 367.

[29] *Sovetskii Soiuz i vengerskii krizis,* pp. 432–439.

[30] *Sovetskii Soiuz i vengerskii krizis,* p. 462. At the Presidium meeting on October 30, Zhukov reported that military transport aircraft were being assembled near Vienna, but there was no further discussion of the point. Apparently the Vienna airport was used for humanitarian aid from the West for Hungary. *Ibid.,* pp. 457, 462.

[31] Zolotarev, *Rossiia (SSSR) v lokal'nykh voinakh,* p. 143.

[32] *Sovetskii soiuz i vengerskii krizis,* pp. 479–480.

[33] *Sovetskii soiuz i vengerskii krizis,* pp. 376–377.

[34] *Sovetskii soiuz i vengerskii krizis,* p. 494.

[35] Interview with Ambassador Charles Bohlen, December 17, 1970, New York Times Oral History Project (Columbia University oral history collection, pt. 4, no. 23), p. 11.

[36] Interview with Bohlen, pp. 9–10.

[37] Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,* pp. 127–128.

[38] Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. 156.

[39] In an NSC meeting on November 1, Allen Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, expressed his astonishment that the revolutionaries had been able to achieve any success in fighting Soviet troops. "In a sense", he declared, "what had occurred there was a miracle. Events had belied all our past views that a popular revolt in the face of modern weapons was an utter impossibility." Csaba Békés et al., *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution,* p. 324.

[40] "Probable Developments in the European Satellites", from Békés et al., *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution,* p. 69.

[41] NIE 12.5-55, "Current Situation and Probable Developments in Hungary", FRUS 1955-1957, XXV (Washington, 1990), pp. 17–23.

[42] "Memorandum of Discussion at the 301st Meeting of the National Security Council", 26 October 1956, from FRUS 1955–1957, XXV (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 295–299. Also see Eisenhower's diary entry for 26 October 1956, from the papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann Whitman.

[43] NSC Meeting 26 October 1956, FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, p. 299.

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 299.

[45] Eisenhower Diaries, Whitman file. Also see "Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State", 26 October 1956, 7:06 p.m., FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, pp. 306–307.

[46] "Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, 26 October 1956, 5:50 p.m.", FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, p. 305.

[47] "Address by the Secretary of State Before the Dallas Council on World Affairs, 27 October 1956", FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, p. 318.

[48]   For the objections of the JCS to the proposed NSC draft, see "Draft Statement of Policy by the Planning Board of the National Security Council", 31 October 1956, FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, p. 357. The danger that the Soviets would attempt to force withdrawal of US troops from Western Europe was addressed in NSC 5602/1, the "Basic National Security Policy" of 15 March 1956. See FRUS 1955–1957 XIX, pp. 267–268.

[49]   "Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State", 29 October 1956, FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, pp. 321–322.

[50]   "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union", 29 October 1956, FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, p. 328.

[51]   "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union", 30 October 1956, FRUS 1955–1957 XXV, p. 348.

[52]   *Sovetskii soiuz i vengerskii krizis,* p. 334.

[53]   C. D. Jackson to Eisenhower, 8 November 1956, 12:58 p.m., and Eisenhower to Jackson, 19 November 1956, from the Eisenhower Diaries, Whitman files.

THE COLLAPSE OF LIBERATION RHETORIC: THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE 1956 HUNGARIAN CRISIS[1]

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This paper will analyze Eisenhower's policy towards Eastern Europe in general and towards Hungary in particular from the perspective of the gaping gulf between high-minded rhetoric and the political realities of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. While the Eisenhower Administration sounded the high-faluting rhetoric of "liberation of captive peoples" from communism and engaged in the short-lived effort to launch a "Volunteer Freedom Corps" to undermine communism in Eastern Europe, the political reality was that uprisings against communism were not supported in East Germany in 1953, neither in Poland and Hungary in 1956.

The Cold War regimes in Central Europe, along with the establishment of deterrence strategy, made the cautious Eisenhower administration not dare actively support rebellions in Eastern Europe. The price of an escalation of conflict towards nuclear war was deemed too dangerous; no direct interventions were launched in the Soviet sphere of influence. The price the Eisenhower administration also had to pay was a loss of trust among the "captive peoples". Eisenhower's rhetoric was revealed to be only propaganda.

Keywords: Hungary, 1956, Eisenhower's foreign policy, Cold War, Eastern Europe, propaganda

I. Introduction

Let me make it clear from the beginning – I am a "post-revisionist" when it comes to Eisenhower historiography (Introduction in Bischof/Ambrose 1995/1). I consider the Eisenhower administration's failure to support the Hungarian revolution in the fall of 1956 after three years of crusading rhetoric and propaganda promises of "liberating captive peoples" as one of its biggest policy breakdowns. It was also a huge moral failure in terms of the promises of democracy by the Western world to be extended to the Soviet block. One cannot, however, speak of a "missed opportunity" in Hungary, as post-revisionists aver in cases of Eisenhower's failures to react more positively towards initiating an era of détente with the new Kremlin leadership after Stalin's death in 1953, or improving relations

with Mao's China instead of constant pinpricks directed against Beijing over the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu, or by supporting nationalist regimes in the decolonizing "Third World" (e.g., Vietnam, Egypt). The Eisenhower administration could have been bolder and recognized Hungarian neutrality, once Imre Nagy announced it on November 1, and pushed for other nations to recognize it. The Eisenhower Administration could also have kept its "propaganda attack dogs" in the Munich studios of "Radio Free Europe" on a tighter leash and insisted that they not incite revolution in the Soviet block and not encourage the insurrectionists in Hungary by intimating U.S. military help. Eisenhower was prudent, however, in not directly intervening in the Hungarian Revolution with military force, or on a lower scale augmenting CIA covert operations. The danger of escalation up the nuclear ladder was too big in the new age of limited nuclear and/or thermonuclear war, especially as the Suez crisis provided another flashpoint of growing East-West tensions and potential escalation towards nuclear war.

Overall, the rather harsh judgment by the fine Hungarian-born Cold War scholar John Lukacs seems not far off the mark when it comes to Ike's containment policies in general and his Hungarian policy in particular: *"Eisenhower was devious rather than straightforward, ideology-ridden rather than pragmatic, governed by calculation rather by convictions"* [emphasis added] (quoted in Bischof 2003, 104).

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' policy towards the Revolution in Hungary in late October 1956 grew out of long-standing frustrations and resentments in the right wing of the Republican Party with the twenty-year tenure of Democrats in the White House in general and President Harry S. Truman's "passive" Cold War containment strategy in particular. White House reactions to the uprising in Hungary reflected unresolved policies and ambiguous feelings between a public policy of "liberation of captive nations" and a private behind-the-scenes realization that *military* challenges to Soviet hegemony in its Eastern European sphere of influence might trigger a larger nuclear conflict. While Eisenhower "psychological warfare" (Osgood) and "rhetorical diplomacy" (Tudda) remained truculent until 1956, his actual Eastern European policy had come to the conclusion by as early as late 1953 that the United States would not "incite uprisings" behind the iron curtain, since military interventions in Soviet controlled territory were out of the question for fear of a larger conflict and the unleashing of "World War III". Eisenhower opted for a policy of liberation "by peaceful means", which was equal to "waiting for Godot", as people suspected then and know much better now. This inherent ambiguity between tough crusading rhetoric and cautious policy was not as clearly discernible at the time as it is today recognized by "post-revisionist" scholars of the Eisenhower Presidency. The Hungarian insurrectionists have never forgiven Eisenhower his failure to support them militarily against the Soviet intervention in early November 1956.

They took the drum beat of pronouncements and promises of "liberation" and "rollback" emanating from Ike's "spy warriors" out of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as a firm promise rather than crusading *propaganda*.

This paper will address two themes: first, the dilemma of forging an unambiguous and unified foreign policy in the sometimes seemingly anarchical domestic environment of American democracy, where numerous constituencies fight for influence in Washington and need to be pleased; secondly, the use of psychological warfare and covert operations as integral parts of U.S. foreign policy making in the global struggle to contain Soviet communism in the early Cold War. The importance of psychological warfare to Eisenhower's Cold War policies has been the focus of the most recent literature on the Eisenhower presidency.

II. Domestic Context of Eisenhower's Policy vis-à-vis Communism

Mark Kramer has rightly stressed the importance of "internal-external linkages" with regard to Soviet foreign policy formulation after Stalin's death in March 1953 (Kramer, parts 1–3). The same holds even more true for American foreign policy making, where numerous domestic influences and public opinion always need to be addressed. One contextual element studies on both Eisenhower's Cold War policies in general and his policy vis-à-vis the Soviet block in Eastern Europe have not sufficiently taken into account is the volatile climate emanating from the domestic "politics of anti-communism" and the traumatization of American politics in the early 1950s by fears of a domestic "red scare". The pressure of McCarthyism pushed the Republican Party to the right after Dewey's loss against Truman in 1948. McCarthy's cowed Eisenhower during the 1952 campaign with his attacks on his mentor George C. Marshall. The Republican stalwarts (among them Senators Robert Taft and William Knowland) castigated the Democrats by beating them over the head with the "sellout of Eastern Europe" in the Yalta agreements. Even though Dulles had personally detested communism for religious reasons for a long time, the domestic "politics of anti-communism" is the real backdrop to Dulles' promises of the "liberation of the captive peoples", written into the Republican campaign platform in 1952. On the campaign trail in August 1952 Dulles warned that the U.S. "must abandon the 'containment' policy ... in addition to being immoral, [it] does not work. It snuffs out a resistance spirit within the captive peoples ..." (Tudda, 77). Such inflammatory rhetoric was not only an attack on Truman but also an appeal to the Polish voters of Chicago and Cleveland and Detroit to vote for "Ike".

Eisenhower himself used crusading rhetoric in his own campaign speeches. In August 1952 he told the American Legion:

> We must tell the Kremlin that never shall we desist in our aid to every
> man and woman of those shackled lands who seeks refuge with us,
> any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of free-
> dom or who is dedicated to the liberation of his fellows (quoted in
> Horvath, 7).

Never, however, did Dulles or Eisenhower promise the use of force to liberate
the captive peoples. They expected those peoples to liberate themselves, or hoped
that one day the Soviet Union would relinquish them.

But since Eisenhower's policy vis-à-vis the fellow Republican McCarthy was
not to "get into a pissing contest with that skunk" and "giving him enough rope to
hang himself", the junior Senator from Wisconsin stayed on the attack in 1953
(Bischof, 1995/2). He tried to block Bohlen's appointment as ambassador to the
Soviet Union and Conant's as high commissioner to West Germany in their hear-
ings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He sent the "junketeering
gumshoes" Cohn and Shine to Europe to hunt for communist authors in America
House libraries. He was searching for communists inside the State Department,
the Army, and the CIA – which was like finding Belzebub inside the Vatican. Ei-
senhower also faced a right wing isolationist insurgency in his own party by those
like McCarthy who wanted the Yalta Agreements officially repudiated, and by
Senator Bricker who aimed at curbing executive authority with his amendment re-
quiring Congressional approval of all executive agreements. There were commu-
nist spies in the American government before and during World War II, as we now
know from the "Venona" transcripts. But McCarthy's populist apoplectic reaction
to the communist threat within the U.S. polity came late, and he never uncovered a
single spy. He was the master of arousing fear and alarming the masses (Morgan,
xiv). With his attack on the Army and the subsequent Army-McCarthy hearings
the Senator from Wisconsin was censured and finally did "hang himself".

But this is the context of a rabid Republican right wing putting enormous pres-
sure on the new president to reverse Truman's containment policies in which Ei-
senhower unleashed his rhetorical "liberation" crusade and his covert operations
and propaganda initiatives to "roll back" the iron curtain in 1953. The high point
of these policies were during the first two years of his presidency when McCarthy
was still a power to be reckoned with and hovered over all of Eisenhower's Cold
War foreign policy actions. Eisenhower himself was an ideologue and, at times,
revealed some of McCarthy's unrelenting anti-communism as, for example, when
he told Churchill at the Bermuda meeting in December 1953:

> ... as regards the P.M.'s belief that there was a New Look in Soviet
> Policy, Russia was a woman of the streets and whether her dress was
> new, or just the old one patched up, it was certainly the same whore
> underneath. America intended to drive her off her present 'beat' into
> the back streets (Colville, 683 in Bischof/1995/1, 146).

Of course, he did not live up to this promise during the East German and Pilsen revolt in 1953, nor in the Polish labor strikes or the Hungarian uprising in 1956.

Once McCarthy was censored, Eisenhower could slowly back off from such hardline anti-communist talk and embark on testing Soviet offers for peaceful co-existence in 1955 and agree to a summit meeting at Geneva after the signing of the Austrian treaty. The pressure from the Republican stalwarts snapping at his heels, in other words, was less intense by late 1956 during the Hungarian crisis and that is why he may have been even less inclined to test Soviet resolve by supporting Hungarian insurrectionists.

We should also keep in mind that in the midst of the dual Hungary/Suez crises in 1956 Eisenhower was running for reelection and therefore inclined to be even more cautious in his foreign policies (Ambrose, 347ff). The seasoned incumbent President did not need the Eastern European vote so badly anymore to win his re-election as he did in 1952 as a newcomer to presidential politics. In a November 2, 1956 letter to his friend "Swede" Hazlett, however, Eisenhower indicated that he was overwhelmed by the unfolding of the double crisis in Hungary and Suez in the final days of a presidential campaign:

> It became too difficult for me to keep in touch with the various items
> of information that pour constantly into Washington from Europe
> and the Mid East and at the same time carry on the hectic activities of
> actual campaigning (PDDE, XVII, 2354).

III. The International Background to Eisenhower's Policy
towards Hungary

Recent studies by Peter Grose, Gregory Mitrovich, Scott Lucas, Kenneth Osgood and now the massive *Habiliationsschrift* by the young German scholar Bernd Stöver, make it abundantly clear that the "shadow war" of covert opera-tions aiming at destabilizing Soviet influence in its Eastern European sphere al-ready began under President Truman in 1947/48. Stöver has shown that the Amer-icans took the template of undermining the Soviet sphere and "liberating" the populations enslaved under communism directly from Nazi policies against the Soviet Union. The genesis of postwar "rollback" of communism originates in the Nazi crusade against bolshevism (Stöver, 121 ff). Nobody else, but George F. Kennan, the Director of the State Department's influential Policy Planning Staff initiated an aggressive policy of "counterforce" – a revolutionary policy designed to undermine the Kremlin's hold over the satellites (written down in the basic memorandum NSC 20/4). The goal was to incite and support "Titoist heresies" in Eastern Europe. A "campaign of truth" was started by way of the new radio sta-

tions "Radio Free Europe" and "Radio Liberty". In a massive "black propaganda" campaign, balloons were drifted across the iron curtain dropping millions of leaflets aiming at undermining the communist regimes with their demands for freedom. The CIA secretly financed the "Congress of Cultural Freedom" and its crusade among Western European intellectuals on the left, trying to inspire anti-communism and reduce anti-Americanism (Berghahn). The CIA began to recruit a future "foreign legion" type army from the displaced Eastern European refugees in Germany and Austria who hated communism. They were to be sent back into the Eastern European satellites as a guerilla force destined to incite rebellions. In 1948 the highly secret "Office of Policy Coordination" (OPC) was established in the State Department (in 1950 transferred to the CIA) under the former OSS-operative Frank Wisner to launch a more aggressive policy of psychological warfare against the Soviet sphere. In 1952 the OPC had a budget of 206 million dollars and operated 4,000 agents in Europe, however, without any dramatic results. Operations in Albania, for example, were betrayed by the British spies Philby and Maclean. In fact, due to these moles the Kremlin seemed to be better informed about OPC guerilla activities in Eastern Europe than most members of the Truman administration.

In 1951 Truman established the "Psychological Strategy Board" to coordinate the "psychological warfare" against the Kremlin. During a general review of these programs, the Truman administration came to the conclusion that all efforts to undermine or topple Soviet regimes had failed. Charles Bohlen proposed a toned-down future "strategy of rational hope" containing the Soviet Union, yet accepting co-existence with it, and abandoning the dangerous aggressive subversive actions in the Soviet sphere of influence that might unleash a larger conflict (Mitrovich, 83–121).

It is a supreme irony of history that at the moment in time when the Truman administration had to admit that its subversive guerilla strategy in the Soviet block had not produced recognizable successes, the Republican candidate Eisenhower called for an even more aggressive psychological warfare strategy, abandoning containment and ultimately "rolling back" communism. Part of the problem was the Truman's "shadow war" programs had been so highly secret that the Republican opposition (Eisenhower and Dulles included) did not know the full extent of it.

After his election victory, Eisenhower and Dulles unleashed their "liberation" strategy with reckless abandon. They revived the idea of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps" of Eastern European refugees to be sent into the Soviet bloc as guerillas. Again, the idea had originated during the Truman years. Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had pushed the idea of such a VFC soon after the end of the war. In 1952 Congress had passed 100 million dollars towards the establishment of it (a Republican congressman from Wisconsin pushed this under the "Kersten

Amendement"). Eisenhower actively supported the VFC until 1955 (Carafano). Little did the Republicans realize what OPC operatives like William Sloan Coffin had come to recognize in the DP-camps of Germany and Austria – these divisive refugees were more interested in the American dollars doled under the CIA, Marshall Plan and VFC programs than in actually putting their lives on the line fighting communism behind the iron curtain. The "United States Information Agency" was created as an independent propaganda agency. Radio broadcasts were boosted and balloon programs into the Soviet sphere were stepped up. An ideological warfare "campaign of truth" was unleashed to discredit communist ideology. The high level "Operations Coordinating Board" replaced Truman's "Psychological Strategy Board" to coordinate all psychological warfare initiatives. Eisenhower appointed C. D. Jackson as his quasi-"psychological warfare czar". Eisenhower's definition was all-inclusive: "Psychological warfare can be anything from the singing of a beautiful hymn up to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage" (letter to Dulles quoted in Osgood, 413). In the basic National Security Council document NSC 162/2 (replacing Truman's key document NSC 68), psychological warfare actually was added as an integral part of Eisenhower's "new look" national security policy (Osgood, 422ff).

After a long, critical and intense review process of America's basic alternatives between containment and rollback in "Operation Solarium" throughout the summer of 1953, NSC 162/2 was passed in October (Dockrill, 1996, 33–47). The inherent dilemmas of an aggressive "rhetorical diplomacy" hobbling more cautious actual behind-the-scenes policies became clearly visible here. The new Eisenhower Administration had been caught unprepared for both Stalin's surprising death in March 1953 and the East German uprising on June 17. No plans for such exigencies of "captive people" taking action into their own hands existed in Washington. Eisenhower sent food to the East Germans insurgents but did not further fire them up with propaganda, let alone American military support that might result in a shooting war with the Soviets.

At a moment when anti-Soviet sentiment seemed to be boiling over in the Soviet bloc, NSC 158 of late June 1953 advocated "rollback" with the provocation of insurrections against the communist regimes. But the larger national security strategy review NSC 162/2 pulled back from such a dangerous course. While the military wanted to develop a more dynamic approach to undermining Soviet control in its bloc, including the "use of force", Eisenhower and Dulles pulled back from such escalation, fearing that nuclear war would result from it. The hard-won and sobering consensus in the NSC was: *"The detachment of any major satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or by war"* [my emphasis] (quoted in Ostermann, 520). In the basic memorandum on U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet satellites NSC 174 of December 1953, rollback was duly abandoned. Psychological warfare undermining Soviet control and

"support the spirit of resistance" via propaganda initiatives were to be continued. But the "incitement of premature revolts" must be avoided, even though satellite regimes should be undermined and "conditions favorable to eventual liberation" should be promoted (Ostermann, 521; NSC 174 repr. in Békés et al., 34–53). Eisenhower still tried to square the circle.

No false hopes for U.S. military intervention must be aroused among captive peoples. In a progress report on NSC 174, the Operations Coordinating Board made this crystal clear on July 17, 1954:

> The desire for liberation from Soviet domination is undoubtedly strong among the captive peoples, many of whom would welcome militant action to liberate them, even to the extent of resort to a war of liberation by the West. Neither the U.S. nor the free world countries are willing to take such extreme steps, nor is the U.S. prepared to undertake or foster activities which it would not back up with military support in the event of ruthless Soviet suppression and reprisals. Furthermore, our European allies are strongly against taking what they estimate to be provocative action. *Consequently, the U.S. must limit its activities to a scope which is considered inadequate by at least the activists among the captive people and some of the émigrés* [emphasis added] (quoted in Kovrig, 69).

By mid-1954, then, right after McCarthy's implosion, all that was left of Eisenhower's "liberation" policy was *"liberation rhetoric"*, which, of course, continued to raise hopes among captive peoples. The cautious policy of no military support of insurrections or direct interventions in the Soviet bloc was firmly laid down. As this citation indicates, Eisenhower's advisors fully anticipated the disappointment of rebellious captive peoples and émigré communities as a result of its unwillingness to support "extreme steps" towards liberation. The President's special advisor Harold Stassen had observed in a discussion in the National Security Council in December 1953: "There was no course of action or plan which the US would follow in the event of a *successful* revolt by one of these countries against their Soviet masters" (quoted in Horvath, 16). No detailed plans for supporting liberation struggles, in a nutshell, foreshadowed the U.S. response to the Hungarian rebellion in 1956.

Still, President Eisenhower would keep up the din of public rhetoric, calling for the unlikely liberation of Eastern Europe and German reunification in major propaganda statements such as the "Atoms for Peace" speech in December 1953, and continued to do so during the Geneva Summit meeting of July 1955. Liberationists condemned Geneva, which seemed to disguise containment as liberation (Tudda, 93). John Foster Dulles warmly praised the lucky Austrian settlement in a television appearance and speculated that Austrian freedom would be contagious

to her neighbors behind the iron curtain (Bischof/1995, 158). He grandiloquently predicted in Congressional hearings that Austrian neutrality "will open up a new frontier of freedom in Yugoslavia and also the first frontier of freedom with Hungary, and one can anticipate that it is going to lead these countries to want for themselves that which they see given to Austria" (quoted in Horvath, 20). After the signing of the Austrian treaty Dulles strongly held up neutrality *à l'Autriche* as a model for captive peoples to follow in order to be lured away from Soviet control.

These "schizophrenic policies" (Tudda, 93) of the Eisenhower administration continued into 1956. In his January "state of the union" address Eisenhower condemned the Soviets for their "grave injustices" in Eastern Europe, yet behind the scenes he continued to reject military liberation and continued to promote "peaceful" liberation with exile groups. Khrushchev's "secret speech" was "pure gold" (G. Kennan in Tudda, 95) for Eisenhower's propaganda crusade. Dulles resisted the temptation to encourage further revolts in Czechoslovakia and Poland after their suppression, tepidly insisting on "keeping alive the spirit of liberty in these people" but not wanting to instigate anything. The Dulles brothers vetoed a proposed Nixon visit to Eastern Europe as being "crazy" and too provocative. the NATO's North Atlantic Council further cautioned the Eisenhower Administration not to "substitute hope for reason" in the "thaw" of Khrushchev's sensational critique of Stalin's policies. The captive peoples should not be encouraged towards "futile rebellions", since the West was "not prepared to use force to liberate" them (Tudda, 95f).

In its basic review of Eastern European policy (NSC 5608) of early July 1956, the National Security Council continued its policy between active containment and passive liberation. A "deliberate policy of attempting to liberate satellite peoples by military force must be rejected". But propaganda and covert operations should be continued "to maintain the morale of anti-Soviet elements, to foster desired changes in Soviet-satellite relationships, and to maximize Soviet difficulties". Yet the U.S. "should not encourage premature action on their part which will bring upon them reprisals involving further terror and suppression". The NSC was fully aware that there was a fine line between supporting "passive resistance" and an "invitation to suicide" (NSC 5608 repr. in Békés, 119–128, here 127f).

The stage was set, then, for the U.S. and Western response to the Red Army's crushing of the Hungarian rebellion, particularly since it was further complicated by Western disunity over Suez (for the complex interplay between these two major crises see the essays in Heinemann/Wiggershaus). After the first Soviet intervention, Dulles in a telephone conversation with Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, worried on October 24 "that it will be said that here are the great moments and when they came and these fellows were ready to stand up

and die, *we were caught napping and doing* nothing" [emphasis added] (FRUS, XXV, 273). CIA director Allen Dulles speculated in the National Security Council meeting on October 26 that "Soviet intervention in Hungary may have been due to Soviet unwillingness to submit to a second humiliation after Poland" (FRUS, 1955–57, XXV, 296). After Moscow did not intervene in Poland after a summer of unrest, they may well have feared satellite dominoes beginning to fall in Hungary.

John Foster Dulles assured the Kremlin in a speech delivered to the Dallas World Affairs Council the next day that the U.S. did not look upon the satellites as "potential allies" (FRUS, 1955–57, XXV, 317f). He insisted that Ambassador Bohlen hand the relevant passage of this speech to the Kremlin bosses a couple of days later (FRUS, XXV, 1955–57, 328). Eisenhower, upon disarmament advisor Harold Stassen's suggestion, had urged Dulles in a telephone conversation the night before his Dallas speech to give such an assurance. The President's desire that if the satellites had a free choice, they would choose neutrality, was wishful thinking: "*All we hope is that they have the same likes as Austria*" [emphasis added] (Ostermann, 527f).

The lack of consensus behind the President's passive and restrained course of action in the face of the Red Army's gunning down Hungarian freedom fighters continued throughout the crisis. Voices in the CIA and the Pentagon advocated active support of the rebels (Ostermann, 528f). OPC's Frank Wisner was ready to launch his CIA operatives from Vienna and was in total despair over Washington's refusal to aid the rebels directly. His "Red Sox/Red Cap" program encouraging unrest apparently was ready to go. Some American airborne forces were mobilized outside of Munich for deployment in Budapest (Granville, 193), and there is oral history evidence that some American units got as far as the Vienna area (Vienna conference 2002). Eisenhower rejected two proposals to air drop arms to the Hungarians (Granville, 193). There would not be an American military intervention for which the rebels in Hungary fervently hoped.

Some émigré broadcasters from "Radio Free Europe" in Munich, whose scripts were not sufficiently vetted by their American superiors, overstepped their tightly controlled boundaries and incited the Hungarian rebels by arousing false hopes of Western military aid. As Johanna Granville has concluded after reviewing the RFE scripts:

> While some broadcasts raised hopes of military aid, others discredited Nagy, praised Mindszenty, fomented hatred of ?VH men, gave misleading information about the U.N., created a false picture of the political situation (siding with Hungary and ostracizing the Soviet union), and otherwise distorted the news (Granville, 171).

RFE seems the only American organization that did not tightly abide by the strictures of Eisenhower's passive response to the Hungarian rebellion. Hungarian rebels losing their lives as a result of their continued resistance against all odds due to such RFE encouragement was the real tragedy.

IV. Conclusion

With new documents becoming available and with more distance from the Hungarian events of 1956, scholars have only become more critical of the Eisenhower administration's passivity during the Hungarian insurrection in spite of its continued liberation rhetoric. Washington "lacked a concrete plan of response should a satellite try to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and appeal to U.S. aid", charges Johanna Granville (Granville, 194), following a critique that Harold Stassen had already made in the National Security Council in 1953. Hungary clearly revealed the inconsistencies of the Eisenhower/Dulles liberation policy between the poles of emphasizing caution and encouraging Titoism. Concludes British intelligence scholar Richard Aldrich: "The pathetic efforts of the Hungarian underground against the invading Soviet forces also exposed the stupidity of any marginal policy of stirring up trouble somewhere short of liberation" (Aldrich, 337). Berndt Stöver has observed that the 1953 redefinition of containment by the Eisenhower Administration made the transition from offensive containment to liberation policy fluid (Stöver, 187). Ever since 1953 the public perception in the United States and in Europe was that Eisenhower was committed to actively supporting liberation of the captive peoples. Both the caution in not committing to active support of liberation and the lack of a plan for how to respond to liberation struggles in the Soviet sphere once they erupted, gave the Eisenhower White House an aura of indecisiveness. In Hungary, Dulles and Eisenhower indeed were caught "napping". During the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, Eisenhower's continued his "bland wait-and-see policy" that had characterized his entire stance vis-à-vis Eastern Europe (Horvath, 32).

Chris Tudda relishes the ultimate irony:

> In reality, when revolution came to Eastern Europe, liberation reaffirmed Truman's containment policy. The Eisenhower administration never intended to risk a war against the Soviet Union in order to free the captive peoples (Tudda, 101).

Truman's psychological warriors had already concluded correctly in 1952 that peaceful liberation of the Soviet bloc would take a long time, maybe a generation or more. An embarrassed Eisenhower had to learn the hard way again during the Hungarian crisis and henceforth toned back his empty liberation rhetoric. The out-

come of this policy for the Hungarian rebels was tragic, as László Borhi has observed, for "the unwillingness of the United States to counter Soviet military action meant that the Hungarian quest for liberation was suicidal" (Borhi, 1999, 109).

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SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS OF DISCONTENT: PARADOXES OF 1956

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In the paper we seek to trace and better understand the surprising sociological com-
ponents of the '56 revolution. The paradox lying in the heart of the revolutionary
events concerns the fact that the social groups most closely involved in the political
mobilization included the formerly faithful communist, later "revisionist" intellec-
tuals, the university students and the industrial working class. They had previously
been considered as the primary social basis and legitimation force of the communist
political regime. Still, they were to become the main motor of initiating the disobe-
dience almost before 23rd of October and, in addition, "did the revolution" thereaf-
ter. What could be the reason of their discontent causing the first "revolutionary"
schock to a political regime which regularly defined and declared itself to embody
the social(ist) revolution? The explanation is based on a sociological consideration
(the mobility trap) combined with a psychological reasoning (the sense of guilt, the
bitter feeling of being deceived, and the unfulfilled expectations) and the whole ar-
gument will be placed into the specific historical context specified either by Hun-
gary's road from '53 to '56, and the global developments of the communist world in
the course of 1956.

Keywords: class politics of reprisals, status insecurity, mobility trap, youth subcul-
ture, working class anxiety

Barrington Moore Jr., in his seminal and pioneering book *Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy*, argues that his contribution "is an attempt to dis-
cover the range of historical conditions under which either or both of these rural
groups [the landed upper classes and the peasantry] have become important forces
behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of democracy, and the
dictatorships of the right and the left, that is, fascist and communist regimes."[1]
Unlike Moore, I am now going to try to shed some light on the question of which
social groups and for what reasons became important forces behind the revolt
against Stalinism in a single small country.

It is almost impossible to discuss the social history of 1956 adequately without
a clear picture of the social groups that not only supported or sympathized with the

revolutionary movements but were committed to them and made up the revolutionary bodies. Without relying on impressionistic images available as revolutionary legends or the post-revolutionary propaganda of the Kádár regime, one is left only with the data produced and provided by the subsequent processes of judicial retaliation. The lists of those interned, imprisoned, or sentenced to death after the revolutionary events provide some knowledge of who was actively involved in them. The main problem, however, is that such empirical evidence was constructed some time later, during the reprisal process. Findings taken from judicial proceedings become the basis for identifying and defining what counts as revolutionary behavior, what can be placed in the revolutionary category (or the counter-revolutionary category as the Kádárite persecutors labeled it). This ignores what their immediate inducements to such behavior were. So the bias in the accessible data, coupled with the absence of some 200,000 people who fled westward in late 1956 and early 1957, distorts any picture of the social basis on which the revolution rested. Historians frequently remark that a "fairly wide circle of participants in the incidents was not brought to trial".[2] And this is strengthened by data revealing the behavior of the authorities involved in the reprisal. According to an instruction of December 4, 1957, issued by the deputy Minister of Interior, more exact definition of the social origins both of the persons under arrest and those being suspected is needed to match the correct "class politics". The erroneous data provided on them demonstrates that

> in many cases the 'politicals' and the ordinary criminals are recruited primarily not from the 'class alien', the depraved proletariat and the hooligan elements. [...] It occurs that the previously convicted hooligan elements, class alien persons are assessed as manual laborers on the basis of their nominal occupation, recent work-place or origin.

Therefore, to get a "more exact" definition of who could be considered worker at all, "It is not allowed to register the ones being convicted twice, not even the class alien persons, displaced by the proletarian dictatorship from their [original social] position and doomed to become manual laborers etc. as workers or peasants." So "both the original and the recent occupation has to be taken as a basis" in determining the class position of the persons concerned.[3]

Some further invaluable data about the incentives behind revolutionary action can be gathered from oral history, although the difficulties of applying them are no less considerable. Recollections many years or decades later seem to provide decisive evidence about events whose "true story" cannot be learned from official written sources, which are silent on the subject. Oral history sheds light on facts that are personal, unrepeatable and accidental, but the historical evidence it provides is not flawless either. For the record of oral history is an intellectual or rather discursive construct that has more to do with the present than the past.[4]

On examining earlier a collection of oral history interviews with '56 émigrés, I found that the "framework-story" type of account was shaped primarily by certain time, narrative strategies. Less was revealed about the experienced events of historical value because the account was a subsequent story with a teleological basis.[5]

The first point to be addressed is the social composition of the revolutionaries. It is possible to identify three liberally defined macro-social groups that distinguished themselves in inciting and managing the revolutionary processes: the left-wing, communist-oriented intellectuals (mainly of revisionist writers and scholars); the university students, and the industrial working classes. However, they cannot be considered exclusively. There is no denying of the possibility that a big role as potential revolutionaries was played by several members of the peasantry or other strata. The landowning peasantry clearly had a strong influence over local events in the villages. According to one case study, the first public demonstration in the settlement surveyed, on October 26, mobilized a high proportion of such people – nearly a quarter of the local population – while everybody else stood out at their gates to see what was happening. Altogether a tenth of the male residents of the village, 78 persons out of 797, could be said to have taken an active part in the revolution.

Villagers personally concerned in local events (some of whom even held leading positions in revolutionary organizations) came partly from the young workers under thirty-five years of age (mainly descendants of landholding peasants), and partly from the highest-status smallholders, who belonged to an older generation. With minor exceptions, the workers included were commuters in close touch with the town, so that they could mediate between the revolutionized urban centers and their home villages.[6]

Other case studies relating to far less industrialized villages have also revealed feverish activity by first-generation workers of peasant origin.[7] This had a lot to do with their upward mobility – they, unlike pre-war traditional peasants, had managed to rise socially by becoming unskilled industrial workers.[8] In the interwar period, however, the main channel accessible for the landowning peasantry to rise was either the accumulation of land property or becoming a master artisan, merchant and/or clerical worker.[9]

For the peasantry, traditionally and instinctively, would distance itself from modern collective social protest. The "rational peasant", as Samuel L. Popkin calls him in his analysis, regularly refuses to act for any common or group interest, preferring individual methods of resistance. Individual peasants frequently leave the task of concerted protest to others.[10]

Among the main social forces contributing to the '56 Revolution were the creative intellectuals (poets, novelists and journalists). They had been espousing and popularizing revisionist political ideas as early as 1953, and paradoxically, the

ones who had worked hardest to represent and spread the official culture of the communist regime would become the most voluble fomenters of the uprising.

Another crucial social group behind the political mobilization in October 1956 consisted of university students. Their revolt also takes some explaining, for the restrictive admission criteria for university places in the years leading up to 1956 and the ideological rigor imposed upon students in their studies meant that the children of poor peasant and worker families came to form a very large group among the students: 67 per cent in 1954/5 at the Budapest University of Economics.[11] Furthermore, a scaled-down *szakérettségi* (specialized school-leaving certificate) had been established to make it easier for children of socially disadvantaged families to gain university places. As a result, children from such groups accounted for as many as 21 per cent of all students in 1952–1953, although this had eased to 13 per cent by October 1956.[12] The reason for the drop in the ratio may be accounted for by the cessation of those kinds of courses in 1955.[13]

Ultimately, the urban industrial proletariat also played a dominant role in the revolutionary events. This question deserves attention because official communist ideology claimed to be an embodiment of true dictatorship of the proletariat; the working class was to be the social basis and main beneficiary of communist rule. Upward social mobility was indeed assured by the regime for many members of that class, but the average working-class standard of living was little different from that of other sections of society, though it was higher than that of agricultural villagers.[14]

Meanwhile the social meaning of the expression "industrial working class" had undergone some changes since the inter-war period. The great increase in their numbers and the structural alterations within the class that occurred in the 1950s created quite a new class formation, consisting of many elements representative of the peasant, the lower middle, the middle or even the upper classes. (This social mixture was reflected by the official wording cited before in connection with the official demand of how to categorize the persecuted persons.) Just to mention one aspect: almost 400,000 rural people – one-sixth of the 1949 rural population – streamed into urban industry between 1949 and 1953.[15]

Also in flux at that time were the structure of material interests and the contours of the prestige hierarchy. Young skilled workers with privileged positions on and off the shop floor were approaching middle management in their status, as the traditional wage gap between them perceptibly decreased. This and the concomitant drastic deterioration in the status of non-manual employees in industry finally led to concerted action between them during the revolution under the aegis of the workers' councils. Their convergence, however, was to some extent counterbalanced by an increasing homogenization within the working class itself either in terms of the wages or the diverse prestige of the various branches of industry.[16]

The last problem is how to explain sociologically and psychologically the discontent manifest in the 1956 revolution. The first factor to emphasize is the immense physical and social turnover and mobility in previous years. This had had a deep and lasting impact on the stratification and mental outlook of Hungarian society and had caused almost universal uncertainty and insecurity about personal and group identity. Such enhanced status insecurity was felt equally by those who moved up and down the social ladder. No social group was able any more to see itself as a stable entity, equipped with a specific identity coinciding with a cherished image.[17] Such generally shared social experience is thought to be one of the fundamental sociological roots of revolutionary potential, which will be identified here under the notion of a *mobility trap*. This term seeks to express a paradox: Stalinist power was digging its own grave when it facilitated the social mobility that was supposed to hasten the industrialization and restructuring of the social body that would lend social legitimacy to its repressive authority. The special importance ascribed to obtaining social approval in that form followed from the inability of the communist rulers to employ the institutional forms of political legitimacy found in a liberal democracy. This inability had much do with the "program ideologies" embodied in Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and elsewhere, in which political aims and interests were justified by radical transformation of the inherited social and political conditions.[18]

The question remaining is why the social forces just mentioned should have been the ones to revolt. The hitherto faithful, revisionist communist intellectuals are commonly thought to have been moved by disappointment and disillusionment with the communist utopias. This argument looks plausible, although it needs stating more precisely. The heightened political awareness and responsibility for public issues typically felt by Hungarian intellectuals, writers and creative artists, especially from the first half of the nineteenth century onwards, continued to apply when they started to show disloyalty to the regime. Furthermore, the communist elite laid surprising emphasis on gaining outside support from eminent intellectuals, who had stood apart from the regime, but without showing hostility towards it. The role assigned to these intellectuals, under circumstances in which public opinion did not exist, was to represent and even proxy the absent social consent to communist rule. This role in turn increased the self-esteem of these intellectuals and made them particularly suited to articulating subversive ideas leveled at the political system they had been serving.[19]

The question of why the university students were stirred up so easily has to be placed in a wider context of an emerging youth sub-culture, which could be observed throughout post-war Europe and in America. This revolt against the adult world usually took the form either of lifestyle reform (a change in mass-consumption habits), or of political action. The first striking manifestation of the latter happened in the autumn of 1956 in Hungary. It was followed a decade later by the

youth upheavals in Paris and on American university campuses.[20] The reason why political action came to the fore in Hungary as early as 1956 could possibly be the total lack of personal and public freedom, so that the youth rebellion under such circumstances became channeled into the political movement.

For the working class, the decisive motive seems to have been the anxiety and frustration felt by the lower segment of urban industrial workers, whose poverty was not offset by opportunities for upward mobility. Some analysts even dared to suggest that Durkheimian anomie was behind the prominent part young unskilled laborers played in the armed fighting groups. The social status and mentality of these 'Pest kids' seem to be influenced or even determined mainly by social immobility or downward mobility, low levels of schooling, deviance, marginality, lack of a normal family background, general frustration, a conflict-oriented world view, etc.[21] But one has to add, skilled, as well as young unskilled manual workers were also involved in the armed rebel groups, a fact lessening the feasibility of the aforementioned argument.[22]

Workers, who created and filled in the structures of the workers' councils, co-operated closely with the technicians and engineers above them in the factory hierarchy. On the whole, they were also assisted in their self-organization in the workers' councils by the communist party and its close ally, the trade-union movement; see, for instance, the order of October 26, and the subsequent orders under the Kádárite leadership of November 16 and 22, after the Soviet occupation. This in itself, and not least, the precise way the workers' councils operated in the last months of 1956, contradicts in part the theory put forward first by Hannah Arendt. She contended, the workers' councils "have always emerged during the revolution itself, [as] they sprang from the people as spontaneous organs of action and of order". This proves that

> nothing indeed contradicts more sharply the old adage of the anarchistic and lawless 'natural' inclinations of a people left without the constraint of its government than the emergence of the councils that, wherever they appeared, and *most pronouncedly during the Hungarian Revolution,* were concerned with the reorganization of the political and economic life of the country and *the establishment of a new order.*[23] (My italics)

This highly special meaning attributed to the notion, workers' council was also accepted later on by some historians. Bill Lomax, to mention the most important of them firmly stated that the workers' councils were established with the specific aim of setting up a new social and political order.[24] Also ripe for revision is the equally mythical notion that these organizations represented the will and political credo of the skilled workers – the labor aristocracy of the day, consciously continuing and developing the spiritual legacy of social democracy. Taking seriously

into account the available data on the social composition of the armed rebel groups and the workers' councils, the argument that they expressed an organizational split between two divergent levels of workers seems not to be well founded. It is contradicted by the evidence that many, maybe the most active participants in the workers' councils were recruited from the younger generation, under 30 years of age and very often of poor peasant and agricultural-worker background.[25] Their aspirations to the upward mobility enjoyed by the urban proletariat seems to have been decisive, indeed to have given them the main impetus to identify themselves with the cause of the revolution.

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This brief overview of the social forces behind the events of 1956 and the probable motives that moved the participants in their revolutionary behavior demonstrates that there is unlikely to have been a single "text" of the Hungarian revolution, any simple, uniform interpretation of the causes behind the explosion in 1956. And that may also account for the many, even contradictory interpretations of the '56 revolution preserved and maintained to this day.

Notes

1   Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), xi.

2   Péter Bán, "A Pécsi Megyei Bíróság büntetőperes iratainak néhány társadalomtörténeti tanulsága" [Social-history lessons of criminal trial documents of Pécs County Court], in *'56 vidéken* ['56 in the Provinces] ed. Imre Kapiller (Zalaegerszeg: Zala Megyei Levéltár, 1992), 24.

3   Történeti Hivatal, Az érvényes miniszteri, miniszterhelyettesi parancsok, utasítások, közös utasítások gyűjteménye 1957. 6-21/1957.

4   The classic work is, Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past. Oral History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), esp. 150–166; See also Gábor Gyáni, "Remembering and oral history", *Budapest Review of Books*, 8: 3–4 (1998), 101–107.

5   Gábor Gyáni, "56-os menekültek emlékező stratégiái" [Remembering strategies of '56 refugees] in: Kanyó, Tamás, ed., *Emigráció és identitás. 56-os magyar menekültek Svájcban* [Emigration and Identity. '56 Hungarian Refugees in Switzerland] ed. Tamás Kanyó (Budapest: L'Harmattan/MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2002), 135–149.

6   Árpád Tyekvicska, "Helyi forradalom. Önszerveződés Nógrád községben 1956-ban" [Local revolution. Self-organization in Nógrád village in 1956)] in Imre Kapiller, *op. cit.*, 37, 41, 47 and 49.

7   Gyula Belényi, "Párhuzamos falurajzok: Kistelek és Mórahalom 1956-ben" [Parallel village pictures: Kistelek and Mórahalom in 1956] in Imre Kapiller, *op. cit.,* 14–15.

8   Tibor Valuch, "Changes in the structure and lifestyle of the Hungarian society in the second half of the XXth century" in Gábor Gyáni, György Kövér and Tibor Valuch, *Social History of*

Hungary from the Reform Era to the End of the Twentieth Century. Tr. Mario Fenyo (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, distr. New York: Columbia UP, 2004), 580.

9   Gábor Gyáni, "Social history of Hungary in the Horthy Era" in: *Ibid.,* 416.

10   Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant.* (Los Angeles and London: Berkeley, 1979).

11   Vilmos Zsidi, "A hallgatóság és a tanári kar átalakítása a közgazdaság-tudományi egyetemen 1945–1956" [Transformation of students and faculty at the University of Economics, 1945–56] in Tibor Valuch, ed., *Hatalom és társadalom a XX. századi magyar történelemben* [Power and Society in 20th-century Hungarian History] (Budapest: Osiris/1956-os Intézet, 1995), 615.

12   Mária M. Kovács and Antal Örkény, *Káderek* [Cadres] (Budapest: ELTE Szociológiai és Szociálpolitikai Intézet és Továbbképző Központ, 1991), 17. (Szociológiai füzetek series 52.)

13   György Majtényi, *A tudomány lajtorjája. "Társadalmi mobilitás" és "új értelmiség" Magyarországon a II. világháború után* [Ladder of the Science. "Social Mobility" and "New Intellectuals" in Hungary after WWII] (Budapest: Gondolat – Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005), 109.

14   Gyula Belényi, "A munkáscsaládok reáljövedelme és szociális ellátottsága (1949–1968)" [Real earnings and social provision of worker families, 1949–68], *Történelmi Szemle,* XLV, 3-4 (2003): 305–331.

15   *Idem.,* "Az extenzív iparosítás politikája és a fizikai dolgozók foglalkozási átrétegződése (1948–1953)" [The policy of extensive industrialization and occupational restructuring of manual workers, 1948–53] in Tibor Valuch, *op. cit.,* 623.

16   Sándor Horváth, "Munkás, paraszt, értelmiség munkaverseny lázában ég" [Worker, peasant and intellectual in a fever over work contests] in Levente Püski and Tibor Valuch, eds., *Mérlegen a XX. századi magyar történelem – értelmezések és értékelések* [20th-century Hungarian History in the Balance – Interpretations and Assessments] (Debrecen: 1956-os Intézet/DE TI Új- és Legújabbkori Magyar Történelmi Tanszéke, 2002), 351.

17   Case study findings in terms both of members of the "new" intellectuals or the "new" workers underline the universal instability of such a status identity. György Majtényi, *op. cit.,* 169–171; Sándor Horváth, *A kapu és a határ: mindennapi Sztálinváros* [The Gate and the Border: Everyday Sztálinváros] (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet, 2004), especially 52–53.

18   On the notion of programme ideologies (and their counterpart, status ideologies), see Miklós Szabó, "Programideológiák és állapotideológiák. Az ideológia szerepe és típusai a polgári korszakban" [Programme ideologies and status ideologies. Role and types of ideology in the bourgeois period] in *Idem., Politikai kultúra Magyarországon 1896–1986* [Political Culture in Hungary, 1896–1986] (Budapest: Medvetánc, 1989), especially 98.

19   Evidences supporting the thesis can be found in, Éva Standeisky, *Gúzsba kötve. A kulturális elit és a hatalom* [Hamstranged. The Cultural Elite and the Power] (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet – Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, 2005).

20   See John R. Gillis, *Youth in History. Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1770–Present.* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 185–211. On Hungarian aspects, see Sándor Horváth, "Hooligans, spivs and gangs. Youth subcultures in the 1960s" in János M. Rainer and György Péteri, eds., *Muddling Through in the Long 1960s. Ideas and Everyday Life in High Politics and the Lower Classes of Communist Hungary.* (Budapest: Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution/Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures and Societies, 2005), especially 200–203.

21   Gyula Kozák, "Szent csőcselék" [Holy layabouts] in *Évkönyv 1999 VII. Magyarország a jelenkorban* (Yearbook 1999 VII. Hungary in the Contemporary Period] eds., Éva Standeisky – János M. Rainer (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1999), especially 264–269.

[22]   Cf. Eszter Zsófia Tóth, "A társadalmi részvétel egyes kérdései 1956-ban" [Some questions of social participation in 1956] in Levente Püski and Tibor Valuch, *op. cit.* 379–380. One has to add, that research findings of László Eörsi are to give the most solid ground for any social history generalizations in this area. See, László Eörsi, *Ferencváros 1956. A kerület fegyveres csoportjai* [Ferencváros 1956. Armed Groups of the District] (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1997); *Idem., Corvinisták, 1956. A VIII. kerület fegyveres csoportjai* [Corvinists, 1956. Armed Groups of the VIIIth District] (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2001); *Idem., Széna tériek 1956* [From the Széna Square 1956] (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet – Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, 2004).

[23]   Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 271 and see also 274.

[24]   Bill Lomax, *Hungary 1956* (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), especially chapter V. A far more realistic, less dogmatic approach is, László Varga, "'Utóvédharc'. Munkástanácsok 1956" [Rear-Guard Fighting. Workers' councils 1956] in *Idem., Az elhagyott tömeg. Tanulmányok 1950–1956-ról* [The Abandoned Crowd. Studies on 1950–1956] (Budapest: Cserépfalvi – Budapest Főváros Levéltára, 1994), 199–237.

[25]   Eszter Zsófia Tóth, *op. cit.; Idem.,* "A Csepel Vas- és Fémművek munkástanácsainak története (1956–1957)" [History of the workers' councils of the Csepel Iron and Metal Works, 1956–1957], *Múltunk,* 1999/4. 163–198; Attila Szakolczai, "A győri vagongyár munkástanácsa a győri forradalom élén" [The workers' council of the Győr Rolling-Stock Works in front of the revolution in Győr] in Levente Püski, Lajos Timár and Tibor Valuch, eds., *Politika, gazdaság és társadalom a XX. századi magyar történelemben II.* [Politics, Economy and Society in the History of XXth Century Hungary II] (Debrecen: KLTE TI Új- és Legújabbkori Magyar Történelmi Tanszéke, 2000), 129; Sándor Horváth, "A Központi Munkástanács története" [History of the Central Workers' Council], *Első Század,* 1998/1. 113–209.

HUNGARIAN WRITERS IN THE 1956 REVOLUTION

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My intention is to reexamine some of the documents of the Hungarian revolution that contain statements by Hungarian writers. On October 26 a two-page pamphlet appeared. Its title – 'Immovably' – referred to Vörösmarty's 'Appeal'. The poems by István Sinka and Ferenc Jankovich, as well as the short essay by the Transylvanian-born author Áron Tamási represented the values of the 'Populist' movement of the interwar period. The texts of the November issue of 'Literary Newsletter' were by a wider range of writers. While most of the poems had been composed in the early 1950s, including 'One Sentence on Tyranny' by Gyula Illyés and 'The Dictator' by Lajos Kassák, the essays by Tibor Déry, László Németh, and Lőrinc Szabó were inspired by the uprising. The third document I wish to examine is the collective statement issued by the Writers' Association on December 28th. Since my paper will focus not on aesthetic values but on political views, I will not exclude texts by mediocre writers. The question I wish to ask is whether any difference can be seen between the positions taken by former communists and those who expressed anti-communist views before 1945.

Keywords: totalitarianism, political resistance, intellectual opposition, literary institutions, (self-)censorship

"In the course of their struggle against Soviet and communist tyranny, Hungarian writers and poets composed works that came to represent an everlasting contribution to Hungarian and world literature", wrote István Csicsery-Rónai in May 1957, in his Introduction to an anthology published in Washington, D. C. (Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 3). Today no serious literary scholar would accept this value judgement. In Éva Standeisky's chapter 'Literature in the Revolution', written in 2005 for a new history of Hungarian literature, the reader cannot find a single reference to a text written in the last three months of 1956 that could be characterized as a work of art. My point concerns not so much what these texts are as what they are not. Let there be no mistake about that. What Hungarian authors wrote in or around 1956 has political, historical, or documentary but no aesthetic value.

Once this has been admitted, the question arises to what extent Hungarian writers influenced the course of events. Beyond any doubt, the visual arts, music, and literature were given extraordinary significance in twentieth-century totalitarian régimes. Still, generalizations are dangerous and some distinctions are needed. As the fates of Richard Strauss, Hans Pfitzner, or Wilhelm Furtwaengler suggest, Nazi Germany gave exceptional power to outstanding musicians. It would be difficult to prove that music making suffered because of this. The same cannot be said about communist régimes; Otto Klemperer was forced to leave the Hungarian State Opera after the introduction of the one-party system. Literature became seriously distorted not only in the Third Reich but also in the communist states. No writer could preserve his/her independence from the dangerous influence of politics.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Hungarian literature published in the 1950s is virtually unreadable today. The courage of those who expressed their loss of belief in communism can be appreciated but the works marked by disillusionment are of negligible artistic value. A case in point is the poem called *Pamphlet*, written in January 1953 and published in *Irodalmi Újság* on August 1 of the same year.

> Hopeful I was, and now I look around
> full of hesitation. (Something is wrong.)

Such words may indicate that Sándor Csoóri, a poet of peasant origin who belonged to the second generation of the Populist movement that had started in the 1920s, was one of the first to lose faith in Mátyás Rákosi as 'the wise leader of the Hungarian people'. Painful as it still is to point to the naiveté of the new intellectuals manipulated by the communists, such a confession of uncertainty can be given more credit than the change of attitude of those educated communists who in 1953 decided to side with Imre Nagy and later claimed to play a decisive role in the revolution. Péter Kuczka, for instance, still lamented the disintegration of collective farms and the cult of private property, and continued to speak of class struggle in *Nyírség Diary,* published in *Irodalmi Újság* on November 7, 1953. "Comrades, we have made mistakes", he wrote with considerable cynicism. Middle-aged writers who had started their careers as non-communists before World War II, were either silenced or afraid to make any declaration that could lead to punishment. On 21 November 1954, the Transylvanian-born Áron Tamási published an "Open Letter" in *Magyar Nemzet,* the daily that pretended to represent the Patriotic Front and not the Hungarian Workers' Party. On the one hand, he reminded his readers that he had never joined any political party, on the other, he affirmed his belief in socialism.

It was not until the second half of 1955 that the signs of a conflict between the political establishment and the Hungarian Writers' Association became manifest.

One of the issues of *Irodalmi Újság* was banned because it contained a poem by the provincial and disillusioned communist László Benjámin that ridiculed József Darvas, Minister of Culture. Today the works of both of these two writers are justly forgotten. On October 14 a poem entitled *Bartók* appeared in the popular magazine *Színház és Mozi*. In this text Gyula Illyés associated Picasso's distorted women and horses with human suffering. The December issue of *Új Hang*, containing another piece by the same poet, was banned, and the production of *Galileo*, a play by Illyés's close friend László Németh, was not permitted since this play was thought to be a parable about the current situation, and a similar ban was put on *The Tragedy of Man*, a lyrical drama composed in 1860–1861, because of a scene that presented a phalanstery.

Some communists decided to criticize their leaders. On March 30, 1956, at a meeting of the party members of the Writers' Association, Sándor Lukácsy, known as the organiser of the destruction of books after the introduction of the one-party system, compared Rákosi to Judas, and on June 27, in a speech at the meeting of the Petőfi Circle the prose writer Tibor Déry blamed József Darvas, Márton Horváth, and József Révai for their cultural policy (*Írók lázadása* 1990, 32–33, 156–161). On August 11 another poem by Illyés appeared in *Irodalmi Újság*. *Hunyadi's Hand* represented a way of writing characteristic of the communist period. It seemed to speak of the past but in fact gave an interpretation of the present. The archaic style was meant to conceal the message. The statue of János Hunyadi, the warrior who fought in the battles with the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century, was given a voice, and the spirit of the past referred to "the nation's tomb". On August 18 *Trust in Freedom*, a poem by Lajos Kassák appeared in the same weekly. "Besides peaceful resignation, brave opposition can also be a merit of human beings." These words explicitly urged people to organize resistance.

The message of these two poems was supplemented by the arguments made in articles. On July 28, the president of the Writers' Association, the Populist writer Péter Veres defended the general mood of the population against the charge of nationalism formulated by the political leaders, and in the September 8 issue of *Irodalmi Újság* two communist writers published articles that contained critical remarks. Déry dismissed the Hungarian literature of the period that started with 1948 as the manifestation of a 'Stalinist era', and Gyula Háy condemned self-censorship (Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 59–62). On September 17 Veres opened the session of the Writers' Association by making the point that 'writers always walk in front of society' (Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 65). This assumption clearly shows that in 1956 Hungarian writers modelled their role on the activity of their predecessors in 1848.

Characteristically, the circle in which the most radical criticism of the régime was articulated was named after Petőfi, the Peasant Party led by Veres was rebaptised Petőfi Party, and *Appeal*, a poem by the nineteenth-century Romantic

poet Mihály Vörösmarty set to music by Béni Egressy, became so closely associ-
ated with the uprising that after 1956 people were not allowed to sing it. *Relent-
lessly*, one of the most important documents of the revolution brought out on Oc-
tober 26 by Sándor Püski, the publisher of the Populists, also borrowed its title
from the opening line of Vörösmarty's poem.

1956 is often compared to 1848. Of course, history never repeats itself. From
the perspective of literary or even cultural history, the differences are striking,
even if it is granted that what happened at the end of October 1956 was the result
of processes that had started several years before. The unimaginative fiction and
even the somewhat unsophisticated essays of Veres are largely forgotten today,
and except for Kassák, who is chiefly remembered for the works he composed be-
tween the outbreak of World War I and the 1930s, no one among the poets, not
even Illyés has left a poetic legacy as significant as those of Vörösmarty, Petőfi,
and János Arany. It cannot be claimed that any member of Imre Nagy's two cabi-
nets, not even the political scientist István Bibó, had written works that could
compete in complexity with the output of István Széchenyi or Lajos Kossuth, and
no fiction writer of the stature of József Eötvös, Zsigmond Kemény, or Mór Jókai
was involved in the fight against totalitarianism.

In 1956 literary institutions played a more important role than individuals. On
September 18 the Presidential Council of the Hungarian Writers' Association was
reshuffled. The election was by secret ballot, and although the political pressure
made it impossible to have a poll that could be called free and fair, the procedure
was unprecedented and set an example for later events. Such non-communists as
the poets Kassák, Illyés, and Lőrinc Szabó were elected, together with Áron
Tamási and even László Németh, whose *Galileo* had its first rehearsal on Septem-
ber 23. Several communist authors exercised self-criticism, although it is possible
to sense some ambiguity in their declarations. "Tragic experience, fatal mistakes,
and self-torture have forced communist writers to decide not to lie under any cir-
cumstances." This statement by Gyula Háy at the meeting of the Writers' Associa-
tion may sound more credible than the claim Tamás Aczél made in his highly rhe-
torical *Ode to Europe,* published in *Irodalmi Újság* on October 6, that "we should
open the frontier and look around in the world, (...) then adopt what is good and
leave behind what we don't like" (Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 65, 68). Áron Tamási's
article *A Hungarian Exhortation* and László Németh's short essay *A Nation on the
Rise* belong to the documents that make it difficult to decide whether the caution
that characterized numerous writers' position was necessitated by fear or could be
explained in terms of the illusion that Hungary could remain independent of both
the United States and the Soviet Union and develop a political system that repre-
sented a third road between Western capitalism and Eastern socialism, mar-
ket-oriented and planned economy. Tamási's article was published first in *Relent-
less,* whereas Németh's text was read on Free Kossuth Radio on November 1.

Both were also published in the only issue of *Irodalmi Újság* published during the revolution, on November 2.

The two important poems that appeared in what must be seen as the most significant literary manifestation of the revolution were composed years before 1956. *One Sentence on Tyranny* has become so fully institutionalized that few can read it as a work of art. It is a text with an explicit message, and its relative popularity when compared with other poems of Illyés, would seem to bear this out. As far as I know, the date of its composition is uncertain. According to its author, it was composed in the early 1950s, so it may highlight the assumption that literature had paved the way for the revolution. According to the poet, the manuscript was so effectively hidden that no one could find it, but both he and his wife knew it by heart. At the time of the outbreak of the 1956 revolution he was visiting the poet Lőrinc Szabó in Miskolc. After his return to Budapest, the Petőfi Party asked him to give them some text for publication, so he wrote down the poem.

It follows from the historical nature of art that the reputation of every work may change. It would be a mistake to deny that currently the poetry of Illyés is, to put it mildly, rather unpopular in Hungary, especially among younger people. *One Sentence on Tyranny* is usually regarded as his most memorable poem. It was published first on November 2, 1956, in the only revolutionary issue of *Irodalmi Újság*, the organ of the Hungarian Writers' Association started in 1950. Until 1986 it could not appear legally in Hungary but was known from Western and illegal publications as well as from cassettes containing the author's reading his works and made in the 1960s in the USA. On this occasion it cannot be my task to give a detailed textual analysis of this work. Let it suffice to say that it can be read as a distorted version or parody of *Liberté*, the first piece in Paul Éluard's collection *Poésie et vérité*, published in 1942. Illyés became acquainted with this French poet during his stay in Paris, in the 1920s, and *Liberté* was translated into Hungarian by György Somlyó in the 1950s. This version was re-published in the Budapest daily *Népszava* on October 30, 1956, and in the provincial newspaper *Várpalotai Napló* on November 3. Some readers may have realized that the structure of the Hungarian poem was modelled on that of the French poem.

Éluard's 85-line text was composed at the time of the German occupation of France. It appears to consist of a single sentence. Its four-line stanzas end with the words "J'écris ton nom", with the exception of the last stanza, which is followed by the word that is also the title of the poem:

> Et pour le pouvoir d'un mot
> Je recommence ma vie
> Je suis né pour te connaître
> Pour te nommer
>
> Liberté.

Both poems are based on the structural principle of gradation.

One Sentence on Tyranny was not the only text published in the November 2 issue of *Irodalmi Újság* that reminded the public of the writers' role in the preparation of what happened on and after October 23, 1956. *The Dictator*, a free-verse poem by Lajos Kassák, the leader of the Hungarian avant-garde of the second and third decades of the twentieth century, was composed in 1952. The year is significant, since it indicates that in contrast to most of his contemporaries, Kassák expressed his hatred of totalitarianism before the death of Stalin. The poem acquired a special significance at the time of its appearance, since it much less commented on the actual than forecast the inevitable; it was possible to read it as a prediction about the dismantling of the Soviet leader's Budapest statue, the work of the sculptor Sándor Mikus. In addition, it could be mentioned that it was Kassák who at a meeting of the Writers' Association, after Stalin's death, the Berlin uprising, and the Soviet leaders' decision to replace Mátyás Rákosi with Imre Nagy as prime minister, demanded the implementation of the reforms planned by the new cabinet in the summer of 1953. In consequence, Kassák lost his membership in the Hungarian Workers' Party. Contrary to widely held beliefs, Kassák played a much more significant role in the intellectual opposition to totalitarianism than such renegades as Tibor Méray, Tamás Aczél, Gyula Háy, or even Tibor Déry. Let us remember that Kassák openly disapproved of the dictatorship of the working class as early as 1919. After his attack on Béla Kun appeared in *Ma,* that journal was banned by the Hungarian communists. It is also symptomatic that in the later 1920s, after several years spent in exile, Kassák decided to return to Hungary rather than to live in Moscow, in sharp contrast to Béla Balázs, György Lukács, and others. The last two parts of his autobiography *The Life of a Man,* the sections about 1918 and 1919, were banned in interwar Hungary after a fairly large number of copies had been sold. Characteristically, they were not published between 1945 and the 1980s.

Instead of discussing the activity of those communists who in late 1956 fled to the West and in their highly biased interpretations overstressed their part in the revolution, I wish to mention two components of literary activity in October and November 1956. One of these was the response of the Hungarian writers who had lived abroad since the late 1940s. The most important among these was Sándor Márai, who flew from North America to Munich to interview those who had fled because of the Soviet invasion that started on November 4. On his return to New York, he composed the poem *Angel, Coming from Heaven.* Although Márai was not a good verse writer, this piece, inspired by a popular Christmas song, is a moving testimony to the revolution, comparing the suffering of the Hungarians to that of Christ and condemning the Western decision not to interfere. Another writer who tried to interpret the revolution in the West was László Cs. Szabó, who on

October 30 in a BBC program spoke hopefully of the resurrection of his home-
land.

As far as the texts composed in Hungary are concerned, it could be argued that
the revolution had left its mark on popular rather than on high culture. Much anon-
ymous verse and oral history can be associated with October 1956. As is
well-known, several writers were imprisoned in 1957. It is less often mentioned
that even amateurs were persecuted. To give a random example, János Abrud-
bányai, the Unitarian priest of Kocsord, a small village in Eastern Hungary, got
seven years of imprisonment because at Christmas 1956 schoolboys recited two
of his poems condemning the foreign occupation (Dikán 1993, 217–219).

It has been demonstrated that János Kádár could not tolerate allusions to the ex-
ecution of Imre Nagy. That may be a partial reason for the scarcity of references to
the revolution in the Hungarian literature of the 1960s and 1970s. Those writers
who departed from the official interpretation were punished even in the 1980s.
When *An Everlasting Summer: I Am Older than 9,* a poem composed by Gáspár
Nagy in 1983, appeared in the Tatabánya monthly *Új Forrás,* in October 1984, its
author ceased to be the secretary of the Hungarian Writers' Association. My very
rough translation of the final stanza:

> once there will be a funeral
> we must not forget
> and have to name the murderers.

One cannot do justice to the original in which the last word of each of these
lines is an infinitive, a form that in Hungarian has the ending NI, the initials of
Imre Nagy.

There are very few comparable works that date from the decades prior to 1989.
Sad as it may seem, the compromise most Hungarian writers made with Kádár's
régime was successful in removing the revolution from the memory of the genera-
tions that emerged in the two or even three decades after 1956. György Aczél,
Kádár's cultural advisor did his best to gain the support of the leading intellectu-
als, including not only Illyés but those who were silenced after 1948. When I
was working on my book on Géza Ottlik, I found drafts of letters by this non-
communist writer addressed to Aczél on the birthday of this political leader
(Szegedy-Maszák 1994). Self-censorship led to a corruption with consequences
that will not disappear in the foreseeable future. Márai may have been right in be-
lieving that Hungary paid a very high price. Kádár's régime was arguably more
liberal than that of the rest of the Eastern bloc, but the loss may have been irrepara-
ble. Péter Esterházy's book called *Revised Edition* about his father's work as a spy
for the communists after 1956 may remind us that today there are many Hungarian
citizens who could be blamed for what they had done before 1989. To be more
specific, it would be difficult to find any text by any historian published in Hun-

gary in the period between 1957 and 1989 with no trace of political concessions. On a personal note, I could mention that nowadays I participate in the monthly meetings of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences with an old colleague who censored my publications in the 1960s, 70s, and even 80s. The latent, "deep down" thing is our mutual wonderment as to what we may remember. I may give him rope and yet at the same time remain tied. On one occasion, Péter Esterházy, whose works I admire, seemed to thank me that I never made him aware that I knew that his father was a spy, although he sent reports about my family that I did not care to read after the documents had been released. The words "you are both the prison-keeper and the prisoner" and "every one is a link in the chain" may strike us as prophetic for a long period. This prophecy about the inevitable consequences of everyone's active function as a wheel in the machine of the totalitarian system distinguishes *One Sentence on Tyranny* from the pseudo-confessional and/or bombastic declarations of second-rate versifiers and journalists who have done an excellent job in exploiting and manipulating the memory of the 1956 revolution. Illyés's French culture, his initiations of intelligence and experience, if one will, to say nothing of his work as a translator, make for me a sort of figure who wished to avoid both provincialism and superficial internationalism. It is important that what we may learn from *One Sentence on Tyranny,* we learn less about the early 1950s than about the years that followed the date of its composition. I seem to run here the risk of a bit of exposure to the charge of more or less repeating what Márai wrote in exile, but it may be important to state that, whether designedly or not, the bulk of the Hungarian population betrayed the revolution in the decades that followed 1956. Of course, the blame should be put on the Western reluctance to help rather than on the lethargy of those who survived those decades as citizens of a Warsaw-Pact country. In any case, 1956 promotes infinite reflection, makes a hundred queer and ugly things glare at us right and left.

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ANXIETY OF IDEOLOGY: RESISTANCE TO ALLEGORY IN THE LITERARY NARRATION OF HISTORY

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The efforts of the communist regime, following the Revolution of 1956, to channel discussion of the events of the Revolution into a simplistic ideological opposition exerted (and arguably continue to exert) a powerful influence on political discourse in Hungary, in spite of numerous challenges issued against the validity of this opposition by historians and political scientists. It is possible that literature may offer new perspectives from which the terms that have exercised such a constrictive influence on this discourse can be reevaluated. This discussion of works of poetry by French, German, and American poets on the events of 1956 in Hungary examines the ways in which not only these events, but also the terms in which they were cast were perceived and thrown into question by writers living outside Hungary, several of whom also wrote influential essays on politics. Moreover, it considers how literary theory, specifically because it makes language and the creation of meaning the object of its inquiry, provides critical strategies through which the terms of this discourse can be deconstructed and deflated, creating opportunities for new (re)constructions of our understanding of these events.

Keywords: Hungary, 1956, poetical reception, Jean-Paul Sartre, E. E. Cummings, Albert Camus, Marguerite Duras

In the months and years following the uprising against Russian occupation in Hungary in 1956 numerous poets and authors from the United States and several countries of Western Europe composed works memorializing the events of the uprising and its aftermath. For several of these writers, especially those who at some time in their lives had sympathies with communism, the uprising and particularly its suppression represented a challenge to communist ideology. In this context the events in Hungary of late October and early November 1956 acquire the character of an abstraction. Their relevance becomes a function of the place they assume in an ideological framework of constructed oppositions (the most obvious example being the frequently invoked opposition of revolution and counter-revolution in the rhetoric of Marxist ideology). In contrast to this, however, the writings of several other poets seem to evince an uneasiness with and desire to avoid abstraction.

In their attempts to transform these historical events into language these writers sought rhetorical strategies that, far tending towards allegory, strive to resist parabolic readings. These two approaches to the depiction in poetry of the events of the uprising in 1956 can be thought of as emblematic of two divergent aspirations of literary (and arguably historical) discourse: the desire to assert and ascribe meaning and the desire to insist on the purely representational function of discourse that figures independently of any mediating, interpreting presence.

In the following analyses of several poems written on the events of the uprising in Hungary I attempt to isolate rhetorical strategies that are instrumental in the construction of allegory on the one hand and the resistance to allegorical readings on the other. I seek in particular to illustrate how specific critical techniques developed in the study of literature can reveal the rhetorical processes through which allegorical readings are encouraged and discouraged. I offer reflections concerning the different functions of these contrasting approaches to the literary depiction of historical events in the process of shaping historical memory. In conclusion, I make tentative suggestions concerning the potential uses of such critical techniques in the study of historical and political discourse, suggesting how they may allow more sensitive understandings of the textual artifacts (be they literary, historical, political, etc.) through which these events are memorialized by foregrounding the processes through which they are constructed.

There are any number of rhetorical approaches to the construction of allegory that merit attention. These include the personification of abstract concepts such as in the poem *To Hungary, that American Might Explain* by American Neil Bradford Olson, in which freedom is referred as a loving woman:

> ... freedom never loved best
> Those that bled the less for loving her.[1]

Similarly, in the poem *Hautes Saisons* (High Seasons) by Paul Chaulot one finds the personification of Budapest as a metonym for Hungary coupled with a metaphorical assertion of the emblematic significance of the struggle:

> Sang de Budapest, affiche de chair
> Aux murs de Paris.
> (Blood of Budapest, placard of flesh
> On the walls of Paris.)

However, rather than enumerate such techniques and examples I'd like to focus on one of the more salient approaches to the abstraction of the events of 1956 and examine the implications of this approach, namely the allusion to historical events that have themselves acquired an iconic status. Such allusions are particularly significant in the poetic depiction of historical events specifically because they attempt to confer onto the events they allegorize the same historical significance,

implying that in time they too will become iconic. Moreover, they ascribe to these events a transnational significance by linking them to moments in national histories that have taken on the stature of global history and become metonymic in world historical narratives. An example of this invocation of an iconic moment in European history is the poem *Politische Drucksache* (Political Pamphlet) by German poet Heinz Winfried Sabais. Each of the first two stanzas of this six stanza poem begins with an explicit reference to the French Revolution of 1789:

> Seid getrost, ihr Unterdrückten, Verzweifelten:
> Jede Bastille ist noch abgebrochen worden.
> …
> Seid getrost, irgendein Morgen wird wieder
> Der vierzehnte Juli sein.
>
> (Be consoled, you oppressed, you desperate,
> Every Bastille will eventually be torn down.
> …
> Be consoled, eventually some tomorrow
> Will be the 14th of July.)

Noticeable in this poem is the fact that although it was composed as a tribute to the uprising of 1956, it makes no explicit mention either of Hungary and Hungarians or of Russia or Russians, referring instead to "the oppressed", "the agents of oppression", and "the dictators". Thus the events in Hungary serve as an occasion for abstraction, as an example of an inexorable historical truth, as a human tragedy but not as a national tragedy.

A similar example is found in the poem *Aux poètes hongrois* (To the Hungarian Poets) by French poet Georges-Emmanuel Clancier. This poem, which contains references to Hungary and more specifically Budapest, compares the Hungarian capital to other cities devastated in conflicts of the not distant past:

> Jeunesse, sang de la liberté,
> …
> Ta lumière est celle de l'amour
> Et leur hideuse nuit est la même
> A Budapest que l'ombre d'Oradour
> Et la ténèbre de Guernica.
>
> Youth, blood of liberty,
> …
> Your glow is the same as that of love
> And their hideous night the same
> In Budapest as the shadow of Oradour
> And the obscurity of Guernica.

Perhaps less iconic than the Bastille or July 14th, these allusions to the bombing of the city of Guernica in 1937 and the massacre by German soldiers of 642 inhabitants of the Limousin town of Oradour-sur-Glane in the Haute-Vienne department of France in June of 1944 constitute not only an attempt to ascribe the significance of historical allegory to the events in Hungary. They also represent a challenge, more explicit than that in the poem by Heinz Winfried Sabais, to the ascription of the term counter-revolution by the Kádár regime to the events of 1956. They situate 1956 in the context of recent conflicts that themselves had been appropriated by the Communist party as emblematic, inverting, however, the opposition. Thus, the poem implicitly affirms the ideological opposition explicit in the Marxist conception of revolution and counter-revolution, locating 1956, however, on the other side of the antithesis.

These comparisons of the events in Hungary to other events in European history can be interpreted as gestures of consecration that confer upon 1956 not only historical significance but also a stable meaning that defies reevaluation. By equating 1956 to moments in history that have assumed the stature of icons they sever it from a specific historical context and assign it a mythic value. In doing so, however, they aggressively depersonalize 1956. By situating it in a mythologized past these comparisons (and the poems in which they figure) reduce 1956 to an ideological opposition. Rather than constitute a set of events the meanings of which remain open to interpretation, it becomes one of two antithetical signposts on an abstract ideological spectrum. The poetic text, far from attempting to render through its metaphors a distinctive vision of particular events, deprives 1956 of any historical specificity, reducing it to a sign that implicitly affirms the value of · the opposition central to Marxist ideology of revolution and counter-revolution.

An interesting critique of the functions of historical allegory as exemplified in these poems can be found in the writings of French dramatist, novelist, and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. In an essay entitled Search for a Method, published along with the longer essay Critique of Dialectical Reason in 1960, Sartre expresses his frustration with the tendency among French communists to insist in their analyses of the events in Hungary on what Sartre thought of as an adherence to a dogmatic interpretation of Marxist ideology. Writing dismissively of the contention made by communists in France that "world imperialism" lay "at the origin of the events in Hungary" in 1956, Sartre contends that for these Marxists analysis

> consists solely in getting rid of detail, in forcing the signification of certain events, in denaturing facts or even in inventing a nature for them in order to discover it later underneath them, as their substance[.][2]

Sartre notes that the portrayal of reactionaries alleged to have had a role in the uprising attempts to transform these figures into allegorical characters in a reenact-

ment of a parable of Marxist dogma. "These reactionaries", he writes, "pass over into eternal Reaction; they are brothers of the counter-revolutionaries of 1793, and their only distinctive trait is the will to injure."[3] This objection invites questions concerning the implications of the comparison drawn by Heinz Winfried Sabais between the events in Hungary in 1956 and the events of the French Revolution. While for the German poet 1956 falls at the other end of the ideological spectrum, he nevertheless tacitly affirms the validity of the opposition invoked by the French communists whom Sartre criticizes. Both viewpoints insist on the purely ideological rather than on the historical relevance of 1956 and both encourage one to ignore the contexts of these events in order to facilitate an alleged similarity that is meaningful only as an abstraction.

For Sartre himself, however, 1956 represented the first persuasive challenge to Marxist doctrine as he and other Western intellectuals had interpreted it. Far from reifying his conception of the politically engaged Marxist intellectual expressed in earlier writings such as the 1948 play *Les Main Sales,* 1956 radically altered Sartre's attitudes towards the Soviet Union and communism. Although he never abandoned his Marxist sympathies, he fundamentally rejected in his later writings what he thought of as the simplistic oppositions that sought to ignore or even efface historical specificities.

Sartre was by no means the only prominent Western writer-intellectual for whom the events in Hungary of 1956 constituted a challenge to Marxist ideology. Prominent poets and authors such as Albert Camus, Marguerite Duras, E. E. Cummings, and Archibald Macleish wrote in contemporary periodicals expressing their outrage at the Soviet occupation of Hungary and the suppression of the uprising. Some of these writers, for instance Cummings, had what could be described as socialist leanings. Others, Camus and Duras, had at some point been members of the communist party. By the early 1950s, however, none of them had any illusions about the Soviet Union. For these authors the events in Hungary were not a cause for surprise. They merely further discredited communism and the Soviet Union. There were however other prominent writers who, like Sartre, maintained their faith both in communist ideology and in the Soviet Union as a liberating, democratizing force in Central Europe up until October 1956. Martinique poet, dramatist and political essayist Aimé Césaire, who had been elected as mayor of Fort-de-France in 1945 running on the communist party ticket, tendered his resignation from the party in 1956, making specific reference in his letter to the Secretary General of the French Communist party to events in Hungary.[4] British novelist, poet, and essayist Kingsley Amis, who was a member of the Communist Party up until the suppression of the uprising in Hungary and later went on to become a staunch political conservative, wrote in a letter to the communist periodical *The Daily Worker* dated February 14th 1957, "I used to say that some of my best friends are communists. I can't after Hungary."[5]

If one of the meanings of 1956 is the inadequacy of abstraction, this raises diffi-
cult questions for the poet seeking to craft a textual monument. He/she is immedi-
ately confronted with the essentially abstract nature of language itself. The poet
seeking to discourage allegorical readings must adopt rhetorical strategies
through which the figurative nature of language does not obscure its alleged rep-
resentational function. Far from serving as a tool through which events can be
metaphorically represented, discourse becomes an obstacle that interposes itself
between the text and the reality to which it attempts to refer. The poet must devise
means of overcoming this obstacle.

One such strategy that has had a long history in the literatures of Western Eu-
rope is the insistence, explicit or implicit, on the inadequacy of literary figuration
itself. Paradigmatic examples include the opening lines to Shakespeare's sonnet
130, in which the poet insists "My love's eyes are nothing like the sun", or the
prefatory passages to Balzac's *Père Goriot,* in which the narrator insists "this
drama is neither fiction nor romance". This emphasis on the insufficiency of liter-
ary representation becomes a trope itself. It expresses the poet's thwarted yearn-
ing to transcend the limits of sedimented literary language and devise new ap-
proaches to poetic representation that do not transform a unique event into a liter-
ary platitude.

Numerous poems written on the events of the uprising in 1956 deploy this
strategy in forms more and less explicit. French poet Gerard Prevot insists in his
poem *Aux poètes hongrois* that "Nous ne vous donnerons rien qui puisse être
appelé Littérature" ("We will give you nothing that might be called Literature")
spelling literature, in the original French, with a capital L, as if to denote an insti-
tution as much as a form of art. In a poem entitled *Tract pour les insurgés
hongrois* and dedicated to Géza Képes Alain Bosquet writes,

> Nous vous jurons de ne rien dire qui soit beau;
> Nous vous jurons de ne rien faire qui soit grand.
>
> (We swear to you not to say anything that might be beautiful;
> We swear to you not to do anything that might be noble.)

In the opening lines of his poem *Hungary* English poet C. S. Fraser adopts a more
ironic approach, using a simple declarative sentence to subvert the famous saying
attributed to Patrick Henry: "'But give me liberty or give me death!' / They gave
them death." The poem continues, an ironic mix of literary figuration and the ex-
plicit rejection of figuration:

> Come, look at the rubbish of a season.
> Cracked leaves and crumpled newspapers
> On the patchy scruff of a back green!
> Why should we cut rhetorical capers?

> Last week's courage is this week's treason:
> That is what moving armies mean.

Yet if the rejection of formulae constitutes an expression of the poet's perception of the uniqueness of the event depicted, it nevertheless fails to stage (literarily) the event itself, for doing so would be to imply that the event can be reduced to language. This raises the question what rhetorical strategies are available to the poet who wishes to stage the event with language without reducing the event to a mere literary phantasm? In an essay entitled *The Reality Effect* French literary theorist Roland Barthes offers an answer to this question. In a discussion of so-called realist narratives of the nineteenth century Barthes identifies the enumeration in a novel of descriptive details that bear no relevance to plot or theme as a device deployed to impress upon the reader the reality of the object described. While details which seem to have thematic or metaphorical significance may appear as the fantastic creation of the imaginative poet, details which defy integration into a larger thematic whole suggest – specifically because they defy this integration – that they figure in the text simply because they are true. They are the elements of reality that exist outside of the structuring activities of the poet. As such, they are an assertion both of the reality and of the uniqueness of the event, a uniqueness that resists reduction to allegory.

An example of a text that incorporates such details is the poem *Chanson pour la Hongrie* by Janine Mitaud. This poem, rich in abstraction, also includes moments of description that seem to bear little or no thematic significance. The opening stanza of the poem recalls the poet's acquaintances among members of a Roma community in Hungary:

> Mes frères d'une fête
> Mes amis d'un été[.]
>
> (My brothers of a fête
> My friends of a summer[.]

These lines can be read literally or figuratively, words like "fête" and "summer" bearing numerous metaphorical and even allegorical connotations. Yet alongside such descriptions the poet also mentions that her Roma friends had laughed upon learning that she had gotten lost:

> Un soir vous avez ri
> Que je me perde dans la ville
> Pour avoir confundu
> Syllabes-sœurs en votre langue.
>
> (One evening you laughed
> That I had gotten lost in the town

> Having confused
> Sister-syllables in your language.)

Apart perhaps from suggesting the poet's foreignness, this passage serves no function other than to render real this experience. While the opening lines might invite the reader to interpret the poem as a parabolic idealization, this passage defies such a reading or rather supplements it, preventing the reader from reducing the characters of the poem to the figures of an abstraction or allegory.

Similarly, Jerome Mazzaro's poem In *Praise of the Generation After World War II* uses what Barthes refers to as "futile" details to preclude the reduction of the central figure of the poem to a literary personification of an abstraction. The poem describes the despair of a woman who had fought in the underground against the occupying German forces and later boasted of her bravery. Now, caught in the machinegun fire of a different struggle, she feels ashamed to have served as a "banner" of an alleged "freedom". The poem is explicitly about this woman's frustration to have been depersonalized in the conflicts between different occupying powers. Note how, in the opening paragraph, the precision of a detail irrelevant to the struggles that form the context of the poem asserts the reality and the individuality of this woman:

> In the machinegunfire
> Waking from hope as if
> From sinking,
> She cuts through the cobbled streets
> Alone, her dress waved in
> The brisk...
> Winds[.]

Neither the woman's dress nor the brisk winds in which it waves appear again in the poem. They figure a single time, lavish in their irrelevance, serving in the text only as a confirmation of the reality of the scene described. By suspending for a moment the metaphorical activity of the text exemplified in such images as "waking from hope", this insertion of an extraneous detail suggests that the poem, however personal a vision it may be, nevertheless follows reality submissively. It thus forestalls any attempt to reduce the poem entirely to the product of the structuring activity of the subjective imagination of the poet, insisting on the descriptive, rather than interpretive, value of the text. Ironically, far from being irrelevant, these details are crucial to the theme of the poem, which is the inadequacy of ideological abstraction as a means to describe the fates of individuals.

This discussion of several poems written in Western Europe and the United States following the uprising in 1956 has attempted to identity two divergent tendencies in the structuring of literary monuments to historical events: commemoration through the creation out of specific events of allegorical meanings and com-

memoration that attempts to preserve these events from the oversimplifications inherent in allegory. In doing so it has sought to give precise description of rhetorical techniques through which allegory is both constructed and resisted. The question with which I would conclude is to what extent an analysis of the use of such rhetorical techniques in historical and political accounts might yield insights into the tendencies underlying these accounts. Arguably historical texts must also grapple with these contradictory demands to assign meaning, while at the same time rendering objective descriptions. Such an analysis of accounts of 1956 might be of particular interest specifically because these events, the subject of dogmatic categorization under communism, have undergone and continue to undergo such radical evaluations since the fall of the Kádár regime.

Notes

[1] All poems cited in this paper are contained in the multi-lingual anthology *Gloria Victis: Az 1956-os magyar szabadságharc költői visszhangja a nagyvilágban*. Budapest: Szabadsajtó, 1987 (fourth edition). All translations are mine.

[2] Jean-Paul Sartre. *Search for a Method*. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1963. p. 27.

[3] Sartre, *ibid.*, 30 (footnote).

[4] See Aimé Césaire. "Lettre à Maurice Thorez". In: *Aimé Césaire: Œuvres complètes. V. III: Oeuvre historique et politique*. Paris: Editions Désormeaux, 1976. pp. 463–473.

[5] Kingsley Amis. *The Letters of Kingsley Amis*. Edited by Zachary Leader. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000. p. 503.

THE IMPACT OF 1956
ON THE HUNGARIANS OF TRANSYLVANIA

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"The Impact of 1956 on the Hungarians of Transylvania", provides a 50-year retro-
spective analysis of the political consequences of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956
on the Hungarians in neighboring Romania. It focuses on the inter-ethnic knock-on
effects in the Romanian Workers Party, the "Hungarian/Mures-Hungarian Autono-
mous Region" of Transylvania, and the cultural institutions of the Hungarian minor-
ity. It links these developments to present-day Romanian-Hungarian relations, both
on the interstate and the intrastate levels.

Keywords: Transylvania, 1956, Hungarian minority, Bolyai University, Romania,
Romanian Workers' Party

The Hungarian "Fight for Freedom of 1956" had dramatic consequences not
only for the people of Hungary but for the Hungarians in neighboring states. It is
the concern of this paper to focus on the consequences of 1956 on the lives of
Hungarians in Transylvania, within the Peoples' Republic of Romania.

I have chosen this topic because very little has appeared about it in English or
other "world" languages. Since 1989 many studies and documents have been pub-
lished in Hungarian on this subject, but very little of this awareness has been trans-
mitted beyond the Carpathian Basin. Thus, even among policymakers and acade-
micians there is confusion and outright ignorance about 1956 and its cross-border
effects in East-Central Europe.

I have selected Transylvania for my focus, because it is the area that witnessed
the most far-reaching consequences, but which still has a wealth of literature and
documentation in Hungarian. My objective at present is simply to provide a syn-
thesis of these findings, an overview which will guide others to focus on this issue
with the attention that it truly deserves. The subject deserves such attention be-
cause 1956 was the catalyst and the catharsis that has defined Hungarian-Roma-
nian relations ever since on both intra-state and interstate levels.

The Hungarian literature and documentation has appeared in the publications
of the Teleki László Foundation and the 1956 Institute, as well as a few maverick

sources in the West. The most ambitious compilations have been those of Zoltán Tófalvi, Ágoston Székelyhidi, Ádám Szesztay, László Diószegi, Andrea R. Süle, Kálmán Csiha, András Bodor, István Fehér, Ildikó Lipcsey, and Anna P. Sebők.[1]

It is particularly important to link 1956 to Romanian-Hungarian relations, because like the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 the history of twentieth-century Transylvania is defined by these two events. 1920 witnessed the transfer of sovereignty over Transylvania to the Romanian state, which came out of World War I as the major recipient of Entente, particularly French, largesse. The context of this decision reflected the will and perceptions of the victorious powers then. In 1947 the post-World War II decisions simply reinforced this earlier decision. As opposed to this, 1956, more than any other event, rehabilitated the Hungarians in the eyes of the Western world. Yet, while 1956 was a peak event for Hungarians as a whole, it was followed by devastating consequences for the Hungarians of Transylvania. 1956 provided both the pretext and the opportunity to dismantle Hungarian cultural institutions and communal solidarity in Romania.

Antecedents

Before we turn to an analysis of these developments, it is important to remind ourselves of the nature of the Transylvanian situation in the decade preceding 1956. The urban scene was still overwhelmingly Hungarian in most of Northern Transylvania. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century Kolozsvár/Cluj was a predominantly Hungarian city. Even on the eve of the revolution, this city was still 50.3% Hungarian and only 48.2% Romanian.[2] Furthermore, its institutional profile still included the independent Bolyai University, which provided an organized framework for Hungarian higher education. This provided the Hungarian minority with a self-conscious and properly trained elite.

While Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader of the Romanian Worker's Party, was committed to breaking/undermining the major strongholds of the Transylvanian Hungarian community, he could do so only after the consolidation of ethnic Romanian control over the Romanian Communist Party (at this point called the Romanian Worker's Party). This was accomplished through a patient application of Lenin's "two steps forward, one step back" tactical advice. After all, the Party – the Soviet "control-system" – needed the nationalities in the first stages of capturing and consolidating their power in Romania.

The communist seizure of power in Romania was complete with Petru Groza's ascendancy on March 5, 1945, but it was technically confirmed only with the abdication of King Michael in December 1947. In these years Romania was transformed into a "People's Democracy". One of the most important tactics utilized to attain this end was the nationalities policy of the Party, dedicated to the tenets of

"proletarian internationalism" and the eradication of the abuses and persecutions suffered by the country's national minorities in the days of "bourgeois chauvinism".[3] But while this policy – the eradication of nationalism – was being carried to fulfillment, the growth of the RWP, its changing ethnic composition and organization, was foreboding for future developments for these same national minorities and revealed developments that were far from promising.

The most dramatic development having long-range affects on the position of the country's ethnic minorities and on the resurgence of nationalism was the rapid growth of the RWP following the seizure of power. From a minuscule Party of around 1,000 members in April 1944, the Party grew to 217,000 members by September 1945. This growth accelerated and by June 1947 there were 710,000 members. In this early phase of its development it reached a total of 937,846 members by the September of 1948 with the absorption of the Social Democrats. This was followed by a series of purges (to be discussed below), which consolidated the Party membership at 580,000 in June 1956, just a few months before the Revolution erupted in Hungary.[4] The rapid growth of the Party, particularly in the years up to 1948 drastically altered its ethnic make-up. This growth relegated the ethnic minority Party members – who in the past composed the bulk of the RWP – into a secondary position, as Party ranks were swelled by ethnic Romanians who had seen "the handwriting on the wall".[5]

This rapid post-war growth of the Party was the first major step toward its "nationalization". After 1948, however, the RWP stabilized its membership and carried out purges among elements that it regarded as "unhealthy". Even these purges, however, caused the greatest damage not in the ranks of the newly recruited ethnic Romanians, but in the ranks of the veteran ethnic minority Communists.[6] Thus, both the growth and the purges of the Party contributed to the strengthening of the ethnic Romanian sectors of the RWP. The increases in Party membership accentuated this trend.[7] The regime's search for popularity among the masses allowed it to lower its standards for membership. This enabled many to join who were ignorant of, if not hostile to, the tenets of "proletarian internationalism" and the traditional policies of "minority tolerance", which had prevailed prior to this growth in Party membership.

The resurgence of nationalism can be partly explained by the decimation of the de-nationalized elements, which had composed the bulk of the RWP before 1944. Membership in the Party prior to the seizure of power was predominantly "internationalist", composed of individuals who were for the most part non-Romanians ethnically.[8] Historical reasons determined this adhesion of minorities to the RWP, some of which have already been touched on above. It is the purpose of this study to examine briefly the composition of the RWP prior to the seizure of power, as well as after its "nationalization".

Before the seizure of power the growth and composition of the Party can be divided by the historic Fifth Party Congress of 1932.[9] Up to this Congress, the national minorities dominated the RWP. Jews and Ukrainians from Bessarabia, Bulgarians from Dobrogea, and Jews and Hungarians from Transylvania outnumbered at this stage the ethnic Romanians in the positions of leadership as well as in the number of Party members.[10] From 1932 onwards, however, the ethnic Romanians began to play a prominent part in the Party's leadership although they were still not the dominant sector of the Party membership.

The Party of the inter-war years was made up of roughly two groups. One group was composed of national minority intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals. The other group was composed of ethnic Romanian laborers.[11] Of the two groups the former seems to have been more important until the Party Congress of 1932. They were a heterogeneous lot made up of a variety of nationalities drawn from all classes and practically all professions. As opposed to this, the ethnic Romanian sector of the Party was in all ways more homogeneous. Not only were they similar in national origin, but their class and labor background gave them more social solidarity and political cohesion. Their role became more important following the Fifth Party Congress, the Grivița Strike of 1933, and the emergence of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as secretary-general of the RWP.[12]

The RWP after the Seizure of Power

After August 1944 the RWP underwent a vast change in composition. This change took place on all levels of the Party hierarchy from the Politburo down to the local cell organizations. This change has brought about a real "nationalization" of the Party along ethnic lines.[13] To understand this nationalization it will be necessary to examine not only all levels of the Party hierarchy, but also the fragmentation of the Party leadership following the seizure of power. This fragmentation of the leadership followed the general pattern of other East European satellites, and reflects the division of the Party into "Muscovites", "westerners", and "home" communists.

The "Muscovites" composed perhaps the most "alien" (i.e., non-Romanian) segment of the RWP not only because of their heterogeneous national backgrounds, but also because their first loyalty was always to the Kremlin center and the international at the expense of Romanian needs or capabilities.[14] This group was represented by such well-known individuals as Ana Pauker, Leonte Rautu, Vasile Luka, Dumitru Coliu, and Emil Bodnaras. They were a "rootless" group who were often at odds with one another as well as with the "home" and "western" communists. What gave them their uniting label was that they had spent most of World War II as well as some of the inter-war years in the Soviet Union under the

tutorship of Stalin. They returned to Romania on the coat-tails of the Red Army to assist and carry to fulfillment the communization of the country.[15]

The "westerners" were the smallest of the three above mentioned groups and also the least significant. They resembled the "Muscovites" in a number of ways, yet they were distrusted by Stalin. Like the "Muscovites" they were also recruited predominantly from among the national minorities. Such individuals as Gheorghe Gaston-Marin and Petre Borila represent this group-[16]

Their major – perhaps only – unifying characteristic is that they had spent the war years or part of the 1930's in the West, taking part in the Spanish Civil War or later in the resistance movement in France. Like the "Muscovites" they too returned to Romania at the close of hostilities to take part in the communization of the country.

Unlike the above two groups, the "home" communists in Romania were predominantly (on the leadership level) of Romanian ethnic stock. They had spent the war years as well as most of the inter-war years in Romanian prisons. Although they were relatively a more homogeneous lot than the former two groups, they were by no means united in outlook. Individuals like Gheorghiu-Dej, Apostol, Patrascanu, Ceaușescu, Maurer, Dalea, Moghioros, and Draghici made up this group.[17] While most of them had similar social origins and "religious" backgrounds, their unifying characteristic was that they had spent the inhospitable inter-war years, as well as World War II, in the country.[18] They were, in this sense, the group that was welded together most through a common past of travail and persecution at the hands of the "bourgeois" and "fascist" authorities.

From these various elements – "Muscovites", "westerners", and "home" – the leadership of the RWP was forged in the immediate post-war years. However, the amalgamation of such diverse elements was bound not to last. Even during the lifetime of Stalin – who had imposed unity on these elements in the first place[19] – the instability of the Party's composition demanded internal alterations. These alterations were provided by a number of purges, of which the Patrascanu purge of 1948 and the Pauker-Luka-Georgescu purge of 1952 stand out as the most important.[20] These early purges were later (1957) augmented by the Constantinescu-Chisinevschi purge which followed close on the de-Stalinization policies of the bloc,[21] though ideologically not directly related to them.

The composition of the RWP reflected the change wrought by these purges. The change had "Romanianized" the Party in the true sense of the word at the top levels of power. It eliminated the most "foreign" members from the Party power-structure. Thus, the "aliens" (Pauker, Luka, Georgescu, Chisinevschi, Foris, Koffler and numerous lesser figures) received the ax together with a few "natives" like Patrascanu and Constantinescu. The net result has been to consolidate within the Politburo and the Secretariat the position of the ethnic Romanian Party leaders, who had grouped themselves around Gheorghiu-Dej.[22]

Homogenization Begins

This Romanianized RWP under Gheorghiu-Dej then undertook the task to be-
gin the homogenization of Romania's population. By 1956 he had achieved two
goals that he had set for himself in 1945; he had broken the back of the old Roma-
nian elite, and he had eliminated his major opponents from the Party leadership.
He could now undertake the challenge of assimilating the minority nationalities,
particularly the Hungarians of Transylvania.[23] Even before Stalin died, in January
1953 he had declared that the "nationality question has been solved in Roma-
nia".[24] In Romania Stalinism was institutionalized even without Stalin. Even in
1956 after the Soviet XXth Party Congress, de-Stalinization did not take place.
Gheorghiu-Dej categorically rejected the need to exercise self-criticism, which
had been timidly broached by a minuscule minority of the Party's higher echelon,
including Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevschi. Among the reform com-
munists, among the Hungarians of Romania, the XXth Party Congress and the
program of the Imre Nagy government had a more far-reaching impact. In March,
László Szabédi, instructor at the Bolyai University, already raised the question of
equal opportunity for Hungarians.[25]

Romanians needed to make concessions in a few concrete cases. In July 1956 a
resolution was circulated about the need to raise standards of instruction. Other
verbal commitments were made for additional instructional and cultural opportu-
nities. Plans were underway for reestablishing Hungarian museums in cities like
Nagyszalonta. Articles appeared in *Előre,* the government run daily newspaper,
promising that the Arad memorial for the martyred heroes of 1849 would finally
be refurbished. (These had been taken down in 1925!) Some new minority period-
icals also began publication, and there were promises of additional book publish-
ing opportunities as well.[26] All this, however, was simply the "one step back". The
Revolution of 1956 provided Gheorghiu-Dej with the opportunity to take the next
"two steps forward!"

It is in this context that the Bolyai University now was targeted for elimination.
It had survived World War II. It officially became the Universitatea Bolyai din
Cluj (The Bolyai University of Cluj) in 1946. It survived because it was in the in-
terest of the Petru Groza administration to placate the Hungarian minority. In this
way he could assure their support for his administration. At the same time it was
useful to demonstrate to the outside world that Romania was pursuing a tolerant
policy toward its minorities. The negotiations in Paris leading to the Peace Treaty
were in part concerned about the future fate of Northern Transylvania.[27] Would it
remain with Romania or would part of it be returned to Hungary? Apparently, the
retention of the Bolyai University was a convincing argument – used by Foreign
Minister Tatarescu – to allow Romania to retain all of Transylvania.

Unfortunately, the Bolyai University did not long survive the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty. Within a decade it was divided, reduced and finally by 1959 absorbed by the Romanian Babeş University. This process was carried out in a series of campaigns, which culminated in the institution's Romanianization.

One could argue that Romania under both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu perfected the "salami tactics" system of Mátyás Rákosi, at least in the way in which they systematically undermined Hungarian instruction at the university level. As we have shown above, the nationality policy of the 1944–1947 years responded primarily to Romania's desire to retain all of Transylvania. With this in mind all kinds of temporary concessions were made to the minorities. The nationality policy also responded to Soviet hegemonial demands, to assure that a communist government would come to power in Romania. Playing on the insecurities of the minorities helped the Communists to power. This required concessions such as the "Nationality Statute" and the protection of minority-language institutions, including the Bolyai University.[28]

The relative enlightenment in minority-majority relations was also due to two other factors. One was the role of Petru Groza, the other was the over-representation of the minorities in the Party organization at higher levels of the hierarchy. At least this was the case in 1946–1947, and it also remained characteristic to a more limited extent from 1947 to 1952. While Groza was influential in policymaking, the minorities fared much better. His outlook was colored by tolerance for diversity and respect for the cultural contributions of all nationalities. In relation to the Bolyai University this was clearly demonstrated by his support in 1945 of the retention of thirty instructors, who had Hungarian rather than Romanian citizenship prior to 1940.[29] However, as Groza lost his influence and the Party apparatchiks around Gheorghiu-Dej gained influence, he was less able to stem the tide of Romanian ethnocentrism.

The changed complexion of the leadership in the Romanian power-structure set the stage for the "salami tactics" that characterized the Romanianization of all aspects of minority life. This process of planned corrosion began almost at the moment that the regime issued the charter for the Bolyai University's right to exist. It could be argued, perhaps, that this first stage was not a consequence of Party planning, but the result of the passive resistance of the Romanian academicians, who did not want to see a Hungarian University in Cluj. The most direct result of this resistance is that the university buildings were *not* shared. The Hungarians had to move out, and they could not find facilities large enough to house their institution. This forced them to divide the institution, leaving the legal, humanistic, and social science sections in Cluj, while the Medical and Pharmaceutical sections moved to Marosvásárhely/Tîrgu-Mureş.[30] This initial forced division of the University was made official in 1948 when the Medical and Pharmaceutical college was made independent of the Bolyai University by political decree.[31]

Parallel to this development, the university-level instruction of the institution was also undermined. Under the pretext of paying greater heed to ideological commitments, the instructors who did not have Romanian citizenship prior to 1940, were now terminated by non-renewal of their contracts. This meant that some of the most well-known scholars could no longer teach at the Bolyai University. A similar process of "weeding" or "purging" also took its toll among the Hungarian instructors with Romanian citizenship. Some of the finest instructors were charged with being "clerical reactionaries". While most were purged in this fashion during the early 1950s, some had already suffered termination as early as 1947.[32]

It is true that the instructors of the Romanian Babeş University also suffered during these Stalinist purges. However, a close comparison of the effects of these purges shows that the damage done to the Bolyai University was much more severe. It disrupted continuity of instruction and undermined the quality of education. It also instilled a constant sense of insecurity among the students, not just in terms of their personal existence, but in terms of the survival of the Bolyai University. This was accentuated by the recruitment of "politically reliable" replacements, who were not competent in the areas or courses they were supposed to teach.[33]

Of all the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, the Transylvanian Hungarians were perhaps most adversely affected by the 1956 Revolution, both immediately and in the long run.[34] Until 1956-58 they had an extensive network of cultural and educational institutions. From this time on these institutions and associated opportunities became the target of cutbacks, outright abolition, or gradual erosion. For the Transylvanian Hungarians 1956 was the beginning of extensive discrimination and even repression based on their national origin and sense of solidarity with the Hungarians of Hungary.

During the next two years the Romanian leadership undertook a systematic propaganda campaign to discredit the Revolution and its Transylvanian sympathizers. The Revolution was presented as a throwback to the "Horthyist", "fascist" past that would have become a threat to the territorial integrity of Romania.[35] Again, the mood that was activated related more to the knee-jerk reactions of the Little Entente than to the quest for "socialist solidarity". This campaign came to a head a week before the first anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution, when the Party held a meeting of intellectuals at Cluj.[36] At this meeting the Hungarian intellectuals, headed by Lajos Jordáky, engaged in self-criticism of their behavior during the previous October. They admitted having succumbed to nationalism and having sympathized with the actions of Imre Nagy and other leaders of the "counterrevolution".[37] In effect, this meeting documented the "nationalism" and "isolationism" of the Transylvanian Hungarians even at the highest levels.

The Romanian leaders began to move against this threat of "nationalism" at the first opportunity. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in the summer of 1958 meant that the last impediment to Romanian nationalist revival had been removed.[38] Gheorghiu-Dej and his faction of the leadership immediately set about dismantling the Hungarians' remaining cultural institutions. The first major blow was aimed at the Bolyai University, which was merged with the Romanian Babeș University.[39]

Actually, the merger of the two institutions was already contemplated before the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.[40] However, the uprising provided it with a pretext, which would enable the Party leaders to speed up the process of "unification". During the 1955–1956 academic year visits by important party leaders to Cluj and the Bolyai University, hinted that the Romanian leadership was thinking of "alternative options". Leonte Rautu of the Executive Committee and Miron Constantinescu visited with the university's administrators raising questions about the placement of graduates and the "excessive" time devoted to Hungarian literature in the curriculum.[41] Also, during the summer of 1956 steps were taken to terminate the instruction of history in Hungarian. Although the university was able to stall implementation of this, it was not able to avoid the Party's directives to hold round table discussions with administrators and instructors from the Romanian Babes University, which became regular weekly occurrences at the Continental Hotel.[42]

After the Revolution in Hungary broke out during October 1956 everything accelerated.[43] Under trumped-up charges of sympathizing with the revolution they fired a number of instructors in the Social Studies fields (Géza Saszet, Edit Keszi Harmat, etc.) and arrested a group of students in the history department. Then a brief lull followed until March 1958, when more arrests and trials took place. The Dobai-Komáromi trial was followed by the arrest of talented young university instructors, including Gyula Dávid, Elemér Lakó and János Varró. They were accused of counter-revolutionary agitation for having visited the graves of the poets Sándor Reményik and Jenő Dsida during October 1956, singing and reciting their poems. The well-known professor Lajos Jordáky was also arrested at this time, as were many students in the Department of Hungarian Studies.[44]

Then a meeting of the Bolyai student body was called, at which representatives of the Young Communist League from Bucharest also participated. Provocative questions were asked of the students, and emotions ran high. Eight students were arrested and one of them was given a twelve-year prison sentence. A few days later the University was visited by Virgil Trofin, the Central Committee member with responsibility for youth affairs. For "weakness and indecisiveness" he had both the Dean (András Bodor) and Assistant Dean (Zoltán Náhlik) removed from their positions.[45]

The next step was to go public with the "Hungarian problem". This took place on February 18-22, 1959 at the Bucharest Conference of the Romanian Student Association.[46] A high-powered government delegation was present at the meeting including General Secretary of the Party Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the Minister of Education Athanasie Joja. Gheorghiu- Dej denounced "isolationism" and said that steps must be taken to eradicate the remnants of "national antagonisms". This could only be achieved by bringing all students of all nationalities together in one institution, where they can build Socialism together as a united and patriotic people. All the people who spoke up favored the unification of universities and schools. Minister of Education Joja added that even beyond the classroom, it was important to give students a sense of national unity via common dormitories and other common activities.[47]

On February 23rd the Administration of the Bolyai University called a meeting of the University Council. The Rector presided and stated that the Assistant Rector would make a statement that could not be discussed or questioned. The Assistant Rector then stated that the Party and the Ministry of Education had decided – on the basis of the demands of students from both universities – to unite the two universities of Cluj. Pandemonium broke out in the chamber, but the Rector refused to allow anyone to speak. He simply concluded the meeting by saying that this decision is in the best interest of all concerned, it will allow for teaching of all courses in Hungarian as well as Romanian and at half the cost because it will reduce administrative and other forms of duplication. He also called on everyone to support the Party and government decision with their active participation in the scheduled unification meetings.[48]

These meetings began on February 26 and continued until March 5 almost in marathon fashion. The objective of these meetings was to build public support for the Party's decision and to isolate those who were opposed to it. For this reason the Party sent many of its influential leaders to these public sessions, including Nicolae Ceaușescu, a member of the Presidium, the Minister of Education Joja, Ion Iliescu, the president of the Romanian Student Federation (and two-term President of Romania after Ceaușescu's fall), and many others. Speakers followed one another in a steady stream applauding the Party's decision to "merge" the two universities. In this atmosphere only three members of the Bolyai staff dared to speak up against the unification: Edgár Balogh, István Nagy and László Szabédi.[49]

The public meetings were than used to bring pressure on those who were still hesitant or noncommital about this decision. Nicolae Ceaușescu personally guided the intimidation of the individuals who opposed the decision. He harangued those present by saying that no one should live under the illusion that a Swiss model was applicable to Romania. No such "medieval" model was acceptable in sovereign Romania, where there was no room for Ghettos, and the "isola-

tion of nationalities". In Romania there was room only for one culture, a culture devoted to the construction of Socialism.[50]

László Szabédi was picked out for particular pressure, because of his stature in the community and at the University. He did not break! When called by Ceauşescu to present his own views, he presented them in Hungarian as his colleague Lajos Nagy translated them into Romanian. Ceauşescu was livid and publicly castigated him. During subsequent evenings Szabédi was called in for questioning by the Securitate. This harassment convinced him that he could not alter the decision, but he refused to become a party to it. He committed suicide. On May 5 the Assistant Rector Zoltán Csendes and his wife followed his example.[51]

"Unification" in this psychological sense, was then followed by joint committee discussions between the two universities for the actual implementation of this decision. While the "charter" of the Bolyai University was never annulled, no legal document was drawn up to define the rights and obligations of the two institutions in the newly created "Babeş-Bolyai University". In this way no one could be held accountable for the failure to fulfill obligations. However, the joint committees did hammer out the future academic program in terms of language use in the classroom. Already in this "compromise" it became apparent that the Bolyai faculty and students would henceforth play second fiddle to the Babeş faculty and student body. Of all the courses offered at the new unified institution, 137 would be offered in Romanian, while only 43 would be in Hungarian. In some areas Hungarian was totally excluded (law and economics), while in others it was reduced to a few insignificant sections, which were totally eliminated by the middle of the 1980s.[52] By the time of Ceauşescu's overthrow in December 1989 Hungarian instruction survived only in the pedagogical section for Hungarian literature and Hungarian language.

The fate of lower-level educational institutions followed the same pattern; they were not eliminated outright, but made subordinate parts of Romanian-language grade schools or high schools and subjected to administrative restrictions that undercut their status and standards. These considerations led many Hungarian students to take their classes in Romanian rather than in their mother tongue.[53] Thus, after 1958 the educational system became an unabashed instrument of Romanianization.

Parallel to the elimination of the most important Hungarian educational and cultural institutions, the RWP also began to isolate all those intellectuals who were too closely tied to their sense of national identity. On November 19, 1956 Nicolae Ceauşescu vehemently denounced "isolationism" and at the same time demanded that students fulfill their responsibilities as students, insisting that they should apply themselves to their studies rather than activism. The RWP, he said, was engaged in constructing factories, including cane processing plants, to which

all those students who do not fulfill their responsibilities were to be sent.[54] This was a pointed reference to forced labor in the Danube delta region.

Many, indeed, were sent to participate in such re-educational opportunities and many never returned from this experience. Already on December 5, 1956 the Central Committee received a report from Leonte Rauțu and János Fazekas, which followed up on Ceaușescu's demands. They had gone on a fact-finding trip to Cluj between November 23–26, 1956, focusing primarily on the activities of Hungarian intellectuals and the students of the Bolyai University. Their report included the observation that many of the intellectuals were infected by the developments in Hungary and were skeptical about the "mass basis" of the Kádár regime.[55] Even more disturbing was the attitude expressed by Professor Gyula Márton that the Hungarians of the Romanian People's Republic are really a part of the Hungarian nation. This attitude is a threat to the unity of the state and contradicts Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, the students want independent student organizations unmonitored by the Party. They also want contact with international student organizations without restrictions. All these required a concerted response from the Party and the Securitate.[56]

This response was not long in coming. In fact, some of the first arrests already preceded the Rauțu-Fazekas Report on October 25 when Imre Balázs and Tirnován Arisztid Vid were taken into custody. A year later they were both convicted of incitement and were given seven-year jail terms. On November 17 István Várhegyi was also arrested on the same charge and also given a seven-year term. These were merely the first of a long series of arrests and show trials that continued through the end of 1958. It is not coincidental that they were halted only with the merger of the Bolyai and Babeș universities on February 22, 1959.[57]

Conclusion

While in the short-run 1956 led to retribution in Budapest as well as Kolozsvár/Cluj, in the long-run Hungarians tended to benefit from the glory and the global attention that went with heroic rebellion against the Soviet superpower. In Transylvania, on the other hand, the impact was negative in terms of both the short and long-run. It led to the reprisals of the Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceaușescu administrations. In the short-run long prison terms and forced labor for thousands followed. According to some estimates out of the approximately 30,000 citizens of Romania affected, close to one-third were Hungarians. Besides the executions and imprisonments, the Hungarian part of the population also lost its most influential cultural institution, the Bolyai University. However, other cultural and educational institutions were also eliminated between 1956 and 1959.

These developments were a direct consequence of the Romanianization of the RWP and the nationalist agendas of leaders like Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu. They were also possible because Soviet hegemonial interests were altered by 1956. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev altered its policies, utilizing indirect control rather than just military occupation. Thus, in the summer of 1958 the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romanian territory, enabled the leaders of the RWP to chart a more nationalistic course. They used 1956 as the pretext for their policies of Romanianization. The most devastating long-range consequences were the negative demographic and cultural inroads and the erosion of the Hungarian population's cultural institutions in Transylvania.

Notes

[1] Zoltán Tófalvi, "Kezdeményezések és szervezkedések Erdélyben" in Ágoston Székelyhidi (ed.) *Magyar '56* (Budapest: MVSz, 1996); Ádám Szesztay, "Nemzetiségi törekvések az 1956-os forradalomban", *Regio* No. 2 (1994); Kálmán Csiha, *Fény a rácsokon* (Budapest: Kálvin Kiadó, 1992); András Bodor, *A Bolyai Tudományegyetem 1945–1959* (Budapest: Bolyai Egyetem Barátainak Egyesülete, 1996); István Fehér, *Az utolsó percben: Magyarország nemzetiségei, 1945–1990* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1993); László Diószegi and Andrea R. Süle (eds.) *Hetven év: A romániai magyarság története* (Budapest: Magyarság-Kutató Intézet, 1990); Ildikó Lipcsey, "A forradalom hatása és következményei Erdélyben" M.S. in Teleki László Library Collection; and Anna P. Sebők, *Kolozsvári Perek, 1956* (Budapest: Károlyi Palota, Hamvas Intézet, 2001).

[2] "Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe", Mid-European Center, New York, 1968; Árpád E. Varga, *Fejezetek a jelenkori Erdély népesedéstörténetéből* (Budapest: Püski, 1998), pp. 262–263.

[3] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1951), pp. 339–342.

[4] *The Romanian Workers' Party on the eve of its third congress* (Special Report; Radio Free Europe, München, May, 1960), pp. 8–10; Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania 1944–1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 149–151, 204–215, 241–244; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Revised Paperback Edition; New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 85–91; Randolph L. Braham, "Rumania: Onto the Separate Path", *Problems of Communism*, XIII (May–June, 1964), footnote 5, pp. 16–17.

[5] Stephen Fischer-Galáti (Ed.) *Romania* (New York: Praeger, 1956), pp. 69–71; Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania* pp. 204–208; Robert R. King, *History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1980), p. 64. RCP stands for Communist Party of Romania. This name will not be used throughout this study but rather the name adopted in 1948 at the time of the Communist "merger" with the Social Democrats. The name then adopted was Romanian Workers' Party (RWP).

[6] This is verified by the fact that in December, 1955, 79.2% of the RWP members were ethnic Romanians. See *ibid.,* p. 243. By 1968, 88.43% were ethnic Romanians. Compare Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, p. 243, with "Report of Nicolae Ceauşescu on organizational measures for the steady strengthening of the moral-political unity of the working people", *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania*, No. 27 (Oct. 28, 1968), p. 30.

[7] Braham, "Rumania: Onto the Separate Path", pp. 16–17.

8   Kofos, "Balkan Minorities under Communist Regimes", *Balkan Studies*, 2 (1961), 29, pp. 25–26; Hans Hartl, "Die Nationalitäten-Politik Des Kreml in Rumänien", *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, XXIV (July–August, 1953), 383; D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership", pp. 482, 492–494; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 204–215, 241–245, 316–321.

9   The importance of this Fifth Party Congress on the future development of the RWP cannot be over-emphasized. See: Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 40–46; *The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve*, pp. 3–4.

10 Even the Secretary-Generalship of the Party was held by the non-Rumanian Elek Koblos (alias Badulescu) between 1924–1928. Prior to that, the non-Rumanians C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Christian Rakovsky had played pre-eminent Party roles. For more on the role of Koblos, see: Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 25–28.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 20–28, 40–46; D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership", *Slavic Review*, XX (October, 1961), pp. 479–480.

12 Another similarity to be noted among the ethnic Romanian "workers" of the Party is their "religious" background – Eastern (Romanian) Orthodox. *Ibid.*, pp. 480–485. Though this factor is not decisive in a Communist setting, it should be mentioned because it points out that these leaders had similar childhood experiences and education.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 482, 492–494; *The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve*, p. 8; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 204–215, 241–245, 316–321.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 78–79, 118, 350–356; Fischer-Galáti, *Romania*, pp. 344–350.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 64–67; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 78–79, 94–106.

16 "Rumanian Planner: Gheorghe Gaston-Marin", *New York Times*, June 2, 1964, p. 12; *The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve*, pp. 21–23.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 15–18, 23–31, 34–38; *An Analysis of the Elections at the Third Rumanian Party Congress* (Radio Free Europe, Munich, Germany, July, 1960), pp. 23–25; "Rumania's Strongman: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej", *New York Times*, January 20, 1964, p. 8.

18 Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 78–79.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 284–287.

21 *Ibid.*

22 Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership", p. 482.

23 Lipcsey, "A forradalom hatása...", p. 1.

24 Sebők, *Kolozsvári perek*, p. 12.

25 Lipcsey, "A forradalom hatása...", p. 1.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

27 Lajos Csögör, "Előszó" in Rudolf Joó and Béla Barabás, "A Kolozsvári Magyar Egyetem 1945-ben", unpublished MS prepared for the Magyarságkutató Intézet, 1988, pp. 11–12.

28 *Ibid.;* Elemér Illyés, *National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania* (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs, 1982), pp. 106–111.

29 Rudolf Joó, "Egy sorsdöntő esztendő: 1945 a Kolozsvári Magyar Egyetem történetéből", *Hitel*, X, No. 1 (January 3, 1989), p. 24; Csögör, "Előszó", p. 8.

30 Joó, "Egy sorsdöntő esztendő", pp. 23–24.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

32 *Ibid.;* Csögör, "Előszó", pp. 10–11.

33 *Ibid.;* Joó, "Egy sorsdöntő esztendő", p. 24.

34 György Lázár, "Memorandum", in *Witnesses to Cultural Genocide: First-Hand Reports on Rumania's Minority Policies Today* (New York: Committee for Human Rights in Rumania, 1979), pp. 104–105.

[35] Robert R. King, *Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension Among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 84.

[36] *Ibid.,* p. 85.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] Ferenc A. Vali, "Transylvania and the Hungarian Minority", *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 20 (1966), p. 280.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 282; István Révay, "Hungarian Minorities under Communist Rule", in *The Fight For Freedom: Facts About Hungary* (New York: Hungarian Committee, 1959), p. 298.

[40] Kálmán Aniszi, "A Bolyai Tudományegyetem utolsó esztendeje: Beszélgetés dr. Sebestyén Kálmánnal", *Hitel,* XII, No. 3 (March, 1999), p. 83; *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás: Múlt, jelen, jövő* (Cluj/Kolozsvár: Jelenlét Alkotó Társaság, 1990), p. 21.

[41] *Ibid.,* pp. 21–22.

[42] *Ibid.* p. 22.

[43] Aniszi, "A Bolyai Tudományegyetem...", p. 83.

[44] *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás,* pp. 22–23.

[45] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *Ibid.,* 23–24; Aniszi, "A Bolyai Tudományegyetem utolsó esztendeje", pp. 86–87.

[48] *Ibid.,* pp. 84–85.

[49] *Ibid.,* pp. 85–86; *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás,* p. 25.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Ibid.,* pp. 25–26; Aniszi, "A Bolyai Tudományegyetem utolsó esztendeje", pp. 86–87; Péter Cseke and Lajos Kántor (eds.) *Szabédi napjai*, (Cluj/Kolozsvár: Komp-press, Korunk Baráti Társasága, 1998), pp. 127–136.

[52] *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás*, pp. 26–27.

[53] For this "Romanianization" process see *Rumania's Violations of Helsinki Final Act Provisions Protecting the Rights of National, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities* (New York: Committee for Human Rights in Rumania, 1980), pp. 20–31.

[54] Sebők, *Kolozsvári perek,* p. 20.

[55] *Ibid.,* p. 21.

[56] *Ibid.,* pp. 22–24.

[57] *Ibid.,* pp. 14–22.

AN EMBLEMATIC SHOT OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956: THE LIFE STORY BEHIND THE PHOTOGRAPH AND THE AFTERLIFE OF THE PHOTOGRAPH[1]

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Armed teenagers who fought in the 1956 revolution are preserved in the nation's memory as "the kids from Pest", among them, there were several girls who did not get a separate designation, however several photographs of them survived and some appeared widely in the world press.

My fellow researcher, a French journalist Phil Casoar, and I selected a captivating photograph of an armed young man and a young woman wearing a red-cross armband that might be described as the extraordinary starting point of our research. In November 1956, numerous prominent western weekly magazines published the photo; subsequently books, documentary films and exhibitions made it widely known. It first appeared as the opening image in a series of articles about the Hungarian revolution, entitled "Budapest Heroes", appearing in the magazine *Paris Match*. During the Cold War, the image became well-known in the west as well as the east, but it was placed on opposite poles. In the west, the characters were portrayed as heroes who defied the Soviet tanks; in socialist Hungary and in the east, they were officially considered to be criminals along with other armed rebels. Subsequently, the Hungarian political police used the photos as conclusive evidence during trials. In my presentation I use approximately 35 photographs and documents related to the Paris Match picture to discuss our investigation since 1999, the fate of the young woman appearing in that picture, and the different usages of the *Paris Match* picture.

Keywords: women in revolution, history of working class women, photographs and the 1956 Revolution, biography writing of humbles

The armed teenagers who fought in the 1956 revolution have been preserved in the collective memory as "the kids from Pest". Despite the fact that there were several girls among them, and many photographs of them survived, some even circulated widely in the world press, they did not get a separate designation. The photograph, which is the subject of my analysis, is one of the most emblematic shots of the revolution and had the caption: "Les Héros de Budapest" (the Heroes of Budapest). This image first appeared as the opening picture for a series of reports written by the newspaper's correspondents, who had been sent to Buda-

According to the title of *Paris Match* "our reporters discover the spirit of the revolution in the eyes of the couple stopped on the street"

pest, and appeared on November 10, 1956 in *Paris Match*. This photograph is captivating for several reasons: it is a frontal photograph, which is something of a rarity in a war situation, and it depicts an armed young man and a young wounded woman wearing a red-cross armband in the foreground. Alongside the well-known headlines of all revolutions (youth, heroism, romance), the photograph also shows a representation of what is very common, a female role in armed conflict with the woman providing care and a secure background.

The lack of a separate designation can be mostly explained by the representations of women in armed conflicts. Various forms of armed conflict have to be distinguished when looking at women and their involvement in them. This may be due to the fact that for women, revolutions offer a completely different scope than a war situation might. In war, the individual does her best to remain silent in the interest of the community, whilst revolutions may disrupt existing political structures and traditional gender relations. Despite the fact that men are naturally better suited to getting the most out of the opportunities offered by "great vacations from life", nevertheless, revolutions offer women the opportunity to step out of their usual environment. This is true even if the majority of women are still allocated traditional reproductive roles.[2] The academic literature addressing the role played by women during the armed conflicts of modern times cannot bypass stereotypes

of women's involvement at the time and subsequently.[3] Coexisting stereotypes often contradict one another, for example, "while in one respect femininity is associated in military ideology with (desirable yet despicable) submission, in another – and quite paradoxically – it is associated with a wholly undesirable and 'dangerous' individualism".[4]

In the context of the 1956 revolution – apart from a handful of known female figures (Anna Kéthly, Mária Wittner and Ilona Tóth)[5] – up until recently there has been little academic interest in the role of women as either individuals or as members of a group. For this reason, the assessment of their participation has been hindered by general stereotypes of female roles during armed conflict, which are also part of the myth of the 1956 narratives.[6] According to the first academic evaluation of the role played by women in the 1956 revolution, women's recollections of 1956 are fragmented and anecdotal in much the same way as the account of other participants are.[7] At the same time, we should also add that some women became suddenly "visible" due to the marks left by the "opened social scope" in the wake of the revolution.[8] For example, it is thanks to the uprising that those previously excluded from political opportunity – because they came from poor families, most of them young workers – were provided the opportunity (within certain bounds) for political action. Extensive documentation and recollections describe this effect; even so, we need to handle these with a critical eye, not taking them at face value. Several photographs of women survived and some travelled widely in the world press at the time and slightly later and subsequently, the Hungarian political police used them on occasion as conclusive evidence during trials.[9]

Such a well-known photograph became the unusual starting point of the investigation.[10] First of all, we managed to identify the photographer. The American who took the photographs, Russ Melcher, was only twenty-six years old and – as a freelance photographer for *Paris Match* – came across the couple on Múzeum körút in Budapest at half past seven in the morning of October 30. In the couple he discovered the spirit of the revolution. The photographer later recounted that:

> It was a glorious morning on a day of ceasefire and this young couple – the boy with the machine gun too large for him and the girl with the wound on her face, a red-cross armband and the first aid bag – half bohemian, half proletarian, in shabby, worn clothes captivated me; I was struck by the realism of the image.[11]

Despite the fact that this photograph, which first appeared in *Paris Match,* toured around the international press world,[12] not only the fate of those appearing in the photograph was unknown but their names were not even known. When, along with my French colleague, we still decided to go on an "impossible mission" and follow the trail of those appearing in the photograph, we had no inkling that not only the name of the girl in the photograph would become known to us but

so would several important moments in her life.[13] After one year of research, we eventually stumbled across the young girl's trail: she was called Julianna Sponga but everyone knew her simply as Jutka. When the photograph was taken, she was nineteen years old and worked in a textile factory. Later we also learned that she fled to Switzerland following the revolution and went on to start a family in Australia.[14] We also managed to establish contact with her husband, Stephen Toth, also of Hungarian origin, and it was from him that we learned that Jutka died on May 27, 1990 of throat cancer and – in accordance with her own request – her ashes were scattered into the ocean. This meant that Jutka's biographer was forced to do without her interpretation of the "life story", the "ideology self-portrait".[15]

The aim of the researcher is to thoroughly represent blocks of memory of the subject's life, which can only result in a "kaleidoscope-like" biography.[16] The aim in writing this biography is identical to the democratic ambitions of writing women's history and historiography in general and that is to present an individual who once lived in the past about whom no specific historical record remains.[17] Similarly to the French historian, Alain Corbin, and who documents the life of the French clog maker, Louis-François Pinagot, who lived in the nineteenth century, Jutka's biographer has to aim to present the main character's world, surroundings, possible likes and dislikes, habits, use of language, network of connections, circumstances and concept of time and space as well as the determining events in her life.[18] Even though the work of the French academic did not instinctively affect the initiation of our research, and possibilities to become familiar with Jutka's life were more favourable than in the case of the French clog maker, the questions posed by Corbin in his biography were also useful when looking at our research.

In the twentieth century and within the dictatorship under which Jutka lived, one which placed such great emphasis on recording information, there were naturally more surviving documents – directly related to the individual – than in the case of Pinagot, who was born at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the out-of-the-way, little village of Origny-le-Butin.[19] The starting point for our research was a photograph rather than a name, the face was only joined by a name a year later.[20] Beyond this, in Jutka's case, we have more than the notes that the suppressive system had on her (in Pinagot's case this was local power) to rely on – which only shed light on Jutka's personality very indirectly, and so we can add more questions to those basic ones asked by Corbin. Jutka's face, expression, stance and appearance were known to us.[21] Further details would come from her husband and other individuals who knew her well at the time (colleagues and friends from her life in Switzerland and Australia, her comrade in arms – László Jánoky – who fled to Canada in 1956, as well as one of her sisters-in-law and her neighbours from Csepel). Our research was based on interviews with these figures from her past so that the personality and the fate of the nineteen-year-old textile-factory worker walking on Múzeum körút became accessible to us, albeit in a

limited form. In this study, in presenting information and sources on Jutka, we hope that, while sorting out the data, we will come closer to mapping out the problems of her biography.

The Life Story Behind the *Paris Match* Photograph

Julianna Sponga was born on October 29, 1937 in Tatárszentgyörgy, which lies only fifty kilometres from Budapest, as the only girl in a large humble family.[22] During the war, this family, which had lived from agricultural work in the area around the capital city – similar to many of their kind – came to settle in Budapest. Due to links with their earlier lifestyle and the work opportunities offered by the steelworks in Csepel, the family moved to 32 Jegenye street, in the garden suburb of Csepel, one of the most characteristic working-class areas of Budapest.[23] Jutka's father, István Sponga, was a worker in the Csepel steelworks. Jutka's sister-in-law and neighbours from Csepel said that he drank heavily and had a tendency for violence.[24] Her mother, Erzsébet Tóth, was illiterate and worked as a domestic housewife. Jutka had three elder brothers and one younger. When she was seven Jutka started manual labour in agriculture. It was close to their home in a private vegetable growing settlement in Soroksár. Later, similarly to the mass of women who moved in from the villages, she also ended up in the textile works and in her case this was the Sortex factory in Soroksár. The photographs which depict her in the fields and standing next to machinery in the factory – the woman coming from agriculture into the factory – also offer a plastic image of the changes in her dress and hairstyle as well as her new working conditions and establish a starting point for the anthropology typical of a woman working in the textile industry at the beginning of the 1950s. These pictures also show that Jutka had a tattoo on her lower arm which was not very rare among workers from that period.[25] She acquired the tattoo visible in the photographs between the ages of 17 and 18.[26] It was perhaps because of her older male siblings (who, similarly to the younger brother, are no longer alive) or because of her strict parents (neighbours from the time, the Taschlers, said that the Sponga couple were closer to their sons) that Jutka, who worked in the textile factory, happily sought the company of "street men" in Csepel.[27] From the records surviving in the Hungarian Prison Service Archives, we know that she was arrested three times between the ages of 15 and 17 for "penal idleness" and "vagrancy".[28] She was only detained for two days on a couple of occasions but the third incident led to a sentence of six months in prison of which she finally served only four months and fifteen days in the infamous detention facility at Markó.[29] In Jutka's case, it can be said that, prior to the 1956 revolution, she came into serious conflict with the oppressive regime as a "recidivist". If we call on the identity-crisis definition of "psychohistory" for help,

Jutka in the vegetable growing settlement in the suburbs of Budapest

Jutka as a textile factory worker of the Sortex

we can state that in Jutka's case the "lifestyle-rebellion" of a young individual, with an immature identity against the adult world received a political content, which naturally expanded as the "opened social scope" offered opportunity for this in October 1956.[30]

We do not know what exactly happened to Jutka in the days before the *Paris Match* photograph was taken and what it was that caused her to decide to join the armed uprising. The events leading up to this turning point in her life still remain unknown to us.[31] Of her siblings, it is known that Károly took an active part in the fighting at Csepel.[32] At the same time, her brother, who served in the ÁVH (Hungarian Secret Police), remained loyal to the system in the days of the revolution.[33] (As part of the "silent assimilation policy"[34] of the Stalinist regime, Jutka's elder brothers Hungarianised their name from Sponga to Solymosi in around 1953.[35] This understandably hindered our research of the family.) According to Rózsa Solymosi, István's widow, one of Jutka's elder brothers, Jutka was involved in a tragic experience directly before the beginning of the revolution, which most definitely had a determining effect on her decision to join the struggle at the time of the first Soviet intervention. Her younger brother had thrown stones at the Soviet tanks approaching Hősök tere (Heroes' Square) in Soroksár and was shot dead.[36]

The earliest data following the *Paris Match* photograph, which was succeeded by other photographs taken the same day of the *Paris Match* couple at Felszabadulás tér (Liberation square, today Ferenciek tere) by Italian photographer, Mario De Biasi and one photograph taken only of her as a member of a fighting group by Dutch photographer, Dominique Beretty on Múzeum körút[37] comes from November 4. Jutka got caught up in the street fighting in the 8th District on the day of the second Soviet intervention. It was then that she joined the group from Vajdahunyad street[38] of which, as well as many others, Mária Wittner was a member (it was then that Jutka sustained an injury to her shoulder and that is why she ended up in hospital).[39] When several members of the group from Vajdahunyad street decided to flee, they took Jutka along with them from the hospital.[40] According to László Jánoky, who later emigrated to Canada and who was the brother of the group's second in command, they took the unconscious Jutka across the Danube in a row boat.[41] Then they made their way on foot and later in a truck to the Austrian border. They reached Eisenstadt on November 9 and this is where reporters, Massimo Mauri and Maurizio de Biasi, from the Italian magazine *Epoca,* discovered Jutka. In the interview carried by *Epoca,* they noted that the young man who appeared next to Jutka in the famous photograph was called György, and that he died in the fighting.[42] The Hungarian refugees, fifteen people, first went from Eisenstadt to the refugee camp in Traiskirchen;[43] they were then directed to Switzerland via Vienna.

On November 13 the Swiss authorities granted the group of Hungarian refugees permission to settle in the French-Swiss town of Neuchâtel. Their numbers

had eventually swollen to a total of seventy-two. They were provided with accommodation in what was referred to as the "Chanet House" on the side of the hill next to the lake. A local journalist interviewed several of them and made mention of Jutka's name in one of the two reports carried in the local newspaper called *La Feuille d'Avis*.[44] In August 1957 she came to La Chaux-de-Fonds next to the French-Swiss border and took up a position as a worker in the local Steinmann textile works at the beginning of 1958 and was employed along with ten other Hungarians.[45] She lived at 17 rue des Champs with the Etter family who also worked for Steinmann. René Hess, who was employed as a manager at the factory at the time, recalled that Jutka came to see him to help her find a doctor who would be willing to remove the tattoos that she had on her body. He directed her to a doctor he knew who had previously been involved in cosmetic surgery and who carried out the procedure.

Jutka decided to leave Switzerland in 1961, and she sailed to Australia on the ocean liner, Oceania, on March 24. Her passage was financed by ICEM, an international organisation of help to refugees.[46] It was in October of the same year that she met Steven Toth (István Tóth) at the Hungarian club in Melbourne who later became her husband. He had also fled Hungary in 1956 but he did not take part in the revolution as he was a conscripted soldier at the time. After their two children were born, Jutka no longer worked and she remained a housewife for the rest of her life. She gained Australian citizenship in 1972 and lived in one of Melbourne's suburbs. Jutka corresponded with her parents who – her husband claims – talked her out of returning home because they were frightened that the photograph published in *Match,* which they had seen published in Hungary, would lead to her being recognised by the Hungarian police who would hold her to account.[47]

We only know of one specific interpretation of the photograph from *Match* in Hungary before the political transition. It appeared in Ervin Hollós's infamous propaganda book, published in two editions in 1967,[48] with the caption: "The underworld in arms".[49] Ervin Hollós – who, after 1957, headed the Political Police Inner Reaction-Prevention Department (Ministry of the Interior, II/5) – collected the photographic material for his book from the police archive known as the "1956 Separate Collection".[50] This archive contains photographs and newspaper clipings, from Western magazines, related to the revolution, and in the preparations preceding the 1956 trials the police used these to try to ascertain who appeared in them. Four clipings of Jutka repeatedly appear in the collection: the *Paris Match* picture (the photo of the third male figure was filed with a separate cliping) as well as the three other pictures carried in *Epoca* (one of these shows Jutka as a member of a rebel group on Múzeum körút and the other two were taken of her in Eisenstadt).[51] Each photograph was given its own filing reference number and there was a note in pencil next to the *Match* photograph saying that the girl in the picture had "defected".

Both the fear of Jutka's parents and her own fears seem founded in light of the dossier started by the Hungarian Central Alien Control Office in 1976.[52] At the same time, from her Ministry of the Interior registration, it appears that Jutka's name and the photograph taken of her in 1956 were not successfully linked either directly following the reprisals or afterwards. The fact that she had immigrated to Australia was unknown to them, as she was recorded as being "stateless". According to the Central Alien Control Office material – it is not clear why from July 1978 – she was included in the list of prohibited persons and her data was transferred to the combined computerised records (EGPR) of the state security organisations in 1985. Her inclusion in the list of prohibited persons was reconfirmed annually until June 26 1989, which is the day that registration was discontinued. It is a double tragedy that Jutka passed away less than a year after her name was removed from the records.

The Afterlife of the *Paris Match* Photograph

The interpretations of the *Paris Match* photograph by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior were not unique. During the Cold War, the *Paris Match* photograph, with Jutka and György in the foreground, gained totally different meanings on the two sides of the Iron Curtain.[53] In the West, they appeared as David's fighting the Goliath of the soviet oppressors and their tanks. In the East, mostly articulated by the Communist Kádár-regime of Hungary, they were described as toughs motivated by Fascists, as representatives of counterrevolutionary movement opposing the Proletariat and the power of the people. The photograph appeared several times as an illustration in propaganda or reference books and even on a postcard. The cover of Andy Anderson's *Hongrie 1956: la Commune de Budapest, les conseils ouvriers* [Hungary 1956: Commune of Budapest, the Workers' Councils] published in 1975, was a publication in the West guided by an extreme leftist ideology, emphasising the importance of Workers' Councils in the 1956 Revolution.[54] Also the *Match* picture appears on a postcard with the motto "Souvenir de Budapest" which was possibly produced by a French situationist group in the 1970s, who pointed towards the spontaneous and libertine aspects of the events in Hungary in 1956.[55] Among works of authors of Hungarian origin we need to mention: *23 octobre 1956. Budapest – Ce jour-là* [23rd October 1956. That Day – Budapest] by the journalist Tibor Méray and *Az elhagyott tömeg. Tanulmányok 1950–1956-ról* [The Abandoned Crowd. Studies on 1950–1956] by the historian László Varga.[56] This latter was a book published in Hungary after the transition of 1989 and showed the photograph on its cover.

Moreover, one could also mention a rather artistic interpretation of the *Paris Match* photograph, which also appeared in a Jean-Luc Godard's film entitled *Le*

Petit Soldat (The Little Soldier) and was made in 1958 but only premiered in 1963 for its unusual approach to politics: Godard's film tells the story of an ex-army terrorist, not having any strong political feelings, who is hired to kill an Algerian journalist and symphatizer. In one of the most characteristic scenes of the film the *Paris Match* picture appears, but cut into two so that the word "hero" is missing, perhaps because *The Little Soldier* is an anti-hero's story.

The *Paris Match* photograph is a fascinating historical subject for three reasons: first because it helps us to have better knowledge about the stories of women and, in general, freedom fighters coming from poor families participating in the Hungarian revolution; second because it illuminates the role that foreign photographers played in shaping representations of the revolution; and third because it helps us to understand the various interpretations of the 1956 photographs during the Cold War.

Notes

[1]   The present paper is an extended version of that previously published in a women's history volume: "Sponga Julianna, az 'ismeretlen ismerős': egy világot járt 56-os fénykép női szereplőjének sorsa", in Palasik, Mária–Sipos, Balázs–Tóth, Eszter Zsófia. *Házastárs, munkatárs, vetélytárs? A női szerepek változása a családban, a munkahelyen és a közéletben a 20. századi Magyarországon* (Wife, Colleague, Concurrence? Changing Roles of Women in Family Life, at Work and in Public Life in 20th Century Hungary) (Budapest: Napvilág, 2005), 220–229. An English translation of that paper was also published: "Tracking Down the 'Girl from Pest' on an Emblematic Photo of the Revolution of 1956" in *Regimes and Transformations. Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, edited by István Feitl and Balázs Sipos (Budapest: Napvilág, 2005), 353–370.

[2]   Perrot, Michelle. "Stepping Out", in *A History of Women in the West. IV. Emerging Feminism from Revolution to World War,* eds. Friesse, Geneviève–Michelle Perrot (Cambridge–Massachusetts–London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993), 480–481.

[3]   Macdonald, Sharon. "Drawing the Lines – Gender, Peace and War: An Introduction", in *Images of Women in Peace and War,* eds. Macdonald Sharon–Pat Holden–Shirley Ardener (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 3, 15–16.

[4]   *Ibid.,* 16.

[5]   *Anna Kéthly* (1889–1976) Politician. As member of the Social Democratic Party, she was elected to Parliament after the First World War. By 1948, as opposition politician, she had been imprisoned by commmunist government. During the Revolution of 1956, she became a member of the coalition government of Imre Nagy, formed on November 3. Kéthly went into exile and in 1957 became head of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council in Strassbourg; *Mária Wittner* (1937–) Mária Wittner, of working class origins, was arrested in 1957 – tried and sentenced to be hanged the following year – for having fought as an armed combatant in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1958. She was released in 1970; *Ilona Tóth* (1933–1957) a graduating doctor who was healing the wounded of the 1956 Revolution at a Budapest hospital, was accused of the murder of a wounded member of the ÁVH (Hungarian Secret Police) and executed in 1957. The role of Ilona Tóth in the 1956 Revolution is still object of controversy.

6   Juhász, Borbála. *The Memory of 1956. A Gendered Transcript* (Budapest: CEU, 1998/50), 1 and 29. The majority of women worked in kitchens or tended to the injured during the revolution. Some of them accepted the role of intermediary and helped in the distribution of food supplies. We do not know how many of these women used weapons because very few of them make mention of this: See *ibid.*, 47.

7   *Ibid.*, 2–3.

8   For more information on this topic see Pető, Andrea. *Nőhistóriák: A politizáló magyar nők történetéből 1945–1951* (Women's Histories: From the History of Politicising Hungarian Women 1945–1951) (Budapest: Seneca, 1998), 11.

9   It is primarily those pictures, which easily became condemning evidence that depicted women belonging to the insurgent groups with weapons in their hands: it is known from the trial of Mária Wittner and associates that the photograph taken of Mária Wittner and Katalin Havrila Sticker provided conclusive proof, although they insisted that they only posed for the photograph. See Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (hereafter HAHSS), Trial of Mária Wittner and Associates, V-14 2941.

10   The whole research is presented in a book prepared by Les Arènes Publishing: Phil Casoar–Eszter Balázs, *Les Héros de Budapest* (Paris: Les Arènes, 2006). In a shorter form – primarily focusing on the photographer – in the October 2004 edition of *National Geographic* which carried the latest results of our research. See Balázs, Eszter. "Ő volt a pesti lány" (She Was the Girl from Pest), *National Geographic Magyarország*, No. 10 (2004), 126–133.

11   Interview with Russ Melcher in May 2002. Melcher also recalls that, after nine in the morning, the news spread among the insurgents that they should not let photographs be taken of their faces. (The names of two other photographers, Franz Goëss and Jean-Pierre Pedrazzini, appear on the contact sheets in the *Paris Match* archive. It also took time to identify and discover the whereabouts of Melcher as the actual photographer.)

12   This most definitely appeared in the world's press among photographs taken of Hungarian women and photographs with a political theme, the photograph that we selected being the most well-known after the photograph taken for the article on Júlia Rajk and her husband. Andrea Pető reminds us in her book that this latter photograph made the entire world's press. Pető, Andrea. *Rajk Júlia*, Feminizmus és történelem sorozat (*Júlia Rajk*. Women and History Series) (Budapest: Balassi, 2001), 8.

13   We continued to research the boy in the picture holding a machine gun and the man holding the pistol. In October 2003, a report was shown as part of the television programme called Fókusz – one of the most popular shows on the Hungarian commercial television channel, RTL Klub – which featured this photograph. There were no relatives among those who responded to our call made for family members and friends. In a report made with Jutka in 1956, the girl claims that the boy appearing in the picture was called Gyuri (shortname of György) and he was killed in the fighting. (We will return to this report later on.) The man with the pistol goes on to appear in a photograph taken on Köztársaság tér (Republic square) by the British photographer, John Sadovy, who had been exiled from Czechoslovakia in 1938, and was one of the photographs taken at the time of the siege of Party headquarters which were published by *Life* magazine. (See Gadney, Reg. *Cry Hungary!* (New York: Atheneum, 1986).)

14   The Australian journalist, Frank Bren, who helped to trace Jutka in Melbourne, discussed our research on Jutka in *Memento*, the journal of the Australian National Archives. See http://www.naa.gov.au/Publications/memento   "Searching   for   Julia   of   Budapest" pdf/memento30.pdf.

15   Here I use Andrea Pető's expression. Pető. *Rajk Júlia*, 9–10. For the time being, chances are slim that at least an autobiography or even letters of her would have survived. Documents from the Sortex works, Jutka's former workplace – not including the material of the party commit-

tee – have not survived either (based on information supplied by the Budapest Municipal Archive, its reference section in Óbuda and the Pest County archive). There is no sign of the factory's own newspaper.

[16] Andrea Pető quotes Liz Stanley. Pető. *Rajk Júlia,* 11.

[17] In Hungarian historical writing looking at the period after 1945 – due to the generous and, in good cases, accessible resources – for the time being, it has only been the privilege of known politicians and the intelligentsia to have biographies written on them.

[18] The renowned French historian, Alain Corbin, undertook a special challenge: he picked a name from the register of a remote county in 19th-century France – the only criterion being that the life of the individual should not be too short – and he set about writing his biography. The only personal sign left by the illiterate Louis-François Pinagot was a shaky cross signed next to his name: Corbin took this as his starting point and tried to reconstruct for posterity the hidden and inaccessible life of Pinagot, whom he had selected and referred to as the "man without characteristics". This research was then published and is available in both French and English. Corbin, Alain. *Le Monde retrouvé de Louis-François Pinagot. Sur les traces d'un inconnu (1798–1876)* (Paris: Flammarion, 1998).

[19] In his book, Corbin draws attention to the fact that, prior to the 20th century, written records on the "masses" largely survive related to poverty, catastrophes and wars and that is why research results which rely solely on these may be one-sided.

[20] The first more serious clue for us to explore was the interview with Jutka which appeared in the November 1956 of the Italian magazine *Epoca.* This tells us that the girl appearing in the picture was called Jutka, was 19 years old and textile worker. Reporters from *Epoca* discovered her in Eisenstadt in Austria based on the "notorious" photograph that appeared in *Paris Match.*

[21] It transpired from the surviving records from the archives of the Hungarian Prison Service Archives (hereafter HPSA) – Jutka was taken into the Markó, one of the main prison three times before 1956 for penal idleness – that Jutka had brown eyes and brown hair; she was 158 cm tall. (See later analysis of her files.)

[22] Tatárszentgyörgy today is still one of the furthest points from Budapest within Pest County – the railway and mainroad still avoid its boundaries – the village might just as well be in the centre of the country. The characteristics of the area – rough land covered in juniper bushes – never favoured agriculture by the local population.

[23] The father still enjoyed helping out with agricultural work while employed at the Csepel Works. Interview with the Taschler family, May 2003.

[24] In May 2003 (based on the files created on Jutka in the 1950s by the HPSA) we went to visit Jegenye utca and, based on the old address, we knocked on the door of the neighbours (30 Jegenye street), who were very happy to help us with our research. They introduced us to Jutka's sister-in-law, Rózsa Solymosi (widow of István Solymosi) living at 27 Jegenye street who only knew Jutka based on what she had been told by her husband. István Solymosi died in 2002 and had not seen his sister since 1956 and he had not known of her death in 1990.

[25] Tattoos forming part of "urban folklore" in the 1950s in Hungary affected a wide band of society. See, for example: Kovács, Ákos–Sztrés, Erzsébet, *Tetovált Sztálin. Szovjet elítéltek tetoválásai és karikatúrái* (A Tattooed Stalin. The World and Art of Bandits in the Soviet Union) (Szeged: Sprint GMK-Népszava, 1989), 10. There is, however, no data on quite how widespread tattooing was, not only amongst workers but also female workers. We do not as yet have any information on what symbols were hidden in the tattoos visible in the photograph. René Hess, later Jutka's colleague in Switzerland recalls she had a snake on her right arm and two crossed fists on her left arm. Mária Soós, also Hungarian and a colleague living in Switzerland, recalls that Jutka had tattoos on her stomach as well as her arms. Interview with René Hess and Mária Soós, July 2002.

26 Only the last of the three files found in the HPSA (the one from 1955) mention that she had a tattoo and the one before (from 1954) does not. This means that the tattoos visible on her arm were acquired somewhere between 1954 and 1955. The chronological filing references of the files: 1. from 1952: 509-A-931; 2. from 1954: 32-A-679; 3. from 1955: 40-A-012 (HPSA).

27 We know very little about Sortex for the present and even less from Jutka's perspective. Only a general picture is available from the Party committee material – also with the area we highlighted between 1950 and 1956 – of the work conditions in the factory, conflicts between the workers and the party leaders, the over-pushed work effort. The material from the Sortex Party committee is to be found among the materials for the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Budapest District Committee (Hungarian National Archive Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Budapest District Committee, records from the Sortex factory). It is here that Jutka was most likely to have directly felt the interference by the state in her everyday life. For further background on the relationship between the youth and the state with reference to the Rákosi era and with special attention paid to Csepel, see Kürti, László. *Youth and the State in Hungary, Capitalism, Communism and Class* (London–Sterling: Pluto Press, 2002), 82–101.

28 Under the employment section on the HPSA files, the following data is listed. In the 1952 file: completed school studies at the age of 14 and a year later was working as an apprentice "textile worker". Her class background was "working class". In the 1954 file she was merely described as a "casual worker" and was therefore no longer seen as being qualified. The following can be read in the 1955 file: "parasite", "unemployed". Inasmuch as we rely on the files, it transpires that between the ages of 15 and 18, Jutka's status as seen by the state continuously declined. Her husband claims that she was arrested in 1955 for fly-posting; this information has not been supported by another source.

29 Even though mention is made in the file that sentence was passed, there is, as yet, no other reference made to this sentence.

30 For background information on the identity-crisis term related to psychohistory adolescence, see Erikson, Erik H., *A fiatal Luther és más írások* (The Young Luther and Other Writings), (Budapest, 1991), 368. György Kövér refers to Erikson from this point of view in his book on Géza Losonczy, participant of the Revolution 1956: see *Losonczy Géza (1917–1957)* (Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 1998), 85–86.

31 It would be fascinating to gain an answer to the question of how Jutka saw the 1956 Revolution and whether she saw it as being instrumental in her life and, if so, whether she also saw it as being instrumental for the country. Her husband recalls that, in the early days of his relationship with Jutka, she claimed that had taken up arms in the street fighting. Her colleagues from Switzerland also claimed that Jutka told them that she had fought with a weapon during the revolution. One of them also recalled that there was a picture hanging on her wall showing her with a weapon in her hand. (Until now we could not find this photograph.) It is also true that Jutka only told her Swiss colleagues about the revolution and she did not readily speak about this in front of her fellow Hungarian émigrés. (Interview with Jutka's former, Swiss colleague, René Hess, July 2002.) It is also fascinating to know what makes part of her representation shaped by herself later, in Australia. Respective recollections of the husband, Steven Toth and the younger son, Steve about her fight against János Kádár just as a Russain general during the Revolution are telling much about how myths arise in exile. Interview with Steven Toth and Steve juinor in March 2005.

32 The following is written in the file in the Ministry of the Interior records created in 1966 on Károly Sponga, born in 1935: "From November 4th, 1956, he fought as an actual artillery commander of the Hungarian army with the anti-revolutionaries from Csepel against the Soviet troops. He fired at an armoured car and its military personnel were shot in the head by armed men. No proceedings were initiated against him." Based on the file, it also transpires

that he also used the Solymosi surname earlier (we will return to this point later on) and he worked as a knife-grinder in Nyíregyháza (Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (HAHSS) file on Károly Sponga). (Károly Sponga was summoned to appear at the trial of Sándor Kőrösi and associates and although he was not sentenced, a file was opened on him. HAHSS, Sándor Kőrösi and associates, Investigatory Section of II Department of Ministry of Defence, June 26th, 1957. V-143 818.)

[33]   Jutka's eldest brother, József – a qualified arms technician – served with the ÁVH (Hungarian Secret Police) between 1950 and 1959. As a member of the newly-formed armed force, which played an active role in the suppression of the 1956 revolution, he was entrusted with the collection of ownerless weapons after the revolution, and their distribution to members of the armed force. That is why he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and also received the "For People's Power" decoration. He was forced to resign in 1959 because of his younger sister's defection, news of which had reached his superiors in the interim period. József Solymosi served in the special armed forces of the communist regime from the age of twenty and quickly built a military career for himself. When he was forced to resign, he was able to find work as an apprentice locksmith. As a former minion of the communist regime, he was never able to overcome this sudden break in his career and he went on to commit crimes: he started with fraud, theft and robbery before finally committing murder for which he was tried in 1966 and executed. In appeal against this severe sentence, mention made of his past in the ÁVH was not considered to provide alleviating circumstances. In the eyes of the regime, József Solymosi's crimes were probably seen as betrayal of earlier favouritism and ultimately the regime itself. See trail of József Solymosi, XVI. 2115/1966, Central Archives of the Budapest Municipal Court.

[34]   Karády, Viktor–István Kozma. *Név és nemzet. Családnév-változtatás, névpolitika és nemzetiségi erőviszonyok Magyarországon a feudalizmustól a kommunizmusig* (Name and Nation. Surname Change, Name Politics and Nationality Power Relations in Hungary from Feudalism to Communism) (Budapest: Osiris, 2002), 340–341. "The Stalinist regime in Hungary created a type of silent-assimilation policy but not in the name of some form of nation state building concept but stemming from an indifference to the problems and needs of ethnic minorities, occasionally as a result of distrust."

[35]   The other reason for the name change may have been dissociation with their father's name who was a heavy drinker and had allegedly spent time in prison. See appeal worded by József Solymosi himself in the original copies of the criminal investigation documentation against József Solymosi II., Criminal Investigation Section of Investigative Department of Budapest Police Headquarters, B51055/1966, 4. Central Archives of Budapest Municipal Court.

[36]   Of her Swiss friends, Fritz Zaugg recalls Jutka telling him that she herself had witnessed the event. Interview with Fritz Zaugg, June 2003. On the contrary, according to Mrs Taschler, the neighbour, Jutka did not witness the death of her younger brother. Interview with Mrs Taschler, May 2003.

[37]   This latter was published by the Italian magazine, *Epoca* (on November 11), but the previous ones – coming from the personal archives of Mario De Biasi – have been undeveloped until now. Since several members of this fighting group appearing on Beretty picture participated in the siege of the Communist Party headquarters, Köztársaság tér (Republic square) – they reappear on other pictures taken during the siege – there are some chances that Jutka and György also were at Köztársaság tér.

[38]   László Eörsi dedicates a whole chapter of his book, *Corvinisták, 1956,* on the Vajdahunyad street group and even though he considers Julianna Sponga as a member of the group, he does note that information on her is contradictory. It is important to note that Eörsi's information on Julianna Sponga relies solely on the Wittner trial material. As Jutka only joined the group on

November 4th, Eörsi – during his research into the group from Corvin köz – cannot have come across her name in any other way. See Eörsi, László, *Corvinisták, 1956. A VIII. kerület fegyveres csoportjai* (Corvinists, 1956. The Armed Gangs of the 8th District) (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2001), 239–255.

[39] In the trial of Mária Wittner and associates, Katalin Havrila Sticker and Mária Wittner make mention of her name but of the two of them, it transpires from Mrs. Havrila's account that she really did know Jutka. Katalin and Jutka went together to Switzerland from Austria from where Mrs. Havrila returned to her death. (She was executed for her role in the revolution: a photograph where she appears with a gun was conclusive evidence during her trial.) Mrs. Havrila said of Jutka that: "Julianna Sponga was about nineteen and as far as I know she worked in Soroksár at the market-garden and more recently at the Sortex textile works, she was a resident of Soroksár. [...] She didn't belong to our group, she joined us on the 4th when we were no longer fighting. As far as I know, she didn't fight in other groups either." (Minutes, November 27, 1957.) Mária Wittner's recollections are much fainter and, from the information we gained later, are unfounded: "If she was that long, tall woman then I can say that she also fought with arms against the Soviets and the ÁVH. She was asked to present her identity papers in the ceasefire. She had a machine gun. She disappeared from Vajdahunyad street on November 3. I heard that she became an informer and she betrayed us to the Russians." (Minutes, October 11, 1957.) HAHSS, Trial of Mária Wittner and associates, V-142 941.

[40] For the time being it is not known which hospital this was.

[41] From a telephone conversation with László Jánoky who now lives in Canada, spring 2002.

[42] From the Italian magazine *Epoca,* editions from November 11 and 18, 1956.

[43] The material from the Austrian refugee camp in Traiskirchen cannot be researched because of information protection legislation.

[44] *La Feuille d'Avis de Neuchâtel,* editions from November 17 and December 7, 1956. Reports by Ruth Widmer-Siedler.

[45] The factory was founded and owned by Steinmann, a man of Jewish descent who had fled to Switzerland from Germany in the Second World War and who himself initiated the employment of workers from among the Hungarian refugees. Interview with René Hess, July 2002.

[46] Jutka travelled abroad twice during her stay in Switzerland: according to the passport issued in Bern on July 29, 1958, she spent eight days in West Germany and two weeks in Italy in the summer of 1959. Jutka, who had been born in Tatárszentgyörgy in the Hungarian Lowlands and who had made her way to the flat suburbs of Pest, according to her Swiss colleagues, did not like life in the mountains. She wanted to get away. According to one of her fellow Hungarian refugee friends, the other reason she decided to go to Australia was because she had heard it was easy to marry there. Interview with Géza Csefalvay, July 2002. A friend of Jutka in Australia, Carolyn Fairley emphasized that Jutka scared of the Hungarian Security Police agents in Switzerland. Interview with Carolyn Fairley, July 2002. Also Fritz Zaugg mentioned that Jutka believed that Hungarian police had been after her in Switzerland. Second interview with Fritz Zaugg, October 2004.

[47] Interview with Steven Toth in June 2002 and with Rózsa Solymosi in May 2003.

[48] Ervin Hollós. *Kik voltak, mit akartak?* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1967). The photograph can be found in the first two editions on the page with no page number, but it does not appear in the 1976 edition. Ervin Hollós refused to be interviewed about the "1956 Separate Collection" including photographs and cuttings from newspapers on freedomfighters.

[49] The *Match* picture also appears in a series of images at the end of an untitled, 15-minute film, rather like a foreign body, which is held in the Open Society Archives at the Budapest Central European University. The film was never released and it is highly likely to be an early version of the propaganda film, Ilona Kolonits' *Így történt...* (It Happened Like This...). Source: OSA

Home Affairs Film Studio. 19. It appeared at first time in the exhibition on the counterrevolution of 1956, organized by the Ministry of Interior in June 1957.

[50] HAHSS 1956 Separate Collection.

[51] The pictures copied from *Match* and *Epoca* carry the reference number: V-150 381/10, in the HAHSS 1956 Separate Collection.

[52] HAHSS, Central Alien Control Office on Julianna Sponga, Department III/2, later Department III/II-9.

[53] About the afterlife see more details in our article: Eszter Balázs–Phil Casoar: "En Emblematic Picture of the 1956 Revolution: Photojournalism during the Hungarian Revolution". *Europa-Asia Studies,* Vol. 58, No. 8, December 2006, 1241–1260.

[54] Anderson, Andy. *Hongrie 1956: la Commune de Budapest, les conseils ouvriers* (Paris: Spartacus, 1976).

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OSCILLATORY HERITAGE OF THE GRASTYÁN SCHOOL

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Two major structural designs characterize the cerebral cortex: the scalable, modular neocortex and the single-module hippocampus. Functions attributed to the hippocampal formation have varied over the past several decades and include episodic memory in human lesion studies, spatial mapping in single unit recordings and voluntary exploration of the environment in field recording studies in animals. I suggest that the common thread across these parallel developments is that each captures the essence of episodic coding: items are organized in spatio-temporal context. I suggest that theta oscillations, studied extensively in the Grastyán school in Pécs, is the key temporal metric. Ordered sequences of items are encoded by the strict temporal relations of hippocampal cell assemblies nesting within cycles of theta oscillation. Such a temporal compression mechanism brings neuronal assemblies together in the time window of synaptic plasticity and allows the linking of first order (neighbor) and higher order relations. Seven to nine interleaving assemblies, representing overlapping past, present and future items, can be combined into an episode in a single theta cycle. During recall, the entire hippocampal connection matrix can be searched in the time period of the theta cycle (120–140 msec). I suggest that the hippocampus is an efficient search engine for the reconstruction of complex episodes from fragmentary information.

Keywords: memory, cell assemblies, random graph, autoassociator, unit activity, Pécs, Hungarian, hippocampus, brain oscillations, voluntary

What Makes Us Individuals?

When it comes to the complex organization of the brain, we tend to think of the large cerebral cortex. Its structure and the functions its anatomical organization supports are tuned mainly to detect orderly, species- and individual-invariant relationships in our environment. The perceptions of natural scenes, speech and music, body image as well as our occasional illusions can be attributed largely to the unique organization of the isocortex. Brains with these features only would be useful as long as they are embedded in an unchanging environment. However, we

live in an ever-changing world and numerous events, relevant to our survival and happiness, occur independent of us in an idiosynchratic manner. Detecting and storing all random events and relations around us are virtually impossible by any imaginable hardware. Furthermore, perception and storage of all that junk does not have any personal significance, anyway. Except the ones that do. Our names, birthdates of loved ones, and other important family events are our unique experiences, which do not simply unfold by some external rules. Such arbitrary associations must be first internalized in our brain for later retrieval to assist in future evaluations and decision-making. Forming and storing of individual experiences create a knowledge base, a unique brain-based context that modifies the way the neocortex processes future sensory experiences and contingencies. The accumulation of past experiences, collectively called memory, is responsible for creating individual identity. The emergence of individuality and personal identity are therefore strongly linked to mechanisms that enable the animal to recollect the past and modify its future behavior on the basis of these recollections. There is nothing in the physical world that would tell us whether a face is pleasant or repellent to us. The same face may be judged as beautiful or ugly on the basis of cumulative past experiences of the different observers (Buzsáki, 2004).

What are these experiences and where are they stored? Experiences stored in the brain are usually divided into two major categories: implicit and explicit. An engineer would call them automatic and supervised. For a psychologist, the term explicit or "declarative" means that such experiences have "conscious" recollections and can be declared verbally. They include life-time episodes unique to an individual, such as our first date, or the births of our children, or learning arbitrary facts related to the world we live in, such as the distinction between the brain structures neocortex and hippocampus. These latter factual or semantic memories lack a unique personal link. In contrast to these consciously experienced memories, the implicit experience of learning how to walk comfortably in high heel shoes or habituation to the annoying sound of the traffic when living next to the highway does not require that we are aware of the process (Squire, 1992).

Forming and storing arbitrary associations requires a suitable structure with a large number of connections randomly organized. The six-layer neocortex with its regular modular architectonics and mostly local wiring is far from ideal for such a task. A large part of the modularly organized neocortex is tuned to extract statistical regularities of the world conveyed by our sensors. But there is another piece of cortex, the "other cortex," or, in our Hellenistic scientific jargon, the allocortex below and medial to the neocortical mantle. As I will argue, the hippocampus contains a large arbitrary synaptic "space," which is ideally built for the construction of episodes and temporal sequences from arbitrary relations.

Hypothesized Functions of the Hippocampal System

Starting with the famous patient H. M. with bilateral surgical removal of the hippocampus, a consensus emerged among human psychologists that the hippocampus and associated structures are responsible for declarative (episodic and semantic) memories (Scoville and Milner et al., 1957). However, the mechanism of encoding and retrieving information has remained a major challenge for future work.

A major hurdle has to do with the definition. Episodic memory is claimed to be uniquely human, which endows the individual with the capacity to reference personal experiences in the context of both time and space (Tulving, 1987). It is these life-long experiences, representing unique events through space-time that give rise to the feeling of the self and are the source of individuality. Singular episodes can reemerge through the process of free recall. With such definition, how are we expected to work out physiological mechanisms of declarative memories in animals simpler than humans? Not surprisingly, hippocampal research on animals gave rise to different perspectives. Among these, the discovery of "place cells" provided the most important insights into hippocampal function (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978). Place cells explicitly characterize positions in the environment, independent of animal's location. These landmark-controlled place-signaling neurons are used by the brain to create navigational maps, a Cartesian space, of the environment. Allocentric, map-based navigation is essentially a geometric triangulation process, which depends primarily on the perceptual (input) properties of the brain, a method that does not require motor output or a temporal context. Although the original formulation of the cognitive map theory implied that addition of a temporal component to the basic spatial map in the human provides the basis for an episodic memory system, the relationship between the essentially egocentric episodic memory and allocentric landmark navigation has remained a controversial issue. What is the source of the temporal component that can serve such an important role? A third line of investigation may provide a clue here. The most prominent electrical pattern of the hippocampus is the rhythmic theta oscillation at 6–9 Hz (cf. Buzsáki, 2002), which may provide the necessary timing.

Perhaps reformulating the definition of episodic memory might be instructive here. In its simplest possible formulation, episodic memory can be simply defined as: *What* happened *where* and *when*? From this perspective, the different lines of thoughts regarding the mechanisms of the hippocampus can be tied together, with the place cell and theta oscillations providing the spatio-temporal context, a critical aspect of episodes. Storing large number of arbitrary events requires special structure, for which the random wiring of the hippocampus is most suitable. Be-

low we attempt to put these ingredients together. Because the ground work for this venture began in Hungary, a short digression for exploring the seeds of the ideas is justified.

The Hippocampal Theta Link to Pécs: Grastyán's School of Neurophysiology

My connection with brain rhythms began with attending a physiology lecture by Endre Grastyán in the beautiful small town, of Pécs on the sunny slopes of the Mecsek mountains in Hungary. University of Pécs, or Universitas Quinque Ecclesiensis, as it was called when it was founded in 1367, has produced a remarkable set of neuroscientists, including János Szentágothai, a world-class neuroanatomist, Béla Flerkó and Béla Halász, pioneers of neuroendocrinology and Ferenc Gallyas, the creator of the widely used silver impregnation methods for neuronal labeling.

Like many of us at a young age, Grastyán could not quite make up his mind in his twenties about his future. Finding nothing too interesting or challenging initially, he decided to train for the protestant priesthood and to get some orientation in philosophy. But his mind, filled with too much curiosity, prevented him from becoming a preacher. He ended up in medical school during those stormy years around World War II and became the assistant of Professor Kálmán Lissák. This was a good start. Lissák, a student of Otto Loewi in Graz, Austria, was a legendary surgeon-physiologist. I vividly remember one of his lectures, operating on a dog in front of a class of two hundred students, talking to us constantly about the various neuronal regulating mechanism of blood circulation while effortlessly preparing all the nerves, cannulating veins and arteries and hooking up the instrumentation. At some later point in my early career, Lissák came into my physiology *practicum* and saved me from a complete humiliation from my students. I was trying to demonstrate the classic experiment of Loewi, the first proof that a chemical is released at the synapse. This most beautiful experiment requires two frog hearts. The demonstration, if done well, is simple, elegant and convincing. In the original experiment, Loewi placed the hearts into salt water and separated them by a membrane. He found that stimulation of the vagus nerve that innervates the heart slowed the rate of the stimulated heart but had no effect on the unstimulated one. After removal of the membrane, however, stimulation caused both hearts to slow down. His interpretation of these data was that nerve stimulation caused the release of a substance from the nerve endings, which he called "Vagusstoff", i. e., "stuff from the vagus." This chemical then acted on both hearts. Loewi described his observations in a short paper of only four pages in 1921, which laid down the chemical theory of synaptic transmission. For this breakthrough he was awarded

the Nobel Prize in physiology and medicine in 1936. His student Kálmán Lissák, in his best days, had the reputation of being able to perform Otto Loewi's experiments even blindfolded. He was a tall, attention-demanding handsome man with white hair, who wore a bow-tie even in the worst days of the Bolshevik drama. Visiting my seminar that day, he promptly recognized my troubles. Without saying a word, he took two new frogs, prepared the hearts and nerves in no time, placed them in front of me and left the room. With two great preparations in my hand, the demonstration worked well. My embarrassment notwithstanding, I proudly explained to the students how the chemical acetylcholine, released by the stimulated nerves, was responsible for the visible slowing of heartbeats. After the *practicum,* I prepared 6 heart pairs, and the last three worked just like the ones I got from Professor Lissák. From then on, Loewi's experiment on neurotransmitter release became one of my favorite demonstrations.

Although Endre Grastyán was perhaps the closest friend of Lissák, the two men were as different as they could be. Apart from the surgery demonstrations, Lissák's lectures were scarcely attended. In contrast, Grastyán was a performing artist, his lectures were carefully composed and choreographed. The lecture room was always packed and even students from the neighboring Law School came to listen to his mesmerizing lectures. He generated so much enthusiasm that we students became convinced that the issues he discussed every time were the most important ones in the universe. I often thought that Grastyán could have been a novelist, a story-teller, an artist, and a musician, all in one person. There lay in him, beneath the surface of science, a lost Atlantis of philosophy, fine arts, musical talent and a unique human interaction that one thinks co-existed only in the long-extinct great men of the Renaissance era. On that particular lecture in April, 1970 he talked about the role of control, a topic that changed my life for good. My high-school plan to become an electric engineer had been vetoed by my parents, who offered me the choice between Medical School and Law School. While my friends were having fun at the School of Engineering in Budapest, learning exciting stories about radio transmission and electronic oscillators, I spent most of my time studying the unending details of bones and ligaments. But in that spring time lecture, Grastyán was talking about some truly intriguing questions. His key idea was that control in living systems begins with the output. The first simple biological systems did not have any inputs; they did not need them. Generating a motor output was sufficient when food was abundant in the sea environment. Rhythmic contraction of muscles guaranteed that some nutrients were obtained. Sensation of direction and distance developed only after the invention of movement across space. There is no need to perceive anything unless one can act upon the perceived input, Grastyán argued. He provided numerous and vivid examples of how sensation and perception are always subordinated to motor organization. The whole complicated brain web serves to supervise the output, which in his thinking in-

cluded skeletal movement, autonomic responses, motivation, emotion and even thought. There is no use to hear without the ability to orient to the source. What is the point of the great smell of food if we cannot eat it? The idea of output control of sensation is a profound thought even today. Back then, when Pavlovian sensory-sensory association was the dominant ideology in the East and stimulus-decision-response paradigm dominated Western thinking, Grastyán's teachings were unusual, to say the least. After his lecture I rushed home to read the relevant chapters in our official textbook only to realize that there was not a single word there about what I heard that morning. Or in any other books, as I learned after feverishly searching for sources and references in the university library. Nevertheless, beginning with Grastyán's lecture on the emotional organization in the brain, my life in medical school assumed a new meaning. I applied to become his apprentice and spent most of my student life in his lab. Training in Grastyán's laboratory meant mostly to be part of fascinating lunch discussions that often went on for several hours, where topics ranged randomly from homeostatic regulations of the brain to Johan Huizinga's "Homo Ludens". It was during these lunch lessons where I first learned about the hippocampal "theta" rhythm, the oscillation that became my obsession ever since. Before discussing the critical role of theta rhythm in providing a temporal context for episodic memories, we should overview the structural requirements of an effective coding-decoding device.

A Large Random Graph for Storing Episodes

The hippocampus is a one-layer cortex, a sort of a large appendage to the neocortex. Its main input and outputs are the same: the neocortex, which communicates with the hippocampus via the entorhinal cortex. Unlike the modular neocortex, it is a single giant cortical column. The major entry point to the hippocampus is the granule cells of the dentate gyrus. The axon terminals of granule cells excite about half of the hippocampal pyramidal cells, which are clustered together in the CA3 region (Acsády et al., 1998). In turn, the CA3 neurons send their main collaterals to the CA1 pyramidal cells. These connecting axons are known as Schaffer collaterals, named after the Hungarian anatomist-neurologist Károly Schaffer, who discovered them. The remaining collaterals, form the largest recurrent collateral system in the brain, return the excitatory information to partner CA3 neurons. Due to this large recurrent and feed-forward system, 90% of all intrahippocampal synaptic contacts are formed by the CA3 neurons. The hippocampal information returns to the entorhinal-neocortex origin by the projecting axons of the CA3 pyramidal cells. This neocortex-hippocampus-neocortex loop is an epitome of the multiple, parallel organization of the cerebrum. Traffic in this excitatory system is under the strict control of a rich family of inhibitory neurons

(Freund and Buzsáki, 1996; Sik et al., 1994). This integration of information in the short and long loops depends on the available time windows. Such diverging and converging reverberating circuits can serve various functions, including error correction, pattern completion, amplification and temporary storage. This is what the hippocampus is about. Permanent memories are then laid down in the neocortex, due mostly to the sleep-related activity patterns of the hippocampus (Buzsáki, 1989).

To illustrate the physiological operations of the hippocampus, let us assume that the neocortex is a library and we have to search for a book in it. An ideal library not only contains most books ever written but it also allows speedy access to any volume accurately. Unfortunately, there is no ideal library, man-made or biological. The more books that are accumulated in the library the higher the overlap among authors' names, titles and content. Searching for an item in such a colossal library can become a nightmare. Finding Imre Madách's *Tragedy of Man* is straightforward because of the unique key words one can supply. But try to find the book that you remember is about honesty, courage, and involves a team of young boys fighting a "West Side Story" kind of turf battle over a derelict Budapest building site and about honor. The main character dies for his idols and team because he acquires pneumonia after spying on the enemy team by hiding in the cold lake of a public garden. Even the best man-made search engine, the internet may fail in the search. After typing in multiple combinations of numerous key words about the story, the search engine Google may give you a million choices. However, if you ask your educated librarian, chances are that he or she can tell you right away that the book you are desperately looking for is "The Pál Street Boys" by Ferenc Molnár, who was perhaps the greatest playwright to come out of Hungary. The reason for such a huge difference in search efficiency is that your librarian has a hippocampus, whereas Google does not. Thanks to the hippocampus, humans are very efficient in storing and remembering episodes. We can search the huge space of the hippocampal index and construct a full story from fragments in a matter of a few theta oscillatory cycles.

How big is the available abstract space in the hippocampus and how is it organized? Together with Peter Somogyi, from Oxford University we set out to study this important question by labeling single neurons in the intact rat brain and reconstructing the entirety of their axon collaterals and synaptic contacts in three-dimensional space. The 200,000 CA3 pyramidal neurons in each hemisphere of the rat brain posses a total of 40 kilometers axon collaterals and an estimated 5 to 10 billion synaptic contacts in each hemisphere (*Fig. 1;* Li et al., 1994). Unlike the mostly locally organized neocortical neurons, the distribution of the contacts in the recursive and feed-forward projections in the hippocampus is reminiscent of a random graph. The concept of random graph implies that one can walk from any neuron to any other neuron along the calculated shortest possible synaptic path,

Figure 1. Hippocampus: a randomly organized synaptic space. Shown is the axonal arbor of a single CA3 pyramidal cell. Cell body is indicated by the asterisk. A, anterior; P, posterior direction. Note extensive, non-local distribution of the axon collateral. An average CA3 neuron has about 300 mm of axon collaterals, which establish 30–60,000 synapses with other CA3 and CA1 neurons. Such strongly connected graph is an ideal autoassociator

much as one can walk in an unobstructed field from any place to any other place (Erdős and Rényi, 1959; Barabási, 2002). Construction of a full random graph from 200,000 CA3 pyramidal cells would require only 15 to 20 divergent connections from each cell. This small figure is in stark contrast to the 10,000 to 20,000 of synapses an average CA3 pyramidal cell establishes with its peers. The large divergence implies that the number of possible routes between any randomly chosen start and goal cells is a truly galactic figure. Nevertheless, no matter how impressive this figure is, we do not get far with such reasoning alone. This is because synapses between pyramidal cells are weak and the discharge of a single starter cell will not be able to fire any of its target peers. Only discharging neurons can be used for encoding and retrieving of memories. Without speculating further we can register that the CA3 autoassociator is a strongly connected, directed and weighted graph. This arrangement simplifies how activity can spread in the recursive network. Instead of spreading excitation in any direction randomly, the trajectory of activity is strictly determined by the synaptic weights so when activity arrives at a bifurcation choice, it will progress along the path with the stronger synapses. Importantly, the synaptic weights are set by experience during the learning of episodes. As discussed above, a library to be useful should contain not only all the books we will ever need but also an efficient search mechanism that allows the retrieval of books in a short time. This is where temporal packaging of

information becomes critical. I speculate that the packaging mechanism is hippocampal theta oscillations.

The Short Story of Theta Oscillations

The story of theta oscillations is an edifying chapter in the history of behavioral-cognitive neuroscience. The controversy regarding the exact behavioral correlate(s) of theta oscillation has raged for decades, generating numerous published experiments and occasional strong feelings among the contestants. Virtually every conceivable overt and covert behavior has been associated with hippocampal theta activity, as summarized in *Figure 2*. The first experiments in behavior of animals were carried out by Grastyán et al. (1959). According to Grastyán's pioneering work in the cat, theta reflected an "orienting reflex, searching for stimuli with significance to the subject". Although this relationship has been challenged many times, it has remained one of the dominant views about the function of theta. Many other concepts can be placed under the same general rubric of "input processing". In contrast, a number of hypotheses argued in favor of the "output" or motor control role of hippocampal theta. The most influential of these hypotheses has been the "voluntary movement" hypothesis of Vanderwolf (1969). Cornelius (Case) Vanderwolf, my postdoctoral adviser, suggested that theta occurs only during intentional or voluntary movement, as opposed to immobility and "involuntary", i.e., stereotypic activity. Despite seven decades of hard work on rabbits, rats, mice, gerbils, guinea pigs, sheep, cats, dogs, old world monkeys, chimpanzees and humans by outstanding colleagues, to date, there is no widely agreed term that would unequivocally describe behavioral correlate(s) of this prominent brain rhythm. By exclusion, the only firm message that can be safely concluded from this brief summary is that in an immobile animal no theta is present, provided that no changes occur in the environment, and the animal is not "thinking".

Why is it so difficult to agree on the behavioral correlates of such simple mechanisms as a brain oscillation? Processing environmental inputs requires "attention", and so does intentional movement. With the introduction of the term "voluntary", theta oscillation research unintentionally entered the territory of "intentionality," a label that refers to the "substance" of all subjective mental activity (Dennett, 1987). Thus, an inescapable deduction from the behavior-brain correlation approach is that the "will" plays a critical role in theta generation. An alternative, and perhaps more sober, conclusion is that our behavioral-cognitive terms are simply working hypothetical constructs that do not necessarily correspond to any given brain mechanism. Although the true goal of neuroscience research is to reveal how the brain generates behavior and how particular mechanisms, such as

Movement
Running
REM sleep
Whisking
Muscle activity
Instrumental response
Operant learning
Sniffing
Whisking
Memory
Response inhibition
Response persistence
Approach
Avoidance
Conditioning
Gape response
Voluntary movement
Learning
Extinction
Orienting
Temperature change
Autonomic-somatic

			Olfaction		Memory		
			Reversal learning		Response persistence		
			Motivation		Habituation		
			Information processing		Conditioning		
			Decision making		Avoidance		
			Visual search		Sensorimotor		
			Neurosis		Defense		
		Arousal	Frustration		Bar pressing		
		Orienting	Anxiety		Activation	Working memory	
		Attention	Aggression		Readiness	Plasticity	
		Volition	Holography		Swimming	Encoding	
		Comparator	Cholinergic response		Play	Retrieval	
Arousal	Arousal	Mismatch	Sexual behavior		Hypnosis	Mapping	Navigation
1930	40	50	60	70	80	90	2000

Figure 2. Hypothesized functions of hippocampal theta oscillations during the past several decades. Most correlates can be lumped as "sensory-attention" (input function) or motor output function. Endre Grastyán's (left) 'orienting response' hypothesis was the first, which was derived from observations in behaving animals (cat). The most influential hypothesis in the rat has remained the 'voluntary movement' correlate by Cornelius (Case) H. Vanderwolf (right). Note the large variety of the hypotheses and their culmination in the 1970s. The behavior (independent variable) - brain mechanism (dependent correlate) approach failed to produce a consensus on the behavioral significance of theta oscillations

theta, can categorize and define behaviors, most behavioral-cognitive research, to date, seems to work the other way around. We take a man-created word or phrase, such as one of those in the above list, and search for brain mechanisms that may be responsible for the generation of the conceived behavior. In my humble opinion,

such approach has limitations, despite the best intentions. For example, Vanderwolf used sophisticated "ethological", fine-grain analysis of behavior. Ironically, it is through his work that theta became linked with free will. Grastyán objected passionately against the term "voluntary", yet he could not avoid its connotations. We never uttered Vanderwolf's name in Grastyán's lab without adding a curse, an "innocent" Hungarian custom. Grastyán dedicated the last decade of his life to the understanding of the neurophysiological substrates of play behavior and concluded that theta is an invariant correlate of play in kittens and cats. Paradoxically, according to his favorite philosopher, Huizinga (1955), play is "a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain limits of time and place".

An alternative strategy to understand the role of theta oscillations in behavioral organization is to reveal its content. By content I mean the synaptic and cellular mechanisms that give rise to a population 'order parameter' measured by the mean field of theta waves. Through this process we can gain insight into the temporal organization of population activity of single neurons (Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004). It is the time metric of hippocampal rhythms that determines the synaptic interactions within and among cell assemblies (cf. Buzsáki 2002). If the population activity of the hippocampus provides a timing mechanism and single hippocampal neurons are active depending on the spatial position of the animal, how do we exploit these mechanisms in the service of episodic memory?

Encoding of Episodes by Theta Oscillation-embedded Packages of Neuronal Assemblies

My suggested solution to the above dilemma is the following. If episodic memory in humans provides some internal rules of its organization, we should be looking for such rules in the physiological patterns of neurons in animals. Beginning with the seminal work of Pál Ranschburg from Pázmány (now Eötvös) University in Budapest before World War II, it has been clarified that episodes are not simple linear chains of events, such as A is followed by B, B is followed by C, etc. If it were the case, episodic memories would be extremely vulnerable and losing one item would terminate the episode. Instead, we know from experience that the essence of episode telling is that the story can evolve in multiple directions. This is possible because in addition to the first order (immediate neighbor) relations, higher order connections are also coded (Kahana, 1996). In episodic learning, stronger associations are formed between stimuli that occur near each other in time compared to those that are separated by a greater interval. Furthermore, forward serial associations are stronger than backward associations, meaning that once an item from a studied list is retrieved, the likelihood of retrieving the next item is twice as probable as retrieving the preceding item. Encoding is better for-

ward in time. Looking ahead of the model, we hypothesize that neuronal mechanism of episodic encoding is the tightly correlated timing of neuronal firing. This timing mechanism and the large arbitrary connection matrix of the hippocampus can insure that not only immediate neighbors but items with larger distances can also be connected. What we need for testing this hypothesis is to investigate the neuronal mechanisms in behaving animals in situations analogous to the learning of episodes in humans. Without attempting to prove each step of the logic with complicated experiments, here is a short synopsis of the events that might be occurring in our hippocampus during the formation of episodic memories. (For a more detailed treatment of the topic, see Buzsaki, 2005; 2006.)

Episodic learning of serially presented items, such a list of words, or in real life situation a story, is analogous to a rat's behavior running on a linear track for water or food reward and encoding the sequentially observed places. Place encoding requires sequential activation of hippocampal place-encoding cells in a temporal context *(Fig. 3)*. Sequential segments of the track are represented by unique sets of hippocampal place-coding cell assemblies (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978), which are bound together by synaptic interactions into an episode. The metric distances between adjacent place representations of two place-coding assemblies are reflected by the strength of their synaptic connections and can be studied experimentally by measuring the time differences between the assemblies within the theta cycle. The way this coding occurs is a fascinating but complex process.

Each assembly is active maximally only once on the track, signifying a given position. However, instead of coding each spot in a narrow time window only once, place representations of neurons have long "tails", reflected by the elongated size of the place field, an average of 30–40 cm. As the rat enters the field, the firing rate of the neuron begins to increase, reaches a maximum in the middle of the field and then it decreases gradually as the rat leaves the place field of the neuron. The firing rate of the neuron is controlled by two parameters: the distance from the place field center at a longer scale and periodically by the phase of the theta cycle (O'Keefe and Recce, 1993; Harris et al., 2002). Because each consecutive part of the track is represented by an assembly of neurons, this results an interesting scenario. First, each cell assembly represents one spot best but has some progressively weakening say in the representation of the previous and future places as well. At each theta cycle, the rat moves about 5 cm, so that each place field is re-represented 6 to 9 times. Second, although each spot is represented best by one cell assembly, another 5 to 8 assemblies also contribute. The result is that in each theta cycle 6 to 9 assemblies are packaged, representing the past and future positions on the track in a time-compressed manner *(Fig. 4;* Skaggs et al., 1996). This temporal compression is the most critical aspect of the coding mechanism because it brings neurons representing distant places into the time-frame where synaptic plasticity operates. Single neurons or pairs of neurons cannot represent

Figure 3. Analogy between episodic learning and 1-dimensional navigation. (A) Learning and free recall of an episode. Arrows, higher order relationships, which facilitate recall of items with nearby positions (e. g., county spring, noise earth). (B) Conditional response probability of recall as a function of positional lag. Note advantage for recalls to nearby serial positions and an asymmetry favoring forward recall. (C) Model of episodic encoding in the hippocampus. The width of the bars indicates firing rates of the assemblies and the temporal differences between assemblies reflect distances of their spatial representations. EC, input from the entorhinal cortex (arrowheads) provides updated information about the external environment (places, P1 to P5). In each theta cycle, 6 to 9 cell assemblies are compressed in the order which the rat explores the subsequent places of those assembly representations. In each cycle the most active assembly is associated with the through of the theta oscillation. The compression mechanism provides a context for the strongest assembly and its represented item. Each assembly is re-represented in 6 to 9 subsequent theta cycles, corresponding to approximately 1 sec of activity and 30–40 cm travel distance. The temporal distances within the theta cycle determine the synaptic strengths between the assemblies. By this mechanism both first order (neighborhood) and higher order distances can be connected, which allow episodes to evolve in multiple directions. In the absence of environmental or body cues (i. e., free recall), assemblies are advance by the previous cycles (e. g., P1 recalls P2)

times longer than a few hundred milliseconds, and synaptic plasticity works at the tens of milliseconds scale. The compression mechanism makes it possible that the representations of items can be translated into synaptic strengths among neurons and assemblies.

In related research we have established that the life-time of each hippocampal assembly is about 10–20 msec (Harris et al., 2004). Neuronal coalitions are formed preferentially at this temporal scale because this time window is the most efficient to affect target assemblies. This time constraint allows only 6 to 9 cells assemblies to be nested in the time period of the theta oscillation (120–140 msec), that is we arrive at the same numbers of assemblies as we did with our behavioral estimation. Physiologically speaking, the theta oscillation corresponds to the build up of excitation in the hippocampal space, while all neurons can be visited and terminated by the recruited inhibition. In other words theta periods are temporal windows of opportunities to search the entire hippocampal space. Assemblies are reflected by their time differences within the theta cycle.

The sequences are stored in the autoassociative CA3 recurrent and CA3-CA1 collateral systems and can be updated by entorhinal cortex-mediated environmental signals. During memory retrieval, the CA3 autoassociator is searched in each theta cycle, recalling 6 to 9 temporally linked cell assemblies each representing a spatial field that the rat would traverse during the next second or so. The predicted and perceived locations are replayed in tandem by the CA3 and CA1 assemblies. Prediction of future locations is possible because distances are encoded in the synaptic strengths between assemblies (Muller et al., 1996) and reflected by their theta time temporal sequences. In short, I suggest that the overlapping past, present and future locations are combined into a single episode by the self-organized CA3 and CA1 assemblies in successive theta cycles. The theta-cycle compression brings not only neighboring but several assemblies together in a time frame that allows the strengthening of their connections simply by their temporal differences. Thus, the physical distances represented by the cell assemblies in the real world are translated to time and phase within the theta cycle and eventually synaptic connectivity. This simple mechanism can account for the first- and higher order linking of items into the same temporal context, represented by a theta cycle.

Of course, all experiments described were carried out in animals, which precluded direct testing of the main hypothesis by free recall. Nevertheless, the model outlined above can account for temporal contiguity and the asymmetric nature of recall in episodic memory at the neuronal level. Even though we studied animals, the spatial behavior and inferences we can make from these observations should apply to episodic learning in humans as well.

The observation of nested cell assemblies in hippocampal theta oscillations deserves a little digression. Our previous work demonstrated that 6 to 9 faster cycles, called gamma oscillations, are nested within the theta waves (Bragin et al., 1995).

The faster gamma cycles therefore can be conceived as the macroscopic reflection of cell assemblies. The theta period would define the span of memory with 7 to 9 items multiplexed on the successive gamma cycles (Lisman and Idiart, 1985). Importantly, in human subjects, the time of short-term memory scanning increases with the set size, corresponding to approximately 25 milliseconds per "to-be-remembered" item. Thus, the number of items that can be stored by the multiplexed gamma-theta model is identical with the "magical number 7 ($\pm$2)," the psychophysically measured limit of working memory (Miller, 1956). Therefore, the multiplexing mechanism described above may be responsible for providing a buffer for short-term memories, a process attributed to the operations of neuronal circuits in the prefrontal cortex. Because we also found that the magnitude of gamma oscillations in the prefrontal cortex are modulated by the phase of hippocampal theta oscillations, the common multiplexing mechanism would provide a physiological link between working memory and episodic memory.

What Did We Learn?

Now we are in a position to define theta oscillations from the brain's point of view. Experiments with single cells and cell assemblies we briefly discussed show that the quantal theta periods are necessary for chunking events and places together in time so that the participating neuronal assemblies can be tied together. The temporal compression of cell assemblies in combination with the rules of synaptic plasticity allows for activity to jump from one assembly sequence to the next. Thus, from the perspective of the brain, Grastyán's theta oscillation is an essential temporal organizer, a metric that relates synaptic strengths to the changes in the outside world. Theta is the temporal means of navigation in both neuronal space during episodic memory and real space during self-motion.

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THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF TALK

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For this volume of *Hungarian Studies* dedicated to multidisciplinary contributions of Hungarians around the world, I have chosen to describe my work on a unique multidisciplinary effort called TalkBank. This effort seeks to harness the new information technology to study the great complexities of human talk.

Keywords: multidisciplinarity, statistical analysis, databases of written texts, sample analysis, classroom discourse

Researchers in the brain and behavioral sciences have benefited immensely from the rise of information technology. We now have powerful methods for performing statistical analysis, simulation, modeling, and graphic display. Our computers provide increasingly precise control of eye tracking, brain imaging, and stimulus presentation. We can use computers to analyze large databases of demographic and survey data, as well as huge corpora of written language texts. However, we have not yet succeeded in harnessing web technologies for the study of the most basic of all human social processes – conversational interactions. The TalkBank Project (http://talkbank.org) addresses this problem by providing computational support for the online multimedia collaborative analysis of talk.

To give the reader a sense of what types of materials are currently available in TalkBank, consider this sampler:

1. You can listen to Franciso Ma describe in Nahuatl (with English translations) how he lost his teeth when a bandit shot a gun at his mouth. (Thanks to Jane Hill.)
2. You can view and listen to a discussion of a group of medical students engaged in problem-based learning about diagnosis of a case of an amnesic, dysnomic aphasic. (Thanks to Tim Koschmann.)
3. You can listen to Larry Lessig plead the Napster copyright infringement case at the Supreme Court. (Thanks to Jerry Goldman's SCOTUS Project.)

4. You can watch Bettino Craxi discussing corruption in Italian politics in a TV interview. (Thanks to Johannes Wagner and the MOVIN Project.)

5. You can listen (in Spanish) to Christian Iniguez arguing with a sports talk show announcer about his predictions for the soccer match between Guadalajara and Monterrey. (Thanks to Christian Iniguez.)

6. You can listen to a discussion of card playing and shopping between three Jewish immigrants who resettled in 1938 from Vienna to London, as they code-switch back and forth from German to English. (Thanks to Eva Eppler.)

7. You can watch videos from Alicia between ages 1 and 3 as she interacts with her English-speaking father and other Cantonese speakers in Hong Kong. (Thanks to Virginia Yip and Stephen Matthews).

8. You can watch an elderly gentleman with severe aphasia holding fully effective gesturally-based conversations with his family and friends. (Thanks to Chuck Goodwin).

9. You can watch German schoolchildren from Dresden singing and dancing to Czech songs in their L2 Czech classroom. (Thanks to Angelika Kubanek-German.)

10. You can study transcripts and audio from the CHILDES database from about 1200 children learning 28 different languages.

I cite these ten examples simply to illustrate the enormous diversity in the CHILDES and TalkBank databases. Alongside this qualitative diversity is the quantitative richness of available data, now reaching 300 MB of text and an additional 2 terabytes of sound and video.

Viewing TalkBank along disciplinary lines, we can distinguish 17 fields or research circles that are involved in the study of conversational interactions. For each of these research circles there are corresponding data in TalkBank:

1. child development (mother-child attachment, peer groups)
2. child language development (CHILDES system, test development)
3. language disorders and remediation (aphasia, stuttering, retardation)
4. multilingualism (second language learning, code-switching, acculturation)
5. emergency medicine (ambulance, ER, teaching simulations)
6. legal argumentation (courtroom, Supreme Court, probation hearings)
7. small group dynamics (government meetings, security)
8. psychotherapy (therapist-patient discourse, therapy groups)
9. conversation analysis (rhetorical analysis, sociolinguistics, text and discourse)
10. computational linguistics (parsing, tagging, data-mining, content analysis)
11. speech technology (voice recognition, prosodic analysis)

12. anthropology (field linguistics, film ethnographies, oral tradition)
13. gestural communication (narrative, conversational, crosslinguistic)
14. classroom discourse (science, math, literacy, cultural effects, lectures)
15. tutorial dialog (dyadic, small group, man-machine)
16. human-computer interaction (collaborative dialog, usability)
17. ethology (animal communication and behavior)

The development of a shared database has been a crucial formative step in the maturation of the each of the sciences. In Genetics, projects such as the Human Genome Project (www.ornl.gov/hgmis), GenMapp (www.genmapp.org), or Protein Map (Aisenman – Berman, 2000) are now storing all published genetic sequences in forms that are open to analysis and data-mining through the web. In fact, gene sequences are not accepted for publication until they have been entered in these systems. In Paleontology, museums worldwide preserve fossils whose specific physical structure, radiological dating, and stratificational location are crucial to our reconstruction of the history of life and the earth. Electronic records and scans based on this evidence are now being made available electronically (www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/pdn/) for deeper analysis and data-mining. Internet databases are now fundamental to progress in Astronomy (van Buren, Curtis, Nichols, Brundage, 1995), Physics (Caspar et al., 1998), Economics, Medicine, History, Political Science, Experimental Psychology, Linguistics, and other sciences.

1. TalkBank Data Research Methods

Psychologists often rely on laboratory studies using reaction time methodology, computerized control (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flat, Provost, 1993; MacWhinney, St. James, Schunn, Li, Schneider, 2001), and random assignment to condition to test empirical hypotheses. Although this particular methodology cannot be applied to the study of the real human interactions represented in TalkBank data, there are at least seven equally powerful methodologies that can operate directly on TalkBank data. These include:

1. **Microanalytic studies.** Microanalysis of videos relies on frame-by-frame analysis of linkages of conversation, gesture, proxemics, props, and prosodics. Exemplary applications of this method already in TalkBank include studies of problem-based learning (Koschmann – LeBaron, 2002), Guugu Yimithirr narratives (Haviland, 1993), and professional problem-solving (Goodwin, 1994). These analyses have already served as our first test-bed for published collaborative commentary in journals with CD-ROMs.

2. **Microgenetic studies.** Research programs that study cognitive development (Siegler – Crowley, 1991) use careful video analysis to track subtle changes in learner's strategies across days and weeks as a result of various types of teaching.
3. **Sampled comparisons.** Within the new infrastructure, situations can be sampled across groups and conditions and compared in terms of analytic codings. For example, we could compare the gestures of deaf children of hearing parents with those of normal children in terms of a coding system delineating reference to the here and now (Morford – Goldin-Meadow, 1997). The coding system itself would then be the focus of collaborative commentary.
4. **Error analysis.** We can, for example, distinguish cases of failed perspective-taking in phone call survey data (Schober, Conrad, Fricker, in press) both by sampling across conditions and by microanalysis within conditions.
5. **Longitudinal studies.** In areas where controlled experimentation is not possible, longitudinal analysis is often equally powerful. For example, we can trace the dynamic emergence of the Supreme Court's position in Roe v. Wade and its implementation in 25 years of subsequent decisions. Or we can trace the process of mathematical development across the 12 years of Carolyn Maher's video study of a cohort of learners in Baltimore.
6. **Large sample analysis.** We can assess the effects of oral arguments in the Court's decision-making, by examining outcomes and processes in a large number of oral arguments. For example, attitudinalists (Segal – Spaeth, 1993) view oral arguments as largely irrelevant to the Court's decisions making. Informationists (Johnson, in press) espouse a contrasting view that emphasizes the extent to which justices acquire new information during oral arguments. To adjudicate this issue, we can provide representatives of these competing views with complete access to transcripts and audio of the Court's oral arguments along with simple methods for annotating and coding the transcripts from their respective theoretical positions.
7. **Dynamic modeling.** We can track individual differences in referential compression in dyadic interactions with computerized systems. Because the behaviors being produced in these system are frequent and repetitive, they are amenable to modeling (Anderson – Lebiere, 1998).

Each of these seven methods fits in naturally with TalkBank and our vision of a new community of collaborative commentary. By combining several of these methods, we can begin to understand how processes that operate across very different time scales can become entrained by interactions that occur in observable interactions (MacWhinney, in press-c).

2. Infrastructural Development

The development of the TalkBank database and programs has been facilitated by a series of relatively recent developments in computer and network hardware and software, as well as computerized recording technology. These advances include:

1. **Computational speed.** Current desktop computers run at speeds that make it easy to examine hundreds of megabytes of transcript data in a few minutes. These speed advances make it possible to search quickly for a wide variety of lexical and syntactic patterns in aphasic speech. Today's computers can also be used to compress video material fast enough to allow users to run compression jobs overnight that earlier would have taken weeks. In this project, video compression will be conducted at CMU, where we are already relying heavily on these advances.
2. **Network bandwidth.** Most users now have access to broadband Internet connections that are capable of playing high-quality compressed video without distortion or dropped frames.
3. **Streaming video.** Compressed video can now be configured to permit random access or hinted streaming. Hinting adds time marks to delineate the beginning and ends of small segments of the video. These marks then allow a user to directly access, for example, a clip that begins at minute 18 of the 42 minutes video without having to wait to download the first 18 minutes.
4. **Disk storage.** It is now possible to purchase a terabyte of disk storage for $600. Three or four years ago, this would have cost $10,000. Because these prices have fallen so rapidly, it is easy for the TalkBank Project to store and backup large amounts of high-quality video for distribution through streaming servers.
5. **XML.** Currently, most documents on the web are in HTML. However, over the next few years, materials on the web will move from HTML to the more powerful XML framework. Modern computer software such as Java and C# provides solid support for documents encoded in XML. Moreover XML has strong linkages to the new Unicode standard.
6. **Unicode.** The Unicode character-encoding standard provides a single consistent standard for encoding all of the world's languages, as well as the major classes of symbol systems. Because this encoding is consistent across computer platforms, it allows us to create a single consistent database for aphasia across languages and platforms.
7. **Grid Computing.** Working with Bennett Bertenthal's new NSF Social Informatics Data Grid project, TalkBank can configure data analysis and data sets across a wide array of machines on the Internet that can be accessed by the tools of grid computing. Grid Computing is one component in a set of ongoing ad-

vances in Cyberinfrastructure that can be tracked by consulting the proceedings of the recent NSF Workshop on Cyberinfrastructure for the Social Sciences at http://vis.sdsc.edu/sbe/Sessions.

8. **Recording Technology.** The widespread availability of 3CCD digital video recorders using relatively inexpensive mini-DV cassettes makes the construction of video databases economically feasible. The recent advent of high-quality portable digital recorders also facilitates the collection of excellent digitized audio.

9. **Compression Software.** Particularly on the Macintosh platform, there are excellent systems for quick software video compression. QuickTime 7 and MPEG-7 offer still further advances.

3. TalkBank Tools

TalkBank and the CHILDES Project that predated it have produced six major pieces of software. They are: the CHAT editor, CLAN analysis, the XML convertor, phonological analysis in *Phon*, the TalkBank Server, and the TalkBank Browser.

The CHAT Editor. The CHAT editor is a full text editor written in C++ that runs on Macintosh and Windows platforms. It provides users with four methods for linking transcripts to audio or video media.

1. The *Waveform* method allows users to drag over a segment of the waveform display corresponding to an utterance and then transcribe that utterance in the text window.

2. The *Sound Walker* method simulates the old foot pedal method of transcription that continually replays the current sound and then advances a specified amount.

3. The *Transcriber* method allows the user to play media and hit a space bar whenever an utterance ends. This creates a transcription full of bulleted segments to be transcribed. Then the transcriber can go back and insert transcriptions for the bulleted segments.

4. The *Post Hoc* method allows the transcriber to first create an unlinked typed transcript and then to step through that transcript utterance by utterance linking the transcript to the audio or video media.

Each of these methods allows the user to adjust the borders of the sound segment, replay segments, and relink. The final product resulting from all of these is a transcript with markers that can be used to replay each utterance directly. Using

the CHECK program, it is possible at each moment to check the extent to which the transcript is making legal use of CHAT codes. The editor also provides the standard facilities for character search and replacement, automatic line numbering, and hiding or showing coding tiers. The CHAT editor also provides facilities for transcribing in Conversation Analysis (CA) format. CA researchers have found that facilities in CLAN for linkage to audio and video from the transcript improves not only their ability to study details of the interaction, but also their ability to present analyses in lectures and over the web. Between 2000 and 2003, CLAN provided a separate mode of analyses called CA mode that allowed CA transcribers to use standard CA characters in a special font.

CLAN analysis. Once files have been transcribed in CHAT, users can run a wide variety of CLAN analysis programs. The CHAT editor and the CLAN programs are the creations of Leonid Spektor, who has worked on the CHILDES and TalkBank Projects for 21 years. There are 28 CLAN programs, each with a wide variety of subfunctions and options. String-search programs can compute frequency counts, key-word and line profiles, mean length of utterance, mean length of turn, type-token ratios, maximum word length counts, maximum utterance length histograms, VOCD, and so on. CLAN has a subprogram called MOR that applies part-of-speech taggers for English, Spanish, German, French, Italian, Japanese, Cantonese, and Mandarin. The results of these taggers are then disambiguated using the POST statistical disambiguator (Parisse – Le Normand, 2000). These morphological codes can then be used to automatically compute indices such as DSS, IP-Syn (Sagae, MacWhinney, and Lavie, 2004), and a simple version of LARSP.

The XML Convertor. Franklin Chen has constructed Java-based tools that convert CHAT files to XML. These files can then be reformatted back to CHAT and the initial and final versions compared to guarantee the accuracy of the roundtrip. Only when the roundtrip runs without differences can we accept the data into TalkBank. The process of converting the database to XML was completed in 2004, after nearly three years of work. An important outcome of this conversion has been the full systematization of the coding system and an increase in consistency in the database. In addition, we were able to convert a wide range of discrepant font and character encoding systems to a consistent Unicode format. This was particularly important for Asian languages that use non-Roman characters, but it was also useful for special Roman characters with diacritics in languages such as French, German, and Spanish.

TalkBank has made extensive use of the XML format as a method for translating between alternative transcription systems, including SALT, HamNoSys, Elan, MediaTagger, SBCSAE, HIAT, ISL, LDC, TRS, and so on. The actual

XML used in this work is too verbose to be useful to users. However, several programmers outside the TalkBank project have used the TalkBank XML Schema (http://talkbank.org/talkbank.xsd) as a simple, well documented, platform for writing their own Java programs to process TalkBank data. In this way, the TalkBank project has maximized the availability of the TalkBank and CHILDES databases on both the file level and the program development level.

Phonological Analysis in *Phon*. The study of phonological processes in aphasia is important for both theoretical and practical reasons. On a theoretical level, studies of phonological processes in aphasia can illuminate theories such as markedness , optimality theory (Kager, Pater, Zonneveld, 2004), and dynamic system approaches (Lindblom, 2000). On a practical level, improvements in the control of articulatory processes can facilitate smoother communication. Earlier versions of the CLAN software for child language analysis provided only marginal support for phonological analysis. The only available program for general phonological analysis was the LIPP program developed by Kim Oller in the 1980s. Unfortunately, that program had not been updated in nearly 20 years and was unable to fit in well with modern systems of phonological analysis. Recently, the construction of the *Phon* program (Rose et al., 2005) by Yvan Rose at Memorial University Newfoundland in collaboration with the TalkBank Project has begun to fill this major gap. *Phon* works directly with CHAT files and allows users to segment and analyze children's productions on the level of the syllable and prosodic unit. Once high-level segmentation has been done, an automatic algorithm conducts syllabification. By making reference to a dictionary of standard and variant pronunciations, the model provides an automatic model-replica (Ferguson, Peizer, Weeks, 1973) alignment of the child's production to the adult target. This can then be used as the basis for analyses of phonological processes (Stampe, 1973), syllabic structures (Vihman, DePaolis, Davis, 1998), and constraint application (Goad – Rose, 2003, 2004). The results of the automatic syllabification and model-replica alignment can be checked and modified by the researcher in a variety of ways. Phon includes facilities for conducting a variety of prepackaged and custom analyses on large data sets. Finally, segments analyzed in Phon can easily be sent to Praat for further detailed phonetic analysis. Here are screenshots from the *Phon* Media Alignment window (left), Transcription window (top right), and Automatic Segmentation window (bottom right).

The TalkBank Server. Recently, TalkBank has configured a software/hardware package at that allows institutions outside of CMU to deploy their own full TalkBank sites. The code for this server can be located at http://www.talkbank. org/tbviewer/local/. This system is particularly useful for projects with tight privacy restrictions or specific local requirements, since it allows them full access to

TalkBank tools without having to contribute their data to an international database. In November 2005, we installed a full TalkBank server configuration at the Medical School of the University of Southern Denmark.

The TalkBank Browser. The most significant recent development in the TalkBank system has been the construction of the TalkBank Browser. Users can download and install this browser using the Java WebStart facility and the Java that is now built in to Windows, Mac, and Linux. Using the TalkBank Browser, users can directly access TalkBank transcripts and play them back interactively over the web. The program is written in Java, with components running in C#. The standard Internet Explorer (IE) browser is embedded within Java on Windows, using an API from Sun. On Macintosh, the embedded browser is Firefox. On both platforms, C# is used to control QuickTime streaming playback. A simpler form of playback can be achieved through the WebData facility built into CLAN. For instructions on the use of WebData and the TalkBank Browser, reviewers can consult http://talkbank.org/aphasia.

The TalkBank Browser is now being elaborated to permit collaborative commentary (MacWhinney, in press-a; MacWhinney et al., 2004). This process allows users to view a segment of an interaction with an aphasic and insert comments or blogs in the dialog. These comments can then be stored on the TalkBank server and subjected to further peer commentary.

4. Research Circles

Our discussion of the software advances underlying TalkBank has temporarily deflected focus from consideration of the intellectual core of TalkBank. This core is represented by the notion that, although human communication is a unified fact, it is analyzed through markedly separate techniques in at least 17 disciplinary re-

search circles. By creating a single, shared database on human communication, we can begin to encourage communication across these disciplines. At the same time, much of the initial dialog that has occurred in the TalkBank framework has been disciplinary. This is because researchers tend to identify with particular research communities that understand their goals and terminology. We can think of these groups as research circles. Although TalkBank research circles are now beginning to use common tools and frameworks, they still continue to focus on very different types of communicative interactions and different subject populations. Because of this, it is important for TalkBank to realize that true interdisciplinary work will only emerge from the increase in communication between parallel research circles that have each reached a high level of technical and theoretical sophistication. In this section, I review progress in the development of seven such circles in the TalkBank framework: classroom discourse, medical education, aphasia, CA, second language learning, legal discourse, child development.

Classroom Discourse

Much current research in science education relies on the distillation of longitudinal video, still-image, and observational data to create rich models of learning-in-context, with specific attention to interactions among tasks, discourse, and systems of representation in classroom settings (Greeno, 1998; Sfard – McClain, 2002). Video work has impacted the study of teacher activities (J. Frederiksen, Sipusic, Sherin E., 1998), international comparative studies of videos of mathematics classrooms (Stigler, Gallimore, Hiebert, 2000), learning of demanding topics in high school physics (Roth – Roychoudhury, 1993), engineering educa-

tion (Linde, Roschelle, Stevens, 1994), informal learning in science museums (Crowley, Callanan, Tenenbaum, Allen, 2001), interacting with machines (Nardi, 1996), and the role of gestural communication in teaching and learning (Roth, 2001). The pervasive impact of video studies was in evidence at the 2002 American Educational Research Association meetings, which included 44 scientific panels and symposia using video for learning research,teaching, and teacher education.

Video is also used in teacher training programs (Derry, in press; Pea, 1999) and materials illustrating proposed nationwide educational standards (Daro, Hampton, Reznick, 2004). The field also enjoys a great range of high-quality tools for the analysis of video interactions. Systems such as NVivo (www. qrsinternational.com), DIVER, TransAna (www.transana.org), ATLAS.ti (www.atlasti.com), Elan (www.mpi.nl/tools/elan.html), MacShapa (Sanderson – Fisher, 1994), CLAN (childes.psy.cmu.edu)), VideoNoter/C-Video (Roschelle, Pea, Trigg, 1990), Ethnograph (www.qualisresearch.com), Anvil (www.dfki.de/ ~kipp)), Orion (Baecker, Fono, Wolf, 2006; Goldman-Segall – Reicken, 1989), ePresence (Baecker, Fono, Wolf 2006), Informedia (Wactlar, Christel, Gong, Hauptmann, 1999), and VideoPaper (Beardsley, Cogan-Drew, Olivero, 2006) are allowing researchers to produce large quantities of well-analyzed video interactions.

Despite the high quality of video analysis methodology, the large quantity of data being produced, and the centrality of video to the scientific study of learning and instruction, there has not yet been a community-wide acceptance of the importance of a shared database of instructional interactions. There has been extensive discussion of the formation of collaboratories for the study of instructional interactions (Baecker, Fono, Wolf, 2006; Edelson, Pea, Gomez, 1996). However, without a general method for sharing data across projects, collaboratories are limited to datasets collected from single projects (Abowd, Harvel, Brotherton, 2000). However, many of the most interesting questions in learning and instruction involve comparison between alternative teaching frameworks and situations. This type of diversity in the database can best be achieved by having data from many different laboratories and groups channeled into a uniform, but distributed database.

To address this need, the TalkBank Project has begun an effort to construct a shared database for the Learning Sciences. TalkBank (http://talkbank.org) is an international collaborative effort that has been building a web-accessible database for spoken language interactions. All of the video and audio media in TalkBank are fully transcribed and each transcribed utterance is linked directly to the corresponding segment of the media. The media and transcripts can be downloaded from the web. Users can also open a browser window, scroll through transcripts, play back the corresponding audio or video, and insert commentary regarding

their analyses. The current TalkBank database has large collections of data in the areas of child language (CHILDES), aphasia (AphasiaBank), second language learning (SLABank), bilingualism (LIDES), formal meetings, and spontaneous conversational interactions (CABank and MOVIN).

A shared database for the Learning Sciences will have some interesting features unique to this area. It will be important to develop a taxonomy of educationally-relevant activities, events, and interaction types that can serve as metadata for coding and retrieval. It will also be important to supplement video records with additional ethnographic materials such as diaries, notebooks, drawings, and class records. However, the most powerful feature of a shared database in the Learning Sciences will certainly be its availability to collaborative commentary. The idea of scientific collaboratories has been developed and discussed elsewhere in this volume. With the context of collaboratories, projects such as Orion (Goldman, 2006), DIVER (Pea, in press), and WebCast (Baecker, Fono, Wolf, 2006) have shown how a group of educational researchers can work together to analyze interactions and evaluate competing interpretations. However, for the process of collaborative commentary to work as a general model for the learning sciences, it must be linked to a commitment to the process of data-sharing. What is unique about the TalkBank Project is not its emphasis on collaborative commentary, but rather its emphasis on data sharing. However, the greatest value for scientific progress arises when data sharing is joined with collaborative commentary.

Medical Education

Video analysis has also played a major role in the study of case-based instruction (Lampert – Loewenberg-Ball, 1998; Lesh – Lehrer, 2000) in medical education (Koschmann, 1999). Tim Koschmann at SIU has created a database of analyses of "standardized patients" (SPs) by medical students, residents, and medical faculty. The standardized patient cases are widely used as one method for evaluating medical competency. For example, one such case involve a 35-year-old woman complaining of headaches and fatigue. An initial working hypothesis diagnosis is often for migraine headaches with iron-deficiency anemia. However, blood tests later pointed to a diagnosis of *polycythemia vera*. Another case initially seems to involve psychiatric symptoms, but these are later seen to arise from a primary organic lesion. Koschmann has proposed the establishment of a collaborative commentary circle of researchers interested in analyzing these SP video protocols, along with the clinical notes, from a set of complementary frameworks. These frameworks include problem-solving theory (Koschmann – LeBaron, 2002), cognitive discourse analysis (C. Frederiksen, 1999), latent semantic analysis (LSA, Art Graesser), and memory-based reasoning (Seifert – Patalano, 2001).

We will extend this group to include additional viewpoints, with a particular emphasis on medical educators.

AphasiaBank

In May 2005, we organized a three-day meeting of 20 researchers at CMU with the purpose of providing recommendations regarding the construction of AphasiaBank. The group decided to focus initially on aphasia as a core with secondary attention to related disorders. The group also decided that we should formulate a standard protocol for further data collection. This proposal fleshes out these two basic proposals. In the context of preparation for this meeting, each participant contributed an audio or video record, linked to a CHAT transcript. The preparation of the CHAT transcript and the linkage was done in collaboration with workers at CMU. The resultant database can be accessed through the instructions found at http://talkbank.org/aphasia. The current contents of the database are:

1. Four audio recordings of interactions in patients' homes from Beth Armstrong.
2. The crosslinguistic aphasia project data on English, Italian, Chinese, and German from the 1990s, directed by Elizabeth Bates.
3. Chuck Goodwin's video recording of a series of aphasic communications that rely heavily on gestural and deictic communication.
4. Transcripts without audio from 46 patients contributed by Audrey Holland in the 1990s.
5. Video samples of three aphasics contributed by Audrey Holland.
6. Cookie theft descriptions from patients with dementia contributed by Dan Kempler.
7. Filmed interactions in three situations with a single patient contributed by Nina Simmons-Mackie.
8. Filmed interactions with three patients contributed by Lise Menn.
9. Seven group discussions involving aphasic patients contributed by Mary Oelschlager.
10. Picture descriptions, story retells, and personal narratives linked to audio contributed by Gloria Olness.
11. Video interactions in English and Afrikaans contributed by Claire Penn.
12. Picture descriptions and story retellings linked to audio contributed by Barbara Shadden.
13. Cinderella story retellings contributed by Cindy Thompson.

14. Video of problem solving in participants with TBI contributed by Leanne Togher.
15. Video of discussions of participants with TBI contributed by Lyn Turkstra.
16. Classic video of a patient with jargon aphasia contributed by Hanna Ulatowska.

Conversation Analysis

Conversation Analysis (CA) is a methodological and intellectual tradition stimulated by the ethnographic work of Garfinkel (1967) and systematized by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) and others. Recently, workers in this field and the related field of text and discourse have begun to publish fragments of their transcripts over the Internet. However, this effort has not yet benefited from the alignment, networking, and database technology to be used in TalkBank. The CHILDES Project has begun the process of integrating with this community. Working with Johannes Wagner (http://www.conversation-analysis.net), Brian MacWhinney has developed support for CA transcription within CHILDES. Wagner plans to use this tool as the basis for a growing database of CA interactions studied by researchers in Northern Europe.

Researchers studying gestures have developed sophisticated schemes for coding the relations between language and gesture. For example, David McNeill and his students have shown how gesture and language can provide non-overlapping views of thought and learning processes. A number of laboratories have large databases of video recording of gestures and the introduction of data sharing could lead to major advances in this field. There are also several major groups studying the acquisition of signed languages. One group uses the CHAT-based Berkeley System of Transcription. Other researchers use either the SignStream system developed by Carol Neidle or the Media Tagger system developed by Sotaru Kita. Other groups use adaptations of CHAT and SALT. Because each of these groups is heavily committed to its own current approach, it may be difficult to find a common method for data sharing. However, by relying on XML as an interlingua, it should be possible to store data from all of these formats in a way that will permit movement back and forth between systems. However, the details of this will need to be worked out in a meeting with the various groups involved.

Second Language Learning and Bilingualism

Annotated video plays two important roles in the field of second language learning. On the one hand, naturalistic studies of second language learners can

help us understand the learning process. The second use of video in second language learning is for the support of instructional technology. By watching authentic interactions between native speakers, learners can develop skills on the lexical, phonological, grammatical, and interactional levels simultaneously. TalkBank has created a process of data sharing that will address both of these problems. The database now has major corpora from learners of French, Czech, German, English, Japanese, and Spanish. In addition to these new corpora from older second language learners, there are several extensive new video studies of bilingual development in young children. Finally, there are six corpora documenting dual language interaction and code-switching in adult bilinguals.

Legal Discourse

The SCOTUS (Supreme Court of the United States) project, directed by Jerry Goldman at Northwestern University, is currently engaged in digitizing all of the oral arguments at the Supreme Court from 1955 to the present. The CMU component of this work focuses on scanning and reformatting the transcripts into the CHAT format and linking the transcripts to the audio on the sentence level. From this point, Mark Liberman and John Bell at the Linguistic Data Consortium will provide further word-level alignment of the audio. Once this new database is fully constructed and mounted on the TalkBank servers, it will be an outstanding resource for legal scholars and an excellent target for collaborative commentary. Specifically, we plan to first concentrate our efforts on making available a complete set of cases in these four areas: copyright, privacy and reproductive rights, religious expression, and freedom of speech. Working with the University of Michigan Press, we will organize collaborative commentary circles in each of these areas with the goal of compiling volumes on the legal handling of these issues as reflected in Supreme Court oral arguments. Contributors will include legal scholars, historians, conversation analysts, and the attorneys who argued the specific cases. Kevin Ashley at the University of Pittsburgh and Vincent Aleven at CMU will also contribute detailed cognitive analyses of legal argumentation, focusing on the role of hypothetical and conditional reasoning.

Child Development

Finally, we also plan to organize a Collaborative Commentary Circle in the subarea of Child Development that focuses on interactional components of socialization practices. Within this area, we will include both parent-child interactions during the early years and peer group interactions during later years. Many of the

members of this circle have already had wide experience with the use of transcripts from the CHILDES database. However, none of them have yet become familiar with our new facilities for web-based browsing of the video database and none have yet been able to think about the application of Collaborative Commentary to these issues. However, this field is a natural for this application. We already have large quantities of parent-child video in the CHILDES database. We have access to peer group data from both school and playground. Catherine Snow and Shoshana Blum-Kulka have organized several meetings and sessions involving workers in the peer-group area. Researchers such as Lois Bloom, Michael Lamb, Grazyna Kochanska, and Inge Bretherton have had extensive experience with video analysis of parent-child interactions. Our task at this point is to organize these two subgroups to produce detailed collaborative commentaries.

5. Collaborative Commentary

The crucial claim underlying the TalkBank Project is that human communication is a unified fact and that this unification will eventually force these disparate fields to engage in the multidisciplinary study of communication. In order to move forcefully in that direction, we have recently been exploring the development of a new mode of scientific investigation called collaborative commentary. We can define collaborative commentary as the involvement of a research community in the interpretive annotation of electronic records. The goal of this process is the evaluation of competing theoretical claims. The process requires commentators to link their comments and related evidentiary materials to specific segments of either transcripts or electronic media.

In order to illustrate how collaborative commentary might work, consider an example based on my own interests in the process of word learning. Experimental studies of children's word learning have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, providing evidence for causal cue induction (Ahn – Luhmann, in press), analogic mapping (Gentner, in press)), syntactic frame induction (Katz, Baker, Mcnamara, 1974), social referencing (Baldwin, 1993) and attentional shifting (Merriman, 1999; Smith, 1999). However, there has been virtually no attempt to track the application of these proposed processes to natural word learning between parents and children (MacWhinney, in press-b). To explore the neo-Vygotskyan claim (Nelson, 1998) that word meanings are shaped through communicative interactions, I have browsed through online media at the CHILDES (childes.psy.cmu.edu) site, locating several instances of videos of mother-child book reading in the Julie, Maria, and Rollins corpora. In these interactions, mothers help children turn the pages and name the animals or objects in the pictures. In

some cases, children call the pictures by the wrong name. Often mothers use these errors as opportunities to provide corrective positive feedback. For example, if the child calls a bear a "doggie," the mother will respond, "no, that's a bear, not a doggie."

Building a system to insert comments or "blogs" on these word learning phenomena only makes sense if it will be quickly picked up by a coherent academic community that is deeply committed to the analysis of learning and development in real-life contexts. In the area of early word learning, such a community does not yet exist. However, there are several research fields where these communities do exist. For these areas, practitioners are already waiting for the development of tools for producing collaborative commentary. The academic groups that are most ripe for the introduction of this tool include: aphasia rehabilitation, medical education, and legal argumentation. There are now active research groups engaging in collaborative commentary in each of these areas. For example, in the group examining the oral arguments of the Supreme Court, commentary is currently focusing both on evidence of argument failure in the Napster case and on errors in transcription that reflect serious gaps in the public record of the Court.

The final goal of TalkBank is the development of an active process of collaborative commentary in each of the 17 research circles studying human talk. This process has just now begun, but it is already an exciting beginning.

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CREATIVITY: METHOD OR MAGIC?

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Creativity may be a trait, a state or just a process defined by its products. It can be contrasted with certain cognitive activities that are not ordinarily creative, such as problem-solving, deduction, induction, learning, imitation, trial-and-error, heuristics and "abduction", however, all of these can be done creatively too. There are four kinds of theories, attributing creativity respectively to (1) method, (2) "memory" (innate structure), (3) magic or (4) mutation. These theories variously emphasize the role of an unconscious mind, innate constraints, analogy, aesthetics, anomalies, formal constraints, serendipity, mental analogs, heuristic strategies, improvisatory performance and cumulative collaboration. There is some virtue in each, but the best model is still the one implicit in Pasteur's dictum: "Chance favors the prepared mind." And because the exercise and even the definition of creativity requires constraints, it is unlikely that "creativity training" or an emphasis on freedom in education can play a productive role in this preparation.

Keywords: creativity, creativity training, human mind, unconscious mind, method, preparation

What is "creativity"? Is it a stable cognitive *trait* that some people have and others do not? Is it an occasional *state* that people sometimes enter into? Or is it defined completely by its *products:* "creativity is as creativity does"? Whatever it is, how does creativity come about? How do you do it? Are there rules? Will practice help make you creative?

There is probably some truth in all three notions of what creativity is. It is (at least sometimes, and to some extent) a trait, because it is a statistical fact that some individuals exhibit it repeatedly. It may also be correlated with some other traits; some even think it can be predicted by objective psychological tests. But it is also obviously a state, because no one is creative all the time, and some people are highly creative only once in their lives. Sometimes creativity may not even be a special, unique state, but rather a circumstance that is defined by hindsight based on something external, something creative an individual happens to have done.

There are a number of theories about the underlying mechanisms of creativity, theories attributing it to everything from method to madness – none of them very satisfactory. As to inducing creativity – by using heuristic strategies or through "creativity training" – this has had very limited success.

Pasteur's dictum. Before proceeding to a discussion of mechanisms and methods of **creativity,** we do well to keep in mind Pasteur's famous dictum, <...le hasard favorise l'esprit prepare> ("chance favors the prepared mind"), because this will turn out to say more about what *can* be said about creativity than the more ambitious or modern notions. Pasteur was speaking, of course, about a very specific kind of creativity, namely, experimental scientific creativity. (The quote actually begins: – "In the experimental fields" or "In the fields of experimentation", and was in part concerned with the question of whether experimental discoveries – the so-called "serendipitous" ones – are really just lucky accidents.) Pasteur's insight seems to apply just as aptly to all forms of creativity, however.

One can interpret Pasteur's dictum as follows: There is a (perhaps very large) element of chance in creativity, but it is most likely to occur if the mind is somehow prepared for it. Context shows that by "preparation" Pasteur did not mean being born with the "creative" trait. He meant that existing knowledge and skills relevant to the creative "leap" first had to be sufficiently mastered before a "bolt from the blue" was likely. Paradoxically, his suggestion is that the only formula for creativity is the most uncreative one imaginable, which is to learn what is already known. Only then are you likely to have enough of the requisite raw materials for an original contribution, and only then would you even be in a position to recognize something worthwhile and original for what it really was.

Some undefined notions have slipped into this story: "originality", "worthwhileness", "creative leaps" and "bolts from the blue." Clearly creativity has something to do with originality and novelty, but it is just as clear that it can't just be *equivalent* to something new, because so many new things are random, trivial or uninteresting. This too has to do with "preparation." A cancer cure (to take a mythic example) is unlikely to be discovered by someone who hasn't done his homework on what is already known about cancer. He may indeed come up with "new" hypotheses no one has ever thought of, but it will be evident to the "prepared" minds of the field when such an untutored hypothesis is simplistic, nonsensical, or a long-abandoned nonstarter (as it is very likely – though not, of course, logically certain – to be).

So novelty is not enough. Something creative must also have some *value* relative to what already exists and what is perceived as being needed. (Note that this, and all the foregoing discussion, focuses on what might be called "intellectual" or "technological" or "practical" creativity, whereas there is, of course, another dimension of value that has little to do with practicality and perhaps not much more to do with intellectuality, and that is artistic creativity. Here one of the criteria of

value is aesthetic value, an affective or emotional criterion that will turn out to re-surface unexpectedly even in intellectual creativity. We will return to this below, but, for now, note that intellectual and practical considerations are not the only bases for making value judgments.)

And even being new and valuable does not seem to be enough: The outcome must also be unexpected; there must be a sense that it is surprising. Usually this means that it would not have occurred to most people, who were instead attempting something along the same lines without success precisely because they were following conventional expectations – something the surprising result somehow violates.

And here, with this third and last criterion of "unexpectedness", we seem to be at odds with Pasteur's dictum. For what can all that "preparation" do but train our expectations, establish conventions, move in familiar, unsurprising directions? In defining creativity as the production of something that is not only new and valu-able, but also unexpected, we seem to have put an insuperable handicap on taking the path of preparation: For whatever direction the preparation actually leads us cannot be unexpected. This does indeed seem paradoxical, but again, a closer look at Pasteur's dictum resolves the apparent contradiction: The suggestion is not that preparation guarantees creativity. Nothing guarantees creativity. What Pasteur means is that the only way to *maximize the probability* of creativity is preparation. He correctly recognized that the essential element is still chance – the unforeseen, the unexpected – but that this fortuitous factor is most likely under prepared con-ditions.

Having arrived at three (admittedly vague) criteria for what counts as creative, we could perhaps strengthen the notion by contrasting it with what is *not* creative. We will find, however, that whereas there are many cognitive activities that are ordinarily not in themselves creative, each one is capable of being performed cre-atively as well, which suggests that creativity is somehow complementary to ordi-nary cognition.

What is Not Creative?

Problem solving. In general, problem solving is not a creative activity (al-though Stravinsky thought it was – we will return to his view and his rather differ-ent definition of "problem solving"). Problem solving involves applying a known rule or "algorithm" in order to solve problems of an overall type that varies in a minor or predictable way. Although some elements of novelty and decision-mak-ing may be involved – it is an undergraduate fallacy, shaped by the unfortunate exigencies of exam-taking, that problem solving can be successfully accom-plished by rote – and the pertinent rule or formula may require some insight in or-

der to be understood and applied, conventional applied problem solving is nevertheless a relatively passive and mechanical process. Successfully understanding and applying a rule is just not the same as discovering it. However, as our discussion of analogy below will show, sparks of creativity may be involved even in recognizing that a class of new problems can unexpectedly be solved by an old rule. And even in the context of instruction, gifted students may independently rediscover new applications of algorithms they have been taught for more limited purposes.

Deduction. Deductive reasoning, which is defined as reasoning from general principles to particular cases (as in deducing from the principles that "All Men are Mortal" and "Socrates is a Man" the consequence that "Socrates is Mortal"), is in general not creative. On the other hand, viewed in a certain way, all of mathematics is logical deduction: There are theorems for which it is difficult or impossible to see intuitively whether or not they are true, let alone prove they are true by showing the steps through which they can be deduced from general principles. Hence not *all* deductions are trivial; some may well require formidable creativity to accomplish. In general, it is the size of the deductive gap between the principles and their consequences that determines whether or not deduction requires creativity: "Socrates is Mortal" does not; Fermat's last theorem does.

Induction. Inductive reasoning, which is defined as "reasoning" from particular cases to general principles, is also, in general, not creative, but it is more problematic, for interesting reasons. For whereas in deductive reasoning, once a theorem's truth is known and the proof has been constructed, the path from principles to consequences can be traversed relatively mechanically, in inductive reasoning there seems to be no available mechanical path other than trial and error; and this path, in most interesting cases, can be shown to be either random or endless (or both). Hence inductive generalizations that are not trivial (in the way "this apple is round, that apple is round, therefore all apples are round" is trivial) do call for creativity. And even when the general principle is found, there is no "a posteriori" path one can reconstruct using hindsight (as one can do after discovering a deductive proof) so as to lead from the particular to the general – only the other way around.

In other words, there seems to be no general algorithm or rule for doing inductive reasoning. So whereas most everyday induction is very gradual, trivial and uncreative, the more substantial instances of inductive "reasoning" are probably not reasoning at all, but creativity in action. Note, however, that since the size of the "gap" that separates the conventional from the creative is to some degree arbitrary (and since it is unlikely that our basic cognitive capacities evolved in the service of rare, celebrated events), even "everyday induction" may exhibit bona fide elements of creativity that never achieve celebrity.

Learning. Although, as with all skills, some people will do it better and more impressively than others, learning is, in general, likewise not a creative activity: It is the acquisition of knowledge and skills by instruction and example. By its nature it is not something that can give rise to something new and unexpected, although sometimes there are surprises, with creative students discovering (or, just as important relative to what they already know and don't know: *re*-discovering) things that go significantly beyond the immediate content of what is being taught them.

Imitation. By definition, imitation gives rise to something that is not new; hence it is also in general not a creative activity. And yet it too has been found to be an important precursor of creativity, especially artistic creativity. Those who ultimately become creative innovators often start out as remarkably astute mimics of others. Imitation is also related to other important factors in creativity, such as analogy, metaphor and "mimesis" (a Greek theory that art imitates nature). Invariably the new and valuable resembles the old in some (perhaps unexpected) way.

Trial and error. Almost by definition, trial and error is not creative, involving random sampling rather than inspired choice. Yet the role of chance in creativity must not be forgotten. "Serendipity" refers specifically to surprising, new, valuable outcomes arising purely by chance, and hence potentially out of nothing more than random trial and error. Insights may arise from trying a panorama of individual cases. Nevertheless, random trial-and-error (or "fumble and find") is usually a symptom of a particularly uncreative approach. Yet a prominent exception seems to be the biological evolutionary process (which some have even admiringly described as "creative"): Evolution has produced its remarkable results with what, according to the best current theory, is little more than random genetic variation, which is then selectively shaped by its adaptive consequences for survival and reproduction. Similar (usually uncreative) processes are involved in the shaping of behavior by its immediate consequences in trial-and-error ("operant" or "Skinnerian") learning.

Heuristics. Heuristics are usually contrasted with "algorithms" in problem-solving. Solving a problem by an algorithm or failsafe rule is supposed to yield an exact, reliable solution that works for every case. "Solving" it by heuristics – by an unintegrated and incomplete set of suggestive "rules of thumb" that work in some cases, but not in all, and not for fully understood or unified reasons – is just as uncreative as solving it by algorithm. However, many people have noticed that heuristic procedures (such as sampling many special cases by trial-and-error) sometimes lead to insights, sometimes through inductive generalization and analogy with cases in which heuristics succeed, and sometimes because of the stimulus provided by cases in which heuristics (or even algorithms) *fail* (see the discussion of anomalies, below).

Abduction. Peirce has proposed that, besides induction and deduction, there is a third process, called "abduction", whereby people find the right generalization from considering sample cases even though the probability of finding it is much too low. Since this process is hypothetical, it does not really belong in this list of things we actually do that are (usually) not creative. However, the rest of the hypothesis does refer to a theme that will arise again when we discuss possible mechanisms of creativity. A more recent exponent of Peirceianabduction (and one of the most creative thinkers of our age), Noam Chomsky, holds that the reason we succeed so often in finding improbable generalizations is that the solutions are somehow already built into our brains. Hence, according to this view, creativity is a kind of "remembering", much the way Plato thought learning was remembering [anamnesis] (not conscious remembering in either case, of course). If it is true that the innate patterns of our brain activity play such a crucial role in creativity, then of course no "preparation" is more important than this (evolutionary?) one, and creativity turns out to be in part an instinctive skill.

Thus ends the (partial) list of suggestive cases of what is ordinarily *not* creative activity. I will now discuss briefly the "state versus trait" issue before going on to consider the "creative process" and possible "mechanisms" of creativity.

Creative Trait or Creative State?

There is currently considerable debate over whether intelligence is a unitary or a plural trait, i.e., is there one intelligence or are there many? Whatever the truth may be, it is clear that one sort of "preparation" (not Pasteur's intended one) that a mind aspiring to be creative (intellectually, at least) could profit from would be a high IQ (or IQs, if there are many). Whether IQ itself is an inherited trait or an acquired "state" is too complex an issue to discuss here (it is probably some of both), but note that the unitary/plural issue applies to creativity too. Whether a trait or a state, creativity may be either universal or domain-specific, with individuals exhibiting it with some kinds of problems and not with others. The distinction between intellectual and artistic creativity is itself a case in point (see the discussion of the performing arts, below).

The way IQ tests work is that we pick, in the real world, the human activity or skill (called the "criterion") that we regard as intelligent (e.g., doing mathematics) and then we design tests that correlate highly with individual differences in this criterion activity, high scores predicting high level performance and low predicting low. This is how IQ tests are validated statistically. Trying to do the same with "creativity tests" immediately raises problems, however, since the criterion "skill" is so rare, diverse and hard to define. So-called "divergent thinking" tests of "creativity" have been constructed without any strong validation. They differ

from the "convergent" tests of intelligence in that they are open-ended, not having a strict correct answer. They are supposed to predict creativity, but the validation problems seem insurmountable, because so much of the definition of "giftedness" and "genius" is post hoc, based on hindsight after rare cases and unique accomplishments. There seems to be a contradiction between the predictiveness of objective tests and the unpredictable element in creativity. However, if there is a (general or problem-specific) trait of "tending to do unpredictable things of value", then tests could presumably measure its correlates, if there are any.

There is also much confusion and overlap with the measurement of the general and special intellectual skills, and no clear notion about how they may interact in creativity. Life-cycle effects pose problems too: IQ-related skills and knowledge increase with age until adulthood, whereas creativity pops up at different ages and stages, sometimes early (as with mathematicians), sometimes late (as with writers).

In general, the picture we have of creativity based on the objective measurement of individual differences is not very informative, leaving open the very real possibility that, except where it depends heavily on a special (noncreative) intellectual skill, there may be no measurable trait corresponding to creativity at all. We turn now to creativity as a state or process.

Underlying Mechanisms

There are four classes of theories about the underlying mechanisms of creativity. They can be classified (relatively mnemonically) as: (1) *method,* (2) *memory,* (3) *magic* and (4) *mutation.* The "method" view is that there is a formula for creativity (usually this is not claimed so crassly). The "memory" view is that the essential factor is somehow innate. The "magic" view is that mysterious, unconscious, inexplicable forces are involved. And the "mutation" view is that the essential element is chance. Let us now consider several candidate theories in terms of these four categories:

The unconscious mind. Creativity as the working of the "unconscious mind" is in the class of "magic" theories (such as divine inspiration). It offers no real explanation of the creative process, merely attributing it to a mysterious (and very creative) unconscious mind. It is espoused by Hadamard and others in his book on mathematical invention, and is, of course, very much influenced by the Freudian ideas prevailing at the time. The scenario is that for a time one works consciously on a problem, and when one fails, one's unconscious mind somehow continues and mysteriously accomplishes what the conscious one could not. From the perspective of modern cognitive science this is not very helpful, because *all* cognitive processes are unconscious, and as such, require an *explanation,* not merely an an-

thropomorphic attribution to another, wiser (or more primitive) mind analogous to the conscious one.

The problem of explaining creative and noncreative cognition consists of providing a mechanism for all of our unconscious processing. The only informative aspect of the "unconscious-mind" model is the attention it draws to the incompleteness of the role of conscious, deliberate efforts in the creative process. Note, however, that Pasteur's dictum had already indicated that preparation was necessary but not sufficient. (Moreover, "conscious, deliberate effort" is not even sufficient to explain such altogether uncreative cognitive activities as remembering a name, recognizing a face or adding two and two.)

Innate structure of the mind. The concept already described as "abduction" comes from a "memory" (anamnesis) theory which holds that creativity is somehow guided or constrained by the innate structure of the mind. (It has a counterpart theory of biological evolution, "preformationism", according to which evolved structure is not shaped by chance and trial-and-error but is already inherent in the structure of matter.) There are two forms that this structural constraint can take. Either it works by eliminating many of the possible false starts we could take by rendering them (literally) unthinkable in the first place, or it somehow guides us in how we select and evaluate the possibilities. Note that this theory at first seems to apply more naturally to intellectual creativity, where there presumably exists a "right" or "wrong", rather than to artistic creativity; but of course in artistic creativity, where aesthetic (affective and perceptual) criteria prevail, it is easy to see how "right" and "wrong" could depend on our sense organs and emotional structure. (The possible role of aesthetic constraints even in intellectual creativity will be taken up again below.)

The problem with the abduction view is that it seems to attribute too much specific innate structure to the mind (and in this respect it has an element of the magical view). Since language, logic and the mechanical sampling of possible variations by trial and error seem to allow us to conceive of so much, it is hard to see how the first form of abduction – limits on what is conceivable – could have much of a role. The problem of creativity seems to begin once we take the vast array of conceivable alternatives as given: How do we then find the "right" ones? (This is also called the "credit/blame assignment problem" in machine-learning theory.)

The second form of abduction – selective guidance – may be more promising, and will be discussed again below, but for now it should be noted that it is unclear to what extent this "guidance" function – the one involved in hunches, conjectures, intuition, etc. (whatever they are) – is an innate, evolutionary one, arising from the structure of our minds, rather than an effect of experience, preparation, analogy and even chance. The abduction view seems to attribute too much to innate structure without giving any explanation of its nature and origins.

Analogy. Although it is not a complete model for the creative process, the view emphasizing analogical thinking is clearly a case of method. The suggestion is that analogies play an important role in the creative process; that often a new "solution" (or, in the artistic case, a new innovation) will be based on a fruitful and previously unnoticed analogy with an existing solution in another area (Hesse, Black). This depends a good deal on our capacity and inclination to look for, find and appreciate structural, functional and formal similarities. It may well involve a basic cognitive process, related to how our knowledge is represented and manipulated.

There is a more elaborated form of the analogy theory, the "metaphor" theory, that applies not only to poetic creation, but to creativity in general. To the extent that this theory is not itself merely metaphorical, it is informative about the surprising productiveness of the strategy of finding or even imposing similarities by juxtaposing objects, images or ideas and then, in a sense, "reading off" or interpreting the consequences of the juxtaposition (Harnad). This is not a failsafe strategy, however, any more than systematic induction or random trial and error are, for there are many more fruitless and empty analogies than "creative" ones. The options are narrowed, however, by preparation (and perhaps abduction), and, with the aid of chance, analogy – both deliberate and accidental – does play an undeniable role in creativity.

Preparation. At this point, the Pasteur "method" itself, that of preparation, should be mentioned. Creative outcomes tend to be novel recombinations of existing elements, which must hence all be made readily available in advance by preparation. The probability of generating and recognizing a new and valuable outcome depends on a sufficient command of what is already available. *No surer strategy can be recommended to anyone aspiring to make a creative contribution in any domain than to master as thoroughly as possible what is already known in that domain, and to try to extend the framework from within.* This is paradoxical, to be sure. First, by definition, a creative contribution will *not* be with existing methods and from "within." Second, there is the well-known problem of falling into a mental "set", which involves perseverating with existing methods by habit, at the expense of trying out or even noticing new ones (as in going back to look for something you've lost in the same place over and over) – precisely what an undue emphasis on preparation might be expected to encourage.

Conventional sets are an everpresent danger, and there exists no formula for overcoming them except to bear in mind that mastery does not imply slavishness and that the ultimate goal is to transcend conventions, not to succumb to them: An attitude of admiration and dedication toward the knowledge or skill one is intent on mastering is not incompatible with a spirit of open-mindedness, individuality, and even some scepticism; indeed, an early imitative capacity coupled with an element of rebelliousness may be a predictor of promise in a given domain (al-

though prodigal gifts sometimes come to nothing). Whether creativity is a state or a trait, it is clear that, given the same initial knowledge or skill, some people do succeed in making original contributions whereas others fall into fruitless, perseverative ruts. The only remaining strategy to be recommended is that if progress is not being made after a sufficiently long and serious attempt, one should be prepared to move on (temporarily or even permanently), perhaps in the hope that creativity, like intelligence, is plural, and one will be able to exhibit it in some other area.

The well-known observation that mathematicians tend to make their creative discoveries when they are very young may be due to the "set" effect: It may be at the point of culmination of one's "preparation" in this most elegant and technical problem area – when one is freshly arriving at the threshold of mastery (sometimes called mathematical maturity) – that one is in the best position to make a creative contribution in mathematics; then one can spend a lifetime exploring the implications of those virginal insights. After longer exposure, unproductive sets form and are difficult to break out of. It may be that if they had changed areas or had first come to mathematics at a later age, the same precocious individuals would have displayed a "later" creativity. It is undeniable, however, that (just as in athletics) there are life-cycle – and trait – effects in creativity irrespective of the timing or field of one's preparation. The insights and skills of historians and writers, for example, tend to mature later in life, perhaps because they depend on more prolonged and less concentrated "preparation", or because verbal skills mature later.

But despite the everpresent danger of falling victim to uncreative sets, if there is one creative "method", then "Pasteurization" is it, with the creative "trait" perhaps amounting to no more than a rare form of resistance or immunity to contagion from convention despite extensive exposure.

Intuitive and aesthetic factors. Theories that appeal to "intuition" and "aesthetics" as guides for creativity are, as already mentioned, in the "memory" category. Apart from what has already been said, it is instructive to reflect on Bertrand Russell's anectode (based on a story he heard from William James[1]) about the man who, when he sniffed nitrous oxide (laughing gas) knew the secret of the universe, but when it wore off, would always forget it. One time he resolved that he would write it down while under the influence. When the effects subsided, he rushed to see what he had written. It was: "The smell of petroleum pervades throughout." What Russell took this anecdote to suggest was that intuition can be a *false* guide too. If one is directed only by one's intuitive or aesthetic sense of profundity, then one may be led to attribute cosmic significance to nonsense. So Russell suggested that, whereas it may be well and good to allow oneself to be influenced by aesthetic considerations (what mathematicians have called "beauty", "elegance", etc.), one must keep in mind that these subjective intuitions must an-

swer to objective tests subsequently (in the case of mathematics, rigorous provability), and that one must not get carried away by one's subjective "epiphanies."

It must be added, however, in favor of intuition, and perhaps abduction, that in mathematics there appears to be a "trait", one that only a very few highly gifted mathematicians have, of being able to repeatedly make intuitive conjectures that turn out subsequently to be proven right. Some even go so far as to say that this ability to intuit what is true is the real genius in mathematics, not the ability to produce rigorous proofs. Of course, the two go together, with no better guide in constructing proofs than an intuitive sense of what will turn out to be true and what false. In any case, the role of pre-verbal, perceptual and aesthetic intuitions should not be under-rated in creativity. Note also that aesthetics need not be innate. Some "tastes" may be acquired from preparation, analogy with other areas of experience, or even chance.

Anomaly. Another "recipe" for creativity, the preparation/anomaly-driven model, is a method based on the observation that creative insights are often provoked by encountering an anomaly or failure of existing solutions. It is not clear whether this variable is truly causal or just situational (i.e., where there is to be a creative solution, there must first be a problem), but what must ultimately provoke a creative solution is evidently some sort of failure of noncreative ones. Sometimes just the discovery that a faithful rule unexpectedly fails to work in certain kinds of cases sets one in the right direction. The result, if successful, is a revision of an entire framework so as to accommodate the anomaly and at the same time subsume prior solutions as special cases. John Kemeny used to say: "If I encounter something new, I first try to fit it into my system; if I cannot, I try to reject it [as wrong or irrelevant]; if that fails, then I try to revise my system to fit *it*." (And, in a slightly magical variant of his own, Russell adds: "If all else fails, I consign it to my unconscious until something pops up.")

Despite the role of anomaly as a stimulus (and logical precondition) for creativity, however, it is hardly a reliable method, as countless noncreative (and unsuccessful) encounters with anomalies must testify. Anomalies may serve to break sets, but they may also create them, in the form of repeated unsuccessful attempts at resolution. Yet it is undeniable that the history of theory building in science can be described as anomaly-driven revision and subsumption.[2]

Constraints. Another "method" is suggested by Stravinsky's views on the creative role of "constraints" in what he called "problem solving."[3] Stravinsky explained why he continued to compose tonal music after most composers had abandoned the tonal system by saying that "You cannot create against a yielding medium." He needed the tonal system as a constraint within which he could exercise creativity.

Stravinsky's view may well be a variant on the "preparation" theme, for if "anything goes" (because of insufficient preparation), nothing creative can happen. This is why Stravinsky saw all creativity as problem solving. He felt that a creative medium could not be infinitely yielding, infinitely "free." It had to resist in some way (perhaps by giving rise to anomalies, problems) in order to allow creativity to be exercised or even defined. For most of his life Stravinsky personally preferred the classical tonal system as a constraint, working to create innovations *within* it; others, such as the twelve-tone composers, rejected tonality, replacing it by *another* system of constraints (possibly, some believe, abductively "unnatural" ones, which suggests that even in the arts constraints cannot be entirely arbitrary). But Stravinsky's point was that there can be no creativity without problems, no problems without constraints, no constraints without preparation. Rules may be made to be creatively broken, but they must be mastered before they can be modified or abandoned, and there must always be new ones to take their place.

There may be a lesson here for advocates of "touchie-feelie" creative freedom (in preference to "pasteurization") in early education. The strategy probably represents yet another form of ineffectual and perhaps even counterproductive "creativity training." Although ultimately desirable and even necessary for creativity, freedom (the absence of constraint) also makes creativity logically impossible in advance of preparation. Moreover, freedom may have more to do with what you are than what you do, training hence being better addressed to first showing you how to follow rules rather than how to flout them. Perhaps studying the true examples of creative freedom – and their real-time historical course – would be more helpful and stimulating than inculcating fabled freedoms in a yielding medium of wishful thinking: The creativity of future generations is more likely to be maximized by inspired than by indulgent pedagogy.[4]

Serendipity. The class of theories that might be called the "cerebral serendipity" school (to which Einstein and Poincare belonged) are mutation theories, emphasizing the crucial role of chance in creativity. Pasteur of course believed this too. The scenario is one of gathering together the elements and constraints out of which a creative solution is (hoped) to arise, and then consigning the rest to the (unconscious) "combinatory play" of chance, with intuition perhaps helping to suggest which combinations might be fruitful. This view provides an important clarification of the role of preparation, for without preparation, the essential elements out of which a fortuitous combination could arise would simply be absent, unrecognized or unappreciated.

Mental analogs. There are some speculative "mental analog" models, belonging to the memory class, that suggest that sometimes the structure of a problem and its solution may have analog counterparts in the mind. Mental "catastrophes" and "phase transitions" arising from mental models actually encoded in the brain and governed by mathematical catastrophe theory or fractal theory have been sug-

gested, among others. These are still too speculative to be considered, but something of this sort could in principle mediate abductive solutions, and even acquired ones.

Heuristic strategies. Another class of methods arises from suggestions (e.g., Polya's) to engage deliberately in heuristics – doing random or mechanical trial-and-error sampling, trying out analogies and inductive conjectures, etc. – as discussed earlier. These strategies might better be described as the heuristic phase of preparation. They can clearly guarantee nothing, although they may increase the likelihood of a stroke of luck in an otherwise prepared mind.

Improvisation and performance. A special case combining the heuristic, aesthetic and analogic "methods" is suggested by the performing arts, which exhibit "real-time", "on-line" creativity while executing, interpreting and, especially, improvising upon the formal codes created by composers and playwrights. Musical scores and theatrical scripts, together with training in the performing arts, constitute the constraints and the preparation, whereas the performance itself, if it is not merely mechanical but innovative and expressive, is the creative "act."

There are many misunderstandings of performance as somehow being derivative or second-rate creativity. This is incorrect. Every creative medium has its own constraints, its own "givens". And they all leave room for originality and for innovation – in short, for genius. The performing arts may in fact be especially revealing about creativity because they "externalize it", so to speak, making it happen before your very eyes. The lessons one learns from it are familiar ones: Much preparation and craft, considerable imitation of the past, an aesthetic sense guiding one's taste in innovation, and the ability and inclination to do something worthwhile, convincing and new with the raw material. Before the "creative" and "performing" arts were separated, one might have watched with one's own eyes while a performing poet-minstrel, in the thrall of an inspired moment – guided by his muse – elaborated an inherited (prepared) tale in a new and inspired way during an improvisatory performance.

Complementarity. Finally, among methods, one must mention the role of collaborative, cumulative and complementary efforts in the combinatory play among many different minds (perhaps differentially "favored" with intellectual and creative gifts) in maximizing the likelihood of a creative, joint outcome. The performing arts already suggest that creativity is not a static, and perhaps not even an individual process. There is complementary specialization in all creative domains: composer/performer, actor/director, experimentalist/theoretician, intuitive conjecturer/rigorous theorem-prover. And then there is the most fundamental complementary relation of all: the relation of the present to the past. One's preparation invariably takes the form of the creative products of one's predecessors. They have furnished the constraints on the otherwise yielding medium in which one can then try one's own chances at making a creative contribution.

Conclusions

Creativity is a phenomenon with both external and internal contraints. The external ones concern the historical state of the problem domain and the role of the unpredictable. The internal ones concern how prepared and how "favored" (endowed) a mind is. Although there are some heuristic methods that one can attempt (such as trial-and-error induction and analogy), the best strategy one can adopt to maximize the likelihood of creativity is to maximize preparation. Maximization is not the same as a guarantee, however; although it is not magical, creativity will always remain mysterious because of the essential rule of unexpectedness and unpredictability in its defining conditions. Preparation can only provide a favorable setting for chance, not a certain one. Moreover, it is unlikely that chance or freedom – i.e., an independent propensity for the fortuitous – can be tutored. Apart from problem-specific preparation and open-mindedness, one's only remaining strategy is to be prepared, given one's mental, physical and experiential resources, to move on (temporarily or permanently) to other potential creative problem domains if a sufficiently dedicated and patient effort ends in unproductive, perseverative loops: Finding one's creative calling (if it exists) may itself call for some (prepared) trial-and-error sampling, guided, perhaps, by the native or acquired dictates of one's aesthetic judgment, but ever dependent for success on the vagaries of chance.

Suggested Readings: Black, *Models and Metaphors*; Hadamard, *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field*; Harnad, *Metaphor and Mental Duality*; Hesse, *Models and Analogies in Science*; Stravinsky, *The Poetics of Music*; Polya, *How To Solve It*.

Notes

[1]   http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/jnitrous.html   and   http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96may/nitrous/nitrous.htm

[2]   New "paradigms", though they may involve startlingly bold innovations, must still be commensurable with the past, at least in the sense of subsuming it as a special case (e.g., the flat-earth theory, which will always remain *approximately* true); this shows that theory building is actually a cumulative and perhaps never-ending series of closer and closer approximations converging on the "truth."

[3]   It must be borne in mind that Stravinsky's suggestion may be peculiar to artistic creativity, where the constraints can be provided from within, so to speak, unlike in science and mathematics, where they come from without: from external reality and from the formal world of logical and mathematical consistency.

[4]   Readers wishing to form their own judgments about some of the adult creativity training methods that exist may want to read a book or attend a seminar on "brainstorming", "synectics", "lateral thinking" or some other soundalike. Or you may sample the offerings of any organiza-

tion that also specializes in weekends on "rebirthing" and "making miracles work for you." Do not be confused by the fact that the adjective "creative" will tend to be freely appended to most of the available offerings, irrespective of their specific benefits.

REVIEWS

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Der vorliegende Band geht auf die Jahrestagung des Instituts für Donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde im Jahre 2000 zurück. Die Verfasser haben sich nicht die Aufgabe gestellt, Vorstellungen über Ungarns Geschichte insgesamt zu überblicken. Vielmehr soll der Band, wie Márta *Fata* einführend formuliert, „anhand ausgewählter Themen, Historikerpersönlichkeiten oder am Beispiel der Werkstattarbeit eine Bestandaufnahme der bisher gestellten wichtigsten Fragen an die ungarische Geschichte leisten und aufzeigen, wie das Ungarnbild der deutschen Historiographie entsteht" (22). Während das literarische, publizistische oder landeskundliche Ungarnbild schon in verschiedener Hinsicht untersucht wurde, sei das der Historiographie bisher ausgespart geblieben. In der Tat beleuchtet der Band verschiedene grundsätzliche Aspekte der Darstellung der ungarischen Geschichte in Deutschland, geht der Deutung und Präsentation einzelner Ereignisse und Epochen nach, beschäftigt sich dabei eingehender mit Fragen der Rechtsgeschichte und aktuellen Rechtsentwicklung aus deutscher Sicht, blickt auf historische Forschungskontakte, aber auch auf deutsche historiographische Einflüsse in Ungarn und das britische Bild ungarischer Geschichte aus. Ein Beitrag zur Münchener Hungarologie gibt einen Einblick in die Entwicklung und die aktuellen Herausforderungen der historiographischen Beschäftigung mit Ungarn in einer wichtigen deutschen „Werkstatt" – diese Ausführungen sind durch die lange Zeit, die bis zum Erscheinen verstrichen ist, freilich eher exemplarisch zu lesen. Damit wird ein informatives Mosaik zu wichtigen Fragen der deutschen Ungarn-Historiographie präsentiert, an dem neben gestandenen Spezialisten für einzelne Bereiche auch einige jüngere Wissenschaftler mitgewirkt haben.

Der Band ist locker in mehrere Teilbereiche gegliedert. Nach dem kurzen Grußwort des Rektors, Eberhard *Schaich* und einer Einleitung der Herausgeberin zum „Ungarnbild in der deutschen Historiographie" (11–24) folgt ein Hauptteil zu „Geschichtsbildern", der Epochen und Probleme von der mittelalterlichen Geschichte bis zum Systemwechsel behandelt. János M. *Bak* betrachtet „Herrschergestalten des mittelalterlichen Königreichs Ungarn in der neueren deutschen Mediävistik" (25–30), István *Futaky* die „ungarische Geschichte an der Göttinger Universität im 18. Jahrhundert" (31–48), ein weiterer Beitrag Márta *Fata*s gilt „Ungarns Geschichte in deutschen historischen Darstellungen zwischen Nationalismus, Konservatismus und Liberalismus im ersten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts" (49–83), Joachim von *Puttkamer* untersucht „Ungarns Nationalitätenproblem im 19. Jahrhundert und die jüngere Nationalismusforschung" (84–98). Daran schließen sich die schon erwähnten Exkurse an, die Attila *Pók* bzw. Robert *Evans* zu „Rankes Einfluss auf Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdenken in Ungarn" (99–109) bzw. zu „Ungarn in der britischen Geschichtsschreibung" (110–125) unternehmen. Es folgen László *Orosz'* Auswertung der „Verbindungen der deutschen Südostforschung

zur ungarischen Wissenschaft zwischen 1935 und 1944", untersucht „anhand des Briefwech-
sels zwischen Fritz Valjavec und Elemér Mályusz" (126–167), Krisztina *Kalteneckers* Be-
trachtung der „Darstellung der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ungarn in der Bonner Doku-
mentation" (168–191), Gerhard *Seewanns* Beobachtungen zu den Arbeiten „Deutscher Histo-
riker zur Geschichte Ungarns im 20. Jahrhundert" in der Spannbreite „Zwischen Positivismus,
Anpassung und Innovation" (192–213) und Andreas *Schmidt-Schweizers* Beitrag zum „Politi-
schen Systemwechsel in Ungarn 1988/1989 aus der Sicht eines deutschen Historikers"
(214–224). „Bilder aus der Rechtsgeschichte" betreffen „Das historische Ungarnbild in der
deutschen Rechtsgeschichtswissenschaft" (Katalin *Gönczi*, 226–239), „Die Aufarbeitung der
ungarischen Rechtsentwicklung 1945–1990 durch die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft" (Georg
Brunner, 240–252) und den „Minderheitenschutz im ungarischen Recht nach 1990 im Spiegel
der deutschen Fachliteratur" (Johannes *Berger*, 253–263). Der letzte Abschnitt betrachtet
„Wege der Vermittlung". Hier schreiben Holger *Fischer* über „Mythen und Legenden versus
Fakten und Strukturen", nämlich „Zur Problematik deutschsprachiger Gesamtdarstellungen
der ungarischen Geschichte" (267–288), Maximilian *Keller* über „Die Lechfeldschlacht, ein
Ereignis zwischen historischer Forschung und populärwissenschaftlicher Darstellung"
(289–298) und Martin *Zückert* über „Ungarn in deutschen Schulgeschichtsbüchern" („Schlag-
lichter im Kontext deutscher Geschichte?", 299–309). Ein Beitrag Zsolt *Lengyels* zur „Hunga-
rologie im Ungarischen Institut München. Grundlagen, Ursachen und Ziele der Neuprofilie-
rung um die Jahrtausendwende" (310–326) läßt den Band mit einem Ausblick in die Realität
der Forschung abschließen. Ein Personen- und ein Ortsregister (327–332, 333–334) sowie ein
knappgehaltenes Verzeichnis der Mitarbeiter ergänzen den Band.

Márta *Fata* gibt einleitend einen instruktiven Überblick über die Positionierung Ungarns in
Raumkonzepten der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft vom Wiener Kongreß über die Zeit
nach dem Ersten und dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis in die Gegenwart im Kontext politischer Rah-
menbedingungen und wissenschaftspolitischer Setzungen. Den Bezugspunkt, die Leistungsfä-
higkeit aktueller Ansätze zu überprüfen, bietet ihr deren Vermögen, der „Ausarbeitung regio-
nalspezifischer Geschichtspfade" behilflich zu sein (16, vgl. 14). Dies gilt gewiß weiterhin,
auch wenn die um 2000 in der Fachöffentlichkeit vehement vorgetragenen Vorschläge zur
Aufhebung der ostmittel- oder südosteuropäischen Geschichte in einer allgemeinen Geschich-
te seitdem zur Ruhe gekommen oder in das Inventar der zuständigen, vom Sparzwang her den-
kenden Ministerialbürokratie übergegangen sind. Die Ergebnisse der jüngeren Forschung, so
resümiert Fata unter Hinweis auf die Beiträge des Bandes, belegen zugleich die zunehmende
Einbindung ungarnspezifischer Forschung in breitere Fragestellungen und die enger werdende
Verbindung zwischen eigener und fremder Geschichtsschreibung auch zu Ungarn.

János M. *Bak* schreitet in seinem Beitrag chronologisch die Reihe wichtiger mittelalterli-
cher Herrscherpersönlichkeiten – Stephans des Heiligen, Sigismunds von Luxemburg, Mat-
thias Hunyadi – ab. Am Beispiel Stephans läßt sich die primär von Deutschland ausgehende
Formulierung von Leitfragen und Wahl von Blickwinkeln in der älteren Forschung besonders
deutlich belegen. Bak würdigt neuere Ansätze, und insbesondere die neuen Ergebnisse, mit de-
nen einzelne deutsche Forscher – Hoensch zu Sigismund, Nehring und Hoensch zu Hunyadi –
vorgelegt haben. – István *Futaky* liefert eine kurze, wohlinformierte Zusammenfassung der
Entwicklung der Göttinger Geschichtsschreibung zu Ungarn, von der ersten interessierten
Kenntnisnahme bis zur zunehmenden Verwissenschaftlichung im späten 18. Jahrhundert.
Deutlich wird auch die wichtige Rolle, die das Interesse von Studenten und Gelehrten aus Un-
garn und die Kontakte zu Ungarn dabei spielten. Nach 1800 allerdings erlahmte das Interesse,
ja das Thema schien einer gewissen erneuten Exotisierung zu unterliegen: die frühere „große
Generation" war gestorben, und das unruhige napoleonische Zeitalter sei „keine günstige Zeit

für die mehr oder weniger 'exotischen Wissenschaften' " gewesen (48). – Márta *Fata* geht dem Ungarnbild von drei exemplarischen Vertretern des Nationalismus, Konservatismus und Liberalismus des frühen 18. Jahrhunderts, nämlich Ernst Moritz Arndt, Friedrich Schlegel und Karl von Rotteck nach. Während Rotteck sein Ungarnbild aufgrund zeitgenössischer Literatur und vermittelter Informationen als Teil seiner „Weltgeschichte" konzipierte, verfügten Arndt und Schlegel zudem über eigene Eindrücke: Arndt hatte auf einer Europareise 1798/99 u.a. auch Ungarn bereist, und Schlegel hatte sich als Stabsmitglied der Armee Erzherzog Karls 1809 in Ungarn aufgehalten. Der Aufsatz ist methodisch höchst interessant und mit dem konsequenten Blick auf Ungarn als Fallbeispiel auch hinsichtlich der überindividuellen Differenzen der genannten Richtungen erhellend zu lesen. Das größte Interesse hat offensichtlich Arndt gefunden, der im Spannungsfeld zeitgenössischer Konzepte von Nation und Politik sicher auch besonders ergiebig ist, während Schlegel und Rotteck die erforderlichen Gegenstücke liefern. Allen gemeinsam war, daß ihre Beurteilung der neuzeitlichen Entwicklung, insbesondere die – bei allen Unterschieden im Detail anerkannte – enge Verbindung Ungarns mit den Habsburgern auf Ablehnung stieß, aber auch daß sie mangels wissenschaftlicher Geschichtsschreibung und systematischer Rezeption in Ungarn als Historiker keine Wirkung ausübten. – Joachim von *Puttkamer* geht in seinem Beitrag weniger auf das Ungarnbild der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung als vielmehr auf die Deutung eines Problems der jüngeren ungarischen Geschichte, nämlich der Nationalitätenfrage des 19. Jahrhunderts, in der internationalen Geschichtsschreibung einschließlich der ungarischen ein.[1] An drei Diskussionsfeldern, nämlich der ungarischen Nationalitätenpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert, den Triebkräften der Magyarisierung und der inneren Struktur der ungarischen Nationsidee arbeitet er den Beitrag heraus, den die kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektive zum Verständnis des Problems wie zum Hinausgehen über die Typisierungen der älteren Forschung leisten kann bzw. schon geleistet hat. Diese kulturwissenschaftliche Nationalismusforschung habe auch für Ungarn „den ungeheuren Sog eines ethnisierten Nationsbegriffs hervorgehoben", der seinem staatsbürgerlichen Gegenstück in der Vermittlung eines Leitbilds bürgerlicher Modernität und nationaler Selbstbehauptung überlegen war. Die ältere Typologie von Staatsnationalismen westlichen und Sprachnationalismen östlichen Typs werde damit in den Hintergrund gedrängt. „Deutlich geworden ist ein allgemeiner Gleichklang der Formulierung und Inszenierung nationaler Konzepte, die sich ähnlicher Elemente und Formen in nur graduell verschiedener Gewichtung bedienten." In diesem Sinne sei, wie die Überschrift formuliert, Ungarn denn auch „kein europäischer Sonderfall". Dagegen verlieh die Vielzahl konkurrierender Nationalbewegungen dem ungarischen Fall besondere Züge. Der kurze Ausblick auf die spätere Entwicklung aus kulturhistorischer Perspektive zeigt, wie sehr aktive Prozesse von Wertsetzung und Selbstverortung die Definition und Redefinition nationaler Identität beeinflußten.

Von Attila *Pók* stammt der erste Exkurs dieser Betrachtungen, der sich mit Rankes Einfluß auf Ungarn beschäftigt. Kenntnisreich stellt Pók Rankes Ungarnbild und die Phasen seiner Kenntnisnahme durch ungarische Publizisten und Historiker vor. Produktive Anregungen entnahm Rankes Schaffen Henrik Marcali. Speziell in dessen Werk über die Zeit Joseph II. erblickt Pók Parallelen zu Rankes Herangehensweise. Positiver Bezugspunkt war Ranke auch für den prägenden Historiker der Zwischenkriegszeit, Gyula Szekfű. Wie schwer sich dagegen die Historikerzunft der sozialistischen Ära mit Ranke tat, zeigt schon allein die verquaste Sprache, in der sie ihre Wesenszuschreibungen über den auch von ihr nicht einfach abzutuenden Vorgänger formulierte. Eine Korrektur und grundsätzliche Nuancierung des Bildes nahm erst Ágnes Várkonyi in den 70er Jahren vor. Somit ist die Geschichte der ungarischen Ranke-Rezeption in erster Linie als Niederschlag der Veränderungen in der ungarischen Geschichtsschreibung lesen. – In einem weiteren Exkurs geht Robert *Evans* auf C. A. Macartney und

seine Vorgänger ein. Die historische wie publizistische Beschäftigung mit Ungarn, das aus britischer Sicht weitaus ferner gelegen war als aus deutscher, wurde mit dem Revolutionsjahr 1848 spürbar intensiver und fand dann in der dualistischen Ära in begrenztem Umfang Fortsetzung. Einen Umbruch erlebte die bis dahin grundsätzlich sympathisierende Sichtweise mit Hugh Seaton-Watsons 1908 erschienene Schrift „Racial problems of Hungary", der schon vor dem I. Weltkrieg weitere ähnlich akzentuierte Arbeiten des Verfassers folgten. Auch vor diesem Hintergrund war Macartneys erstes Werk innovativ, in dem er auch auf die mit dem Trianon-Vertrag vorgezeichneten Konflikte hinwies. In seinem späteren Schaffen widmete er sich allen Epochen der Geschichte Ungarns, ganz besonders jedoch seiner Nachkriegsentwicklung, die er mustergültig in ihren breiteren Kontext einzuordnen verstand.

László *Orosz* knüpft an frühere Arbeiten von Karl Nehring über Fritz Valjavec und Gyula Szekfű an und untersucht den Briefwechsel zwischen Valjavec und Elemér Mályusz. Eingangs zeichnet er den Werdegang von Valjavec und dessen politischen Prägungsprozeß nach, als dessen Ergebnis Orosz die Ausrichtung auf das Südostdeutschtum und die Positionierung als Vertreter von Deutschlands „kämpfender Wissenschaft" sieht. Der Briefwechsel mit Mályusz, den er unter den insgesamt 117 ungarischen Wissenschaftlern auswählt (166), mit denen Valjavec als Redakteur der *Südostdeutschen Forschungen*, später *Südostforschungen* in Kontakt stand, ist besonders interessant, weil Mályusz – im Unterschied etwa zu dem geistesgeschichtlich positionierten und in Ungarn maßgeblichen Szekfű – mit seinem sozialgeschichtlich ausgerichteten Konzept von Volksgeschichte einen Ansatz verfolgte, der dem Valjavec' ähnlich war, dessen politische Stoßrichtung jedoch nicht teilte. In mehreren Argumentationssträngen verfolgt Orosz, wie Valjavec versuchte, sich selbst auch in der ausländischen Fachöffentlichkeit Reputation zu verschaffen, hierzu potentiell Gleichgesinnte heranzuziehen wie die verschiedenen Lager gegeneinander auszuspielen, aber auch den eigenen Standpunkt in jeweils verschiedenem Licht erscheinen zu lassen, und im Interesse des internationalen Ansehens seiner Zeitschrift möglichst breit Mitarbeiter zu gewinnen. Daß der an einem literaturgeschichtlichen Institut arbeitende Orosz hierzu die feinen Umakzentuierungen von Texten analytisch heranzieht, um das Vorgehen von Valjavec zu demonstrieren, gereicht dem Aufsatz sehr zum Vorteil. Manches, was er im Detail herausstellt, wird dann in der Zusammenfassung wieder zurückhaltender formuliert – auf die Dissertation, deren Teil dieser Beitrag vermutlich sein wird, darf man gespannt sein. – Krisztina *Kaltenecker* beschäftigt sich mit dem Ungarn-Band der 1951 begonnenen Dokumentation und Darstellung der Vertreibung aus den Ostgebieten, der erstmals 1956 erschien. Insbesondere vergleicht sie das Ungarnbild der Bonner Kommission mit den Aussagen der damals zugänglichen Quellen zur Zwangsaussiedlung, um dessen subjektive Züge aufzudecken. Wesentliche Verzeichnungen stellen danach insbesondere die Annahme einer eingeschränkten Souveränität „des besiegten und zur Zuständigkeit der sowjetischen Alliierten Kontrollkommission gehörenden Ungarns", der „Mythos des ungarischen Widerstands gegen die sowjetische Forderung" zur Aussiedlung von 500.000 Deutschen und das Übergehen des Vorgehens der ungarischen Regierungen dar, die eine internationale Aufforderung zur Aussiedlung und die Kaschierung der Kollektivschuldthese anstrebten (190). Die Darstellung der Lage der Deutschen in Ungarn und der Nationalitätenfrage wiederum, wie sie die Publikation von 1956 vornimmt, ließe sich auch als „potentielles politisches Argument zur Untermauerung der deutschen Position bei den künftigen Friedensverhandlungen", im Sinne des Anrechts der Heimatvertriebenen auf ihre alte Heimat (191) lesen. – Gerhard *Seewann* stellt eine „Typologie der sich mit Ungarn befassenden historischen Arbeiten deutscher Historiker" vor, auf die auch der Haupttitel seines sehr kritisch gehaltenen Beitrags prägnant verweist. „Der erste Typ ist von einem vordergründigen Positivismus geprägt, der zweite von einer Anpassung beziehungsweise Anlehnung an die ungarische Geschichtsforschung und der

dritte hat die Stufe der Emanzipation von letzterer erreicht und kann deshalb kritisch-innovativ wirksam werden", wobei er Mischungen mehrerer, ja aller Ansätze in einzelnen Studien zugesteht (193). Zur ersten Gruppe zählen zwangsläufig viele Historiker, die mangels ausreichender Sprachkenntnisse gestützt auf die Arbeiten ausländischer Kollegen oder deutsche Publikationen von Ungarn arbeiten. Wer wiederum Grenzen überschreiten kann, passe sich mitunter zu unkritisch – in bewußter Wertung wie impliziter, terminologisch vermittelter Identifikation mit einer dominanten Auffassung – der Binnensicht des untersuchten Landes an. Als anstrebenswert erscheint demgegenüber der Typus der emanzipatorischen und innovativ wirkenden Historiographie. Aufgrund seiner Andersartigkeit im Vergleich zu den im Lande dominanten Forschungsansätzen – etwa sozial- und kulturgeschichtlichen Betrachtungsweisen gegenüber traditionell staatsbezogenen Themen und Fragestellungen – habe es dieser Ansatz jedoch schwer, sich durchzusetzen (195). Über Chancen bzw. über Voraussetzungen, um dies zu überwinden, reflektiert der Autor im folgenden. Abschließend analysiert er anhand einer gemeinsam mit Holger Fischer erstellten Bibliographie relevanter Veröffentlichungen zum 20. Jahrhundert aus den Jahren 1980–1999 (203–213) die thematischen Gewichtungen der aktuellen deutschen historischen Forschung. – Andreas *Schmidt-Schweizer* stellt, da das Thema in der deutschen historiographischen Literatur bisher keine breitere Berücksichtigung gefunden habe, eigene Forschungsergebnisse zum Systemwechsel in Ungarn 1988/89 vor. Deren Kern ist die Charakterisierung der Entwicklung als „politische Systemtransformation von innen", also keinesfalls als Ergebnis von „Ausgleichsverhandlungen zwischen den Machthabern und der Opposition". „Maßgebliche Impulse und grundlegende Schritte" seien vom Reformlager innerhalb der MSZMP ausgegangen und ohne Druck der Öffentlichkeit gefällt worden (223). Auch bei Einbeziehung bisher nicht zugänglicher Quellen meint Schmidt-Schweitzer eine „Rückkehr zur These der 'verhandelten Revolution'" ausschließen zu können (224).

Die „Bilder der Rechtsgeschichte" werden von dem Aufsatz von Katalin *Gönczi* zum historischen Ungarnbild eingeleitet. Die historische Schule der Rechtswissenschaft, deren romanistischer Zweig ebenso wie der germanistische, zeigten an Ungarn nachvollziehbarer Weise kein Interesse. Das weitgehende Fehlen von Berührungspunkten wie die ungarische Rechtspraxis bis Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts mit ihrer fehlenden Trennung von historischem und geltendem Recht trugen gleichfalls hierzu bei. Der entstehende Rechtsvergleich bot dann Anknüpfungsmöglichkeiten, die jedoch zunächst nicht realisiert wurden. Während des Dualismus wurde zumindest in breiterem Umfang ungarische rechtswissenschaftliche Literatur rezipiert. Mit der Entwicklung der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft hin zu einer nationalistisch geprägten und politisch motivierten Geschichtsschreibung konzentrierte sich das Interesse auf die Verbreitung deutschen Rechts in Osteuropa. Besonders stark „durchpolitisiert" wurde die Stadtrechtsforschung. Erst die jüngere Integration nationaler Rechtssysteme habe zur Suche nach den gemeinsamen Grundlagen der europäischen Rechtskultur angeregt, die nun auch in der rechtsgeschichtlichen Ungarnforschung zu beobachten sei (239). – Georg *Brunner* konzentriert sich auf die Beschäftigung der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft mit der Entwicklung in Ungarn 1945–1990. Seine Ausführungen sind zugleich ein kritischer Kommentar zu dem Projekt „Normdurchsetzung in europäischen Nachkriegsgesellschaften" des MPI, dessen Ertrag Brunner als enttäuschend betrachtet und das er als vertane Chance zur rechtsgeschichtlichen Forschung wertet. Ein Grund dafür sei, daß das Projekt eben nicht auf dem Stand der rechtsgeschichtlichen Forschung aufgebaut habe, den Brunner selbst handbuchartig und pointiert und mit einigen Seitenhieben auf des erwähnte Vorhaben beschreibt. Anhand der kurzen Vorstellung von Forschungseinrichtungen zur Ostrechtsforschung und zum Rechtsvergleich, ostrechtlichen Spezialzeitschriften und allgemeinen rechtsvergleichenden Zeitschriften, sowie zur Tätigkeit von Einzelpersonen, die aufgrund der wissenschaftsorganisatorischen Voraussetzungen

entscheidend und prägend waren, sowie in einem abschließenden Blick auf Methodenfragen beschreibt er eine schmal ausgestattete, aber intensiv tätige, profilierte und in engem Kontakt zur ungarischen Rechtswissenschaft stehende Forschungsrichtung, die von historisch bzw. politologisch arbeitenden Kollegen flankiert wurde. – Johannes *Berger* sichtet anschließend die deutsche Fachliteratur zum ungarischen Minderheitenschutz nach 1990. Generell ist zu konstatieren, daß die deutsche Wissenschaft die ungarische Gesetzgebung und Praxis mit der Frage nach geeigneten Modellen für den Schutz von Minderheiten überhaupt – und keineswegs nur mit Blick auf die deutsche Minderheit – betrachtet und sich an potentiellen Lösungen für ethnische Konflikte generell interessiert zeigt. Die meisten Beiträge stammen aus der Zeit um die oder kurz nach der Veröffentlichung des einschlägigen Gesetzes von 1993 und nehmen folglich theoretische Bewertungen vor. Weitere Veröffentlichungen datieren vom Ende der 90er Jahre und können auch die Wirkung des Gesetzes untersuchen. Normen und Ziele des Gesetzes werden sehr positiv bewertet. Neuere Beiträge weisen auf Probleme hin, die sich aus dem Prinzip der freien Identitätswahl ergeben bzw. die bei der Umsetzung des Gesetzes angesichts fehlender oder knapper finanzieller Mittel auftreten. Ein besonderes Problem bilden aus der Sicht der Literatur die Roma, in deren Fall die Notwendigkeit staatlichen Handelns gesehen wird, deren Probleme aber meist nicht als ethnische, sondern als „soziale und gesellschaftliche" (sic, ?) betrachtet, also jedenfalls außerhalb der klassischen Minderheitenrechts-Fragen eingeordnet würden. Nicht eingelöst sei nach wie vor das Versprechen einer Beteiligung der Minderheiten am politischen Prozeß durch eine parlamentarische Minderheitenvertretung.[2]

Der erste Beitrag zu den „Wegen der Vermittlung" stammt von Holger *Fischer* und untersucht deutsche Gesamtdarstellungen der ungarischen Geschichte. Fischer interessiert das Vermögen zur Destruktion von Mythen und Legenden und der Umgang der Geschichtsschreibung mit den Realitäten der Vergangenheit – ob nun seitens deutscher oder deutsch veröffentlichender ungarischer Verfasser. Wer Holger Fischer kennt, wird nicht enttäuscht – auch hier gibt es eine sorgfältig aufbereitete quantifizierende Sichtung der Inhalte und Proportionen der betrachteten Werke inklusive graphischer Darstellungen (bes. 271, 287–288). Der Verfasser, der selbst als Autor einer Gesamtdarstellung hervorgetreten ist,[3] ist ein vorzüglicher Kenner der Materie und hat hier für jeden, der das für seine Zwecke am besten geeignete Werk sucht, den wohl besten Überblick vorgelegt, der dazu in kurzer Form gegeben werden kann. Neben den auch äußerlich relativ leicht ersichtlichen Strukturmerkmalen (Gliederung, Apparat, Literatur) geht er detailliert auch auf Thesen der Werke bzw. in ihnen gepflegte Geschichtsmythen ein, die wohl publizistisch wirksam, für die Verbreitung einer objektiven und zumal wissenschaftlichen Sicht auf Ungarn aber hinderlich sind und statt dessen thematisiert und selbst zum Gegenstand historischer Darstellung gemacht werden sollten. – Maximilian Georg *Kellner* stellt Sichtweisen der Lechfeldschlacht vor. Dabei konzentriert er sich zunächst auf neuere Präsentationen in Schulbüchern und populärwissenschaftlichen Darstellungen, demonstriert Akzentuierungen und versteckte Botschaften, und holt dann weiter aus, um auch die Behandlung des Ereignisses in den Quellen sowie in Texten aus dem 19. und früheren 20. Jahrhundert zu untersuchen. Ganz zum Schluß der instruktiven Sichtung erfahren wir auch noch, daß gerade die Hagiographie, der die plündernden und mordenden Heiden die ideale Szenerie abgaben, um ihre Helden ins rechte Licht zu setzen, zu der Einordnung der Ungarn als „Hauptübel" jener Zeit beigetragen habe – „obwohl innere Unruhen, Normannen und Sarazenen nicht weniger Opfer forderten" (298). – Martin *Zückert* betrachtet die Behandlung Ungarns in deutschen Schullehrbüchern. Dabei konzentriert er sich auf Schulbücher, die in den 1990er Jahren erschienen sind, und schließ damit an die früheren Untersuchungen von Bak und Szabolcs bis Mitte der 60er bzw. bis Ende der 80er Jahre an. Er stellt Schwerpunkte und Lücken der Behandlung Ungarns zusammen, konstatiert, daß in gewissen Bereichen, etwa der Reformations-

geschichte, sogar ein Schwinden der Präsenz erfolgt ist, Ungarn dagegen zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert mehr Raum erhält, wenn es auch vielfach als Teil der Habsburgermonarchie oder lediglich zur Behandlung der Nationalitätenproblematik erscheint. Nach der Lechfeldschlacht verschwindet Ungarn jedenfalls aus der Darstellung deutscher Geschichte, um im günstigsten Fall im Kontext der Revolution 1848/49 wieder aufzutauchen. Während Generalisierungen angesichts der Vielzahl betrachteter Werke und im Detail divergierender Lösungen hier schwer vorzunehmen sind, sei auf die sehr produktive Vorgehensweise des Verfassers hingewiesen, innerhalb der in Schulbüchern immer anstehenden Kompromisse zwischen Genauigkeit und knappem Platz s.E. besonders gelungene und methodisch richtungsweisende Lösungen hervorzuheben. – Zsolt *Lengyel* stellt abschließend die Entstehung und Entwicklung einer der wichtigsten Zentren ungarnbezogener historischer Forschung, das Ungarische Institut in München, vor. Mußte sich seine Tätigkeit trotz weitergehender Ambitionen seiner Gründer lange Zeit auf die Herausgabe wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse in der Buchreihe „Studia Hungarica" und im „Ungarn-Jahrbuch" konzentrieren und überwiegend forschungsorganisierend und wissenschaftsvermittelnd tätig sein und konnte es weitergehende Ziele nur gestützt auf das persönliche Engagement einzelner Forscher verfolgen, so erhielt es 1999 nach gründlicher Evaluierung die Möglichkeit, auch sein wissenschaftliches Arbeitsprofil auszubauen. Lengyel skizziert abschließend die Entwicklungsperspektive, die sich 2000/01 abzeichnete – und deren aktueller Stand durch einen Blick auf die Website des Instituts ergänzt werden sollte.[4]

Verfasser und Herausgeber haben also einen lesenwertes und in einzelnen Teilen zudem als Nachschlagewerk zu Fragen der deutschen Historiographie zu Ungarn nutzbares Werk vorgelegt. Die Schärfe der Einschätzungen gerade zu Mythen, Legenden und Befangenheiten mancher Kollegen in einigen Beiträgen mag überraschen. Mit Blick auf den fortlebenden ungarischen Brauch, Schwächen mancher Werke zwar festzustellen, aber bestenfalls gesprächsweise und privatim anzumerken, ist dies vielleicht sogar ein weiteres interessantes Statement zur deutschen Ungarn-Historiographie. Wer sozialgeschichtlich arbeitet, wird auch den Einfluß immer geringer werdender Mittel auf das ärgerliche Konstatieren vertaner Möglichkeiten und mangels neuer Projekte nicht auszuräumender Legendenbildungen darin ausmachen. – Leider hat es niemand unternommen, die Behandlung Ungarns in Gesamtdarstellungen oder Schulbüchern mit der anderer osteuropäischer Länder – z.B. Polens oder der Tschechoslowakei – zu vergleichen. Mit Blick auf die Wirkung nationalgeschichtlicher Forschungstraditionen wie die mehrfach angemerkten Selbstmythifizierungen der ungarischen Geschichtsschreibung wäre das sicher interessant gewesen. Es ist hier jedoch auch gleich anzumerken, daß dies sicher selten gegebene parallele Kompetenzen sprachlicher wie historiographischer Art vorausgesetzt hätte. Dennoch, eine lohnende Aufgabe bliebe es gleichwohl.

Juliane Brandt

Notizes

[1] Anzumerken ist, daß seine Forschungsergebnisse, die den impliziten Kontext dieser Ausführungen abgeben, inzwischen auch als Buch vorliegen: Joachim von Puttkamer: *Schulalltag und nationale Integration in Ungarn: Slowaken, Rumänen und Siebenbürger Sachsen in der Auseinandersetzung mit der ungarischen Staatsidee 1867–1914*. München (Oldenbourg) 2003.

[2] Gegenwärtige Praxis ist, daß die politischen Parteien auch Minderheitenkandidaten aufstellen.

[3] Holger Fischer: *Eine kleine Geschichte Ungarns*. Frankfurt a.M. (Suhrkamp) 1999.

[4] http://www.ungarisches-institut.de, vgl. den Hinweis des Autors S. 321.

Deutschland und Ungarn in ihren Bildungs- und Wissenschaftsbeziehungen
während der Renaissance. Hgg. Wilhelm Kühlmann / Anton Schindling
Stuttgart (Franz Steiner Verlag) 2004, XII + 292 S., 28 Abb. (Contubernium.
Tübinger Beiträge zur Universitäts- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 62)
ISBN 3 515 08551 3, Preis 50,00 €.

Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Sammelbandes gehen auf ein Arbeitsgespräch des „Wolfen-
bütteler Arbeitskreises für Renaissanceforschung" und der „Arbeitsgruppe für Renaissancefor-
schung" der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zurück, das 2001 in Göttingen statt-
fand. Der Band gliedert sich in einen ersten Teil zu den „Rahmenbedingungen" dieser Bezie-
hungen (1–108) und einen zweiten, der „Personen und geistige Strömungen" betrachtet
(117–174). Karten zur ethnischen Zusammensetzung, zur Verwaltungsgliederung des König-
reichs um 1500 bzw. zur Lage nach 1570 und zu den zentralen Instutitionen des geistigen Le-
bens – zu Schulen und Druckereien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert – helfen bei der Orientierung in
diesem historischen Raum, und die einigen Beiträgen beigegebenen Faksimiles von Titelseiten
zeitgenössischer Bücher und Flugschriften, Albeneinträge und Ortsansichten in ausgesprochen
guter technischer Qualität lockern die konzentrierte geistige Nahrung auf, die hier geboten
wird (Abb.verz. 291–292). Ein Orts- und Personenregister ergänzen den Band.

Ganz allgemein belegt und dokumentiert der Band die Vielfalt der Beziehungen und ihrer
komplexen Rahmenbedingungen, die – auf verschiedenen Ebenen und aus verschiedenen Mo-
tiven – innerhalb der bewegten politischen Kräfteverhältnisse im zeitgenössischen Europa wie
innerhalb seiner grundsätzlich supernationalen, sich jedoch allmählich nach konfessionellen,
politischen und sprachlichen Trennlinien gliedernden Bildungslandschaft zwischen Ungarn
und Deutschland bestanden. Etliche neue Einzelergebnisse, Befunde zu Quellenlagen und wei-
teren Forschungsperspektiven werden dabei vorgelegt. „Renaissance" wird in einem sehr offe-
nen Sinn als Zeitalterbegriff verwendet. Es geht letztlich mit den Worten der Herausgeber „vor
allem" um die „vielfältigen Beziehungen humanistischer Gelehrsamkeit [...], die sich im Zu-
sammenhang der Reformation und später des internationalen Calvinismus um 1600 ergaben"
(VIII). Sehr instruktiv ist die im Ergebnis der Diskussionen des Arbeitskreises in den Beiträgen
– in Einleitung wie Einzelstudien – vorgenommene Zusammenschau der Beziehungen zwi-
schen Habsburgischem Herrschaftsgebiet, deutschen Territorien und Ungarn auf dem Stand
der jüngsten Forschungen, die überall spürbar ist. Die einzelnen Beiträge wählen dabei natur-
gemäß unterschiedliche Blickwinkel, und setzen individuelle bzw. von nationalen Forschungs-
traditionen geprägte Akzente. Neben den Detailergebnissen der einzelnen Autoren besteht in
diesem Zusammenführen und Reflektieren unterschiedlicher Ansätze m.E. ein ganz wesentli-
ches Verdienst des Bandes. Wie die Herausgeber formulieren, ist es „stets bereichernd, wenn
die Binnendiskurse der nationalen Wissenschaftstraditionen sowie der Einzeldisziplinen zu-
einander in Beziehung gesetzt und über die Fächergrenzen hinweg vergleichend diskutiert
werden" (XII).

Das ist hier mit ersichtlichem Ertrag geschehen. Die ungarische und die deutsche Wissen-
schaftstradition unterscheiden sich im Blick auf die Religionsgeschichte des 16.–18. Jahrhun-
derts durchaus. Zwar hat auch die einschlägige ungarische Forschung durchaus sozialge-
schichtliche Fragestellungen rezipiert, die in der Forschung zur Frühen Neuzeit mit der ihr ei-
genen Quellenlage auch in Ungarn immer weitaus stärker implizit präsent waren als beispiels-
weise in der Forschung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Doch erweisen sich einzelne Verläufe
und Eigenheiten der nationalen – auch religions- und kulturgeschichtlichen – Entwicklung wie
die daran anknüpfenden fachlichen Diskussionen „langer Dauer" als stark genug, um bestimm-

te Modelle und Paradigmen nahezulegen bzw. ihre Ablehnung oder doch vergleichsweises Desinteresse daran zu präfigurieren, und produzieren Begrifflichkeiten, die immer wieder der Reflexion bedürfen – was dann freilich im gemeinsamen Austausch auch erhellend und produktiv wirken kann. Die konfessionsgeschichtliche Entwicklung in Deutschland, geprägt und symbolisiert durch den Augsburger Kompromiß und die Regelungen des Westfälischen Friedens, hat die Entdeckung von strukturellen Gemeinsamkeiten in den Entwicklungen der katholischen wie der protestantischen Kirchen und Territorialherrschaften sowie der Verflechtung von kirchlicher, mentalitätsgeschichtlicher und staatlicher Entwicklung gewiß nahegelegt. Das darauf basierende begriffliche Modell der Konfessionalisierung, das bald zum Paradigma ausgebaut wurde und nach wie vor omnipräsent ist, ist für andere Länder nur mit Einschränkungen anwendbar, aber auf jeden Fall auch und gerade wegen der Spannung zwischen Modell und einzelnen Entwicklungen heuristisch produktiv.[1] In Ungarn haben die Verkoppelung von antihabsburgischer ständischer Opposition und Forderungen nach protestantischer Religionsfreiheit bzw. das Bündnis zwischen Katholizismus und Herrscherhaus in der Geschichtsschreibung der protestantischen Kirchen wie in der im 19. Jahrhundert national werdenden und Elemente des Geschichtsnarrativs der Akteure auf der Seite der „nationalen" Unabhängigkeit aufgreifenden Geschichtsschreibung zum einen zu einer konzeptionellen Verknüpfung von (geistigen) Fortschritt, nationaler Unabhängigkeit und Protestantismus bzw. diesem beerbenden Liberalismus geführt, das auch der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts seine Um- und Fortschreibung erlebte. Im Ringen der unterschiedlich aufgestellten Seiten scheint dann die Betrachtung von katholischer Reform und Bildung protestantischer Konfessionskirchen als spekulativ, ja als Sakrileg. Zum anderen führt ein in der Kirchengeschichtsschreibung noch deutlicher präsenter engerer ekklesiologischer Ansatz zur Konzentration auf die eigene Gruppe, nicht in ihrer Vergleichbarkeit und (ebenfalls gegebenen) strukturellen und kulturgeschichtlichen Determiniertheit, sondern in ihrer Eigenart. Entwicklungen wie das Fehlen einer christlichen Obrigkeit im osmanischen Eroberungsgebiet mit seinen interessanten eigenen volkskirchlichen Entwicklungen, der siebenbürgische Religionskompromiß der 1560er Jahre, das Nebeneinander von Luthertum und Calvinismus in Oberungarn, selbst in einzelnen Städten, der Widerstand gegen Exzesse der Gegenreformation oder das (spätere) Phänomen des Wiederauflebens sogenannter verwaister Gemeinden, also die erneute Organisation von protestantischen Kirchen in Gemeinden, die jahrzehntelang, z.T. ein Jahrhundert lang keinen protestantischen Gottesdienst haben durften, nach dem josephinischen Toleranzedikt bestärken die Skepsis; die weitaus ungünstigere Quellenlage zu Entwicklungen vor dem 18. Jahrhundert, auf die auch der Band immer wieder rekurriert, wirkt unterstützend.

Zu beobachten ist aber auch, daß deutsche und ungarische Forscher vorrangig gestützt auf ein eigenes Corpus von Quellen und Literatur arbeiten. Auch weil diese beiden Traditionslinien hier in einem Band zusammengeführt werden, ist das vorliegende Werk so lehrreich und wichtig. Man darf annehmen, daß die in Ungarn zu beobachtende Haltung zum Konfessionalisierungsparadigma auch auf den Gang der Rezeption und auf die nur selektive Zugänglichkeit einschlägiger Werke – in den mit sinkenden Mitteln ausgestatteten Bibliotheken – zurückzuführen ist. So wird es oft rundheraus abgelehnt, statt, was spannender wäre, es im Detail zu korrigieren oder zu falsifizieren. Aber auch auf deutscher Seite ist zu beobachten, daß es einen eigenen deutschen „Umlauf" von Fachliteratur gibt, in die die Ergebnisse der ungarischen Forschung nur auswahlweise über die deutschen bzw. fremdsprachigen Publikationen ungarischer Kollegen eingebunden sind. Was sonst in Ungarn erscheint oder aus der älteren Literatur erneut herangezogen werden könnte, bleibt ausgespart. Angesichts des frühen Übergangs zur Volkssprachlichkeit in bestimmten Genres der Reformationsliteratur legt dies Felder fest, auf denen Beobachtungen möglich sind, und grenzt andere aus, was das Gesamtbild beeinflussen

muß. Ausgesprochen verdienstvoll ist es, daß einige Teilnehmer (*Zach, Seidel,* bes. 156, 228) auf diese Grenze ihrer Arbeit hinweisen. Eben auch daher sind Unternehmungen wie diese Arbeitsgespräche so wichtig. Offensichtlich beherrscht nur der Ausnahmespezialist alle Sprachen, und Wissenschaft ist ohnehin ein kollektives Projekt und findet in kulturell vorgeprägten Köpfen wie auch in durch nationale Diskurse geprägten Milieus und Institutionen statt. Ein Übersetzen zwischen Rednern und ein Übersetzen von Texten ist immer auch eines zwischen Kulturen, und daher eines, in dem die scheinbar semantisch äquivalenten Begriffe doch nur unter Kenntnis ihres Kontextes annähernd zugänglich gemacht werden können (wie eben am Beispielfall skizziert wurde).

Vorprägungen der nationalen Wissenschaftstraditionen sind freilich auch dahingehend zu beobachten, was breiter und was weniger eingehend erforscht wurde. Das Bemühen, bildungs- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn in ihrer ganzen Breite zu thematisieren, hat auch ein „'katholisches Forschungsdefizit'" deutlich werden lassen. Aus Wolfgang Asches Beitrag zu den Studienbeziehungen geht hervor, was die Diskussion offensichtlich noch deutlicher gemacht hat, nämlich „dass gerade für die katholische Seite noch zahlreiche Untersuchungen zur Literatur- und Bildungsgeschichte sowohl in den Territorien des Heiligen Römischen Reichs als auch in Ungarn notwendig sind" (X, vgl. allgemeiner zu Detailforschungen und neuen Quellen auch: 107, 117, 156, 208, 225, 251).

Ein Vorzug dieses Bandes sind die breite Dokumentation sowohl der herangezogenen neusten Fachliteratur als auch der Quellen, sowie die Diskussion von Forschungsmöglichkeiten, die sich aus neuen bzw. in den letzten Jahrzehnten nicht zugänglichen Quellen ergeben. Aus den Archivbeständen der oberungarischen Städte hat offensichtlich vieles doch den I. und II. Weltkrieg überlebt und bietet die Chance zur Schließung bisher zu konstatierender Lücken, zur Präzisierung von Thesen und zur Ergänzung von disziplinär beschränkten Ergebnissen sowie zum Ausbau der bisher lückenhaft entworfenen mentalen Landkarte z.B. der oberungarischen Stadtlandschaft des 16.–17. Jahrhunderts. Aber auch in Städten wie Ödenburg (Sopron) liegen Bestände vor, die, mit neuen Fragen betrachtet, neue Einsichten versprechen. Der Band ist daher jedem einschlägig arbeitenden Forscher allein schon informationshalber unbedingt zu empfehlen.

Nachdem der Band als Gesamtwerk – was er verdienstvollerweise tatsächlich ist – betrachtet wurde, nun zu den Einzelbeiträgen: Die Herausgeber, Wilhelm *Kühlmann* und Anton *Schindling,* beschränken sich in ihrer „Einführung" zu „Deutschland und Ungarn in ihren wechselseitigen Beziehungen während der Renaissance" (VIII–XII) darauf, einen allgemeinen Rahmen zu skizzieren und auf Themen und wichtige Punkte der Einzelbeiträge hinzuweisen.

Franz *Brendle* stellt detailliert das Geflecht der Beziehungen, Interessen und Abhängigkeiten dar, die „Habsburg, Ungarn und das Reich im 16. Jahrhundert" im Wechselspiel der europäischen Mächte verbanden (1–25). In seinem Beitrag wird u.a. deutlich, wie politisch schwierig die Mobilisierung von Ressourcen des Reichs für die Türkenabwehr war, wie sehr damit der Kaiser zu Kompromissen mit der ständischen Opposition – nach Ansicht Brendles auch in religiösen Fragen (bes. 12–14, 25) – gezwungen war, die Frage aber auch ein letztes wichtiges Element eines katholische wie protestantische Reichsstände verbindenden Reichspatriotismus bildete.

Der anschließende Beitrag im Kranz der Texte zu den Rahmenbedingungen der geistigen Beziehungen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts von Matthias *Asche* ist den „Bildungsbeziehungen zwischen Ungarn, Siebenbürgen und den deutschen Universitäten um 16. und frühen 17. Jahrhundert" gewidmet (27–52). Noch vor der osmanischen Eroberung weiter Teile Ungarns waren die Universitätsgründungen des 14. und frühen 15. Jahrhunderts in Ungarn gescheitert. Weniger als die durchaus gegebene starke Konkurrenz der benachbarten älteren Einrichtungen

in Prag, Krakau oder Wien hatte die fehlende dauerhafte Grundlage für diese Prestigeprojekte zu deren Untergang beigetragen (28). Dieses Fehlen von Landesuniversitäten bis zum ersten Drittel des 17. Jahrhundert wurde dann „für den Verlauf der ungarischen Bildungsgeschichte konstitutiv" (31). Asche resümiert kenntnisreich, welche Universitäten in der Folgezeit in bestimmten politischen Konstellationen und konfessionell geprägten Bildungsinteressen von wem bevorzugt frequentiert wurden. Dabei bezieht er den gesamten Raum von Siebenbürgen über Oberungarn bis zur Adria mit seinen vielfältigen ethnischen und sozialstrukturellen Voraussetzungen wie divergierenden und in Bewegung begriffenen konfessionellen Bindungen ein. Während eine Universität in Ungarn 1635 in Thyrnau (1777 nach Buda verlegt) wieder entstand, erfolgte angeregt durch die Impulse der Reformation auf den Ebenen darunter jedoch der Ausbau eines Netzes von städtischen Lateinschulen und akademischen Gymnasien (Kollegien), die sich am Bedarf der lokalen Bürgerschaft und deren kulturellen und politischen Präferenzen orientierten bzw. den Personalbedarf der Kirchen und der regionalen Verwaltungen deckten (bes. 37, 44). Auch Lehrer und Leiter dieser Einrichtungen wurden teilweise aus dem deutschen Raum rekrutiert – berühmtestes Beispiel ist das Kolleg in Weißenburg – bzw. begaben sich zum Studium an deutsche Universitäten. Wittenberg und Heidelberg wurden – vor Leipzig, Marburg und Jena – insgesamt von Protestanten bevorzugt aufgesucht, Wien und Graz waren die erste Wahl für die Katholiken. Sie wurden dann auch Ausgangspunkte für die katholische Reform in Ungarn „unter jesuitischem Vorzeichen" (47).

Márta *Fata* stellt ihren Aufsatz unter die Überschrift „Deutsche und schweizerische Einflüsse auf die Reformation in Ungarn im 16. Jahrhundert. Aspekte der frühneuzeitlich-vormodernen Identität zwischen Ethnie und Konfession (53–107). Dabei geht es ihr um die „Formierung und Abgrenzung des konfessionellen Bewußtseins, sowie die Identitätsbildung der Magyaren im Calvinismus und die der Deutschen im Luthertum im 16. Jahrhundert" (56). Bevor sie diese Entwicklung in mehreren Phasen darlegt, geht sie auch auf Probleme der Forschung, genauer auf das „zum gesellschaftsgeschichtlichen Paradigma aufgewertete Konzept der Konfessionalisierung" (51), auf seine Nutzbarkeit für Ungarn bzw. die weitgehend ablehnende Haltung der ungarischen Forschung dazu ein (51–57). Wichtige Ursachen sind i.E. Vorprägungen des Diskurses über die Nationalgeschichte sowie die disziplinäre Abschottung der einschlägigen Forschung. Die „miserable Quellenlage", „die für einen westeuropäischen Historiker oft kaum vorstellbar ist" (55), schaffe weitere Schwierigkeiten bei der Klärung zentraler Fragen, insbesondere der nach dem „warum" bestimmter Entwicklungen. Doch ließen sich auch bekannte und erschlossene Quellen durchaus erfolgreich neu auf derartige Fragen hin auswerten (57). Eine grundsätzliche Andersartigkeit der ungarischen Verhältnisse stehe der heuristischen Anwendung der These – wie selbst von dem auf dem Gebiet der Reformationsforschung in vieler Hinsicht innovativen Ferenc Szakály behauptet wurde – jedoch nicht im Wege (55). Fata optiert unter Verweis auf Jenő Szűcs dafür, die ungarische Entwicklung „als Bestandteil einer eigenständigen ostmitteleuropäischen Regionalentwicklung" zu begreifen, innerhalb derer „methodische und thematische Vergleichsanalysen der in West- und Ostmitteleuropa abweichenden europäischen Wandlungsvorgänge" aufschlußreich werden könnten (55).

Die folgenden Ausführungen zur Konfessionsentscheidung von magyarischem Adel und deutschem Bürgertum – denn auf diese Gruppen konzentriert sie sich wesentlich – liefern eine pointierte Zusammenschau und problemorientierte Erweiterung der in ihrem Buch präsentierten Entwicklung[2] und führen exemplarisch vor, wie ein Neulesen der Quellen erfolgen kann. Im Falle des Adels beobachtet sie zunächst einen schwierigen Weg zum Luthertum – behindert durch sein Selbstverständnis als christliches Bollwerk, das mit der Lutherschen Deutung des türkischen Vordringens kollidierte, und durch seine Loyalität zum Haus Habsburg. Doch nach

den 1530er Jahren vermochte eben diese Lehre „Antwort auf die nationalen Schicksalsfragen" zu geben (90). Im Westen des Reichs bleib diese Entscheidung auch bestehen, während der Osten, angezogen von dem Deutungsangebot der calvinistischen Lehre, die Wendung zum reformierten Christentum vollzog. Nach Fata waren es „gerade die [...] schweizerischen Lehren über die Prädestination und den freien Willen, mit deren Hilfe der Adel die lutherischen Lehren über die völlige Entwertung des freien Willens und damit seine passive politische Haltung überwinden und seine Berufung durch Gott zur Befreiung der eigenen Nation erkennen konnte" (69). Angesichts der Spannbreite der individuellen Ausdeutungen von „Sendung" und „Vorsehung" wie der Vielzahl divergierender theologischer Rezeptionen der schweizerischen Vorbilder – die die Autorin kenntnisreich in nuce vorstellt – ist es mutig, aber m.E. auch produktiv für die weitere Diskussion, diese Zusammenfassung vorzunehmen. Untersucht wird dann die „Erweiterung der adeligen Identität um die ethnische Komponente" (71), als deren Marksteine die Selbstinterpretation der Magyaren als auserwähltes Volk (in biblischer Parallele) und die Entdeckung der Muttersprache durch die Späthumanisten und protestantischen Prediger standen. Die Verknüpfung der politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Interessen des magyarischen Adels mit dem Calvinismus, die im Zuge dieser Entwicklung erfolgte, verlieh diesem einen spezifischen ethnischen Charakter – wie auch bei anderen Gruppen dauerhafte Verbindungen von Konfession und Ethnie entstanden, die auf die kulturelle Mentalität der jeweiligen Konfessionsgruppe einwirkten.

Interessant ist auch, wie Fata die Rolle des ungarischen Adels insgesamt im Verlauf der Reformation in Ungarn einschätzt. In der Literatur wird bekanntlich vielfach davon ausgegangen, daß der Adel maßgeblichen Einfluß auf das Bekenntnis seiner untertänigen Bauern ausgeübt und auf seinem Besitz die Reformation vorangetrieben bzw. sein eigenes Bekenntnis durchgesetzt habe. Das deutsche „cujus regio, ejus religio" sei dabei im Sinne eines grundherrlichen jus reformandi umgedeutet worden. Dieses Bild zeichnet im vorliegenden Band auch *Brendle* (u.a. 9). Fata weist dagegen auf die Eigenart der Adelsreformation in Ungarn im 16. Jahrhundert hin, „wonach die ungarischen Magnaten und Adeligen nicht den Anspruch erhoben, die Konfessionszugehörigkeit ihrer adeligen Servienten oder ihrer bäuerlichen Untertanen zu bestimmen. In Ungarn waren konfessionelle und territorial-herrschaftliche Identität bis zum Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts keineswegs deckungsgleich" (90).[3]

Beim deutschen Stadtbürgertum habe sich die Entscheidung für die lutherische Reformation bzw. das Festhalten an ihr ebenfalls in mehreren, u.a. von sozialen und politischen Konflikten bzw. Interessenlagen beeinflußten Schritten, im Ringen zwischen Bürgern und Stadtrat vollzogen. Das schließlich als verbindlich angenommene lutherische Bekenntnis stellte dann „den gemeinsamen städtischen sakralen Raum und die städtische Einigkeit wieder her", das „politische Bündnis der evangelischen Städte mit dem katholischen König" habe anschließend einem weiteren Abdriften zu schweizerischen Ideen entgegengestanden (91). Wesentliches Ergebnis ist der Nachweis, daß „die Teilnahme der ethnisch-sozialen Gruppen an der Reformation bzw. ihre Präferenz für die eine oder andere reformatorische Richtung nach der Selbstdefinition und den gruppenspezifischen Interessen entsprachen, in denen politische Konzeptionen, soziale Interessen und ethnische Ansichten wirksam werden konnten". Interessante weiterführende Fragen ergeben sich m.E. auch aus der These: „Die sich aus der Konfessionalisierung ergebende Notwendigkeit der religiösen Abgrenzung bedeutete zugleich eine sich seit dem Mittelalter allmählich vollziehende und sich im 16. Jh. verstärkende ethnische Abgrenzung" (ebd.).

Die Vorstellung der Rahmenbedingungen schließt Mihály *Imre*s Aufsatz über den „ungarischen Türkenkrieg als rhetorisches Thema in der Frühen Neuzeit" ab (93–107). Kenntnisreich stellt der Verfasser die mittelalterliche Vorgeschichte einschlägiger Gedanken, u.a. des Motivs

vom „Bollwerk der Christenheit", seine mit dem Vordringen der Türken erfolgende engere, ja ausschließliche Verbindung mit Ungarn, sowie die Behandlung einschlägiger Topoi und Argumente in der zeitgenössischen Rhetorik dar. Seine Rekonstruktion der Verwendung einzelner Motive, ihrer Entlehnungen und der dabei wirksam werdenden personalen Beziehungen führt zugleich vor Augen, wie nachhaltig die Anwesenheit von Studenten aus Ungarn an den deutschen Universitäten für die Verwendung der Problematik und die Verbreitung einschlägiger Texte war. Nicht vernachlässigt werden sollte Imres abschließender Hinweis auf den fragmentarischen Charakter seiner Überschau, die durch weitere Analysen des vorliegenden umfangreichen Quellenmaterials an lateinischen und deutschsprachigen Reden, Predigten und Gebeten ergänzt werden sollte. Auch mit Blick auf die dünne Quellenlage zur Reformation in Ungarn, so wäre hinzuzufügen, ist dies ein hoffnungsvoller Hinweis.

Die Reihe der Beiträge zu Personen und geistigen Strömungen eröffnet András F. *Balogh* mit einer Untersuchung über „Literarische Querverbindungen zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts" (117–127, sowie Ill.). Er weist einleitend auf die Spezifik dieser Werke und ihr Verhältnis zur kanonisierten Literatur hin: die meisten deutschen Texte mit Ungarnbezug seien „nicht in einem primär literarischen Bereich aufzufinden", sondern vielmehr von einem journalistischen, chronikalischen, theologisch-politischen Kontext bestimmt (118). Um der Eigenart der Texte gerecht zu werden, sei die Anwendung eines allgemeineren Begriffs von Schrifttum ratsam. Ferner hätten damit auch die Kontakte, die aus den Texten beleuchtet werden können, nicht nur literarische Aspekte, sondern seien „auch theologischen und zeithistorischen Charakters" (119). Im engeren Sinn literarische Beziehungen seien in der volkssprachigen Literatur gerade im frühen 16. Jahrhundert noch nicht zu beobachten. Zu beobachten ist vielmehr die Aufnahme von Motiven, Ideen oder (realen wie fiktiven) Personen in den Texten, in erster Linie auf deutscher Seite, während sich in der ungarischen Literatur Spuren eines deutschen Kultureinflusses nach Balogh erst ab der Mitte des Jahrhunderts zeigten (119). Die vorgestellten Beispiele auf verschiedenen Textgattungen illustrieren denn auch die stark fiktive Einfärbung der als real vermittelten Berichte über Ungarn – das in den Texten wiederum zu einem fernen Randbereich eines deutschen Kulturraums wird –, oder aber die starke Anbindung an allgemeinere deutsche Diskussionen, zu deren illustrierender Folie Ungarn wird (Unterredung gegen die Türken, 125). In die Hochkultur drangen diese Themen und Motive nicht vor (127). Dennoch will Balogh einen gewissen Einfluß des Ungarn-Themas auf die Entwicklung der deutschen Literatur nicht rundheraus verneinen. Die journalistische Beschäftigung mit ihm habe immerhin „Stil und Sprache der Kriegsberichterstattung befördert", die „Lokalisierung der Schauplätze zur Festigung der literarisch-geographischen Grenzen und des Selbstbildes in der deutschen Literatur beigetragen", und schließlich sei in den Traktaten der „Übergang vom theologischen zu einem säkularisierten Diskurs geschaffen worden" (127), um nur einige wichtige Argumente zu nennen.

Ulrich Andreas *Wien* beschäftigt sich in Anknüpfung an das Motto „Sis bonus atque humilis, sic virtus Deusque / Tollet in excelsum, constituetque locum" mit der humanistischen Reformation im siebenbürgischen Kronstadt, mit Johannes Honterus und Valentin Wagner (135–150). Diese Verbindung von Humanismus und Reformation, die schon Schullerus und Reinert herausgestellt haben, und ihre „integrative Einheit" (139) erscheint als das besondere Merkmal gerade der Kronstädter Reformation unter Honter und Wagner. Eine der Voraussetzungen dafür waren die weit ausgreifenden internationalen Kontakte, in die der siebenbürgische Humanismus eingebunden war. Eine zentrale Rolle im Werk beider Reformatoren nahm auf dieser geistigen Grundlage die Pädagogik ein. Gerade bei Wagner, der wichtige Anregungen von Melanchthon bezog und in seiner Lehre von der Willensfreiheit teilweise noch über diesen hinausging, nahm deshalb die Ethik eine zentrale Position ein. In der Auseinanderset-

zung mit der aufkommenden calvinistischen Theologie ab Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts konservierte die sächsische Kirche ihre einmal erreichte Position und entwickelte einen Standpunkt, in dem sich dieses geistige Erbe in einer konservativen lutherischen Kirchenordnung mit dem Festhalten an überkommenen Formen des Kirchentums in spezifischer Weise verband (139, 150), und die in der siebenbürgischen Religionsgesetzgebung – von Wien als Religionsfreiheit begriffen und für 1571 angesetzt – ihre Rahmenbedingungen erhielt.

Unter dem Motto „'... Eine kleine Biblia...'" rekonstruiert Krista *Zach* „Rezeption und Resonanz des reformationszeitlichen Katechismus im historischen Ungarn (1530–1640)" (151–179, Ill.). Nach einem Rückblick auf die Vorgeschichte von Katechese und Katechismus und der Kennzeichnung ihrer Stellung in den zeitgenössischen reformatorischen Kirchen und im Katholizismus stellt sie die Verbreitung einzelner Katechismen im historischen Ungarn vor. Einzelne Strömungen der Reformation stellten hier in unterschiedlicher regionaler Kombination ihre Lehren in den Volkssprachen dar – so entstanden „magyarisch-, deutsch-, bibeltschechisch- wie slowakischsprachige Katechismen in Oberungarn und der Zips; magyarische und deutsche wie rumänische und griechische in Siebenbürgen bzw. magyarische in den Regionen West- und Zentralungarns sowie in Süddeutschland oder Wittenberg, Bücher in südslawischen Idiomen und Schriftarten für Kroatien, Slawonien und Dalmatien" (158). Die wichtigsten Vorlagen bzw. Katechismusmodelle in Ungarn waren Luthers *Kleiner Katechismus* (1529 und folgende Ausgaben) und *Brenzens Fragstücke* (1535), der *Zweite Genfer Katechismus* Calvins und der *Heidelberger Katechismus*, der die vorige Filiation nach 1565 verdrängte. „Pertrus Canisius' Katechismen werden in den Quellen erwähnt, auf die Dottrina Christiana breve (1597) des Erzbischofs Bellarmin konnte kein Hinweis gefunden werden. Bischof Petrus Mogilas Confessio Orthodoxa (1642) war schlussendlich ein Reflex auch auf rumänischsprachige Katechismen im Fürstentum Siebenbürgen von calvinistischer Seite." (161) Diese Situation wurde dadurch noch komplexer, daß neben den gedruckten Varianten, die vielfach abgewandelt wurden, und den „hausgemachten" Katechismen, die belegt, aber vielfach nicht überliefert sind (173), auch – u.a. als Ergebnis von Auslandstudien – viele individuell erstellte handschriftliche Varianten Verwendung fanden. Zachs Aufsatz gibt einen Überblick über eine Gattung und die dabei wirksamen europäischen Beziehungen im Prozeß einer „Mehrfachkonfessionalisierung" (179) in einem mehrsprachigen und politisch zergliederten Raum, wobei die Sammlung und Erschließung selbst der einst bzw. noch heute vorliegenden Werke noch nicht als abgeschlossen gelten kann.

Bálint *Keserű* widmet sich mit dem „Fall Imre Újfalvi. Die reformierte Opposition in Ostungarn und die Melanchthon-Anhänger in Sachsen" (185–195, Ill.) „einer der spannendsten Gestalten" des von Magyaren bewohnten reformierten Gebiets des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen (185). In den 1580er und 1590er Jahren studierten in Wittenberg bedeutende ungarische Humanisten und von ihnen begleitete Adelssöhne in so hoher Zahl wie nie zuvor. Im Spätsommer 1591 kam auch Imre Újfalvi (mit vollem Namen Imre Szilvas-Újfalvi Anderko, geboren kurz vor 1570, gestorben vermutlich 1616 oder danach) nach Wittenberg, und die Erfahrungen, die er in dieser Phase der Ablösung der Philippisten und ihres Versuchs zur Beseitigung scholastischer Relikte in Unterricht und Wissenschaft machte, erwiesen sich als prägend für seine weitere Laufbahn. Keserű weist anhand u.a. des *Album Amicorum* Újfalvis nach, wie engen Kontakt dieser – als Anführer des selbst in Schwierigkeiten geratenen ungarischen Coetus in Wittenberg – zu verbannten oder geflüchteten Melanchthonianern hielt. Nach seiner Rückkehr ins Partium, vor allem in seiner Position als (reformierter) Pastor und Senior in Großwardein und als einer der bedeutsamsten Organisatoren des literarischen Lebens seiner Zeit initiierte er eine Bewegung gegen den autokratischen Bischof des Distrikts, Lukács Hodászi. Dafür wurde er – unter Zuhilfenahme der weltlichen Autorität – eingekerkert, ausgepeitscht, mit der Todesstrafe

bedroht und schließlich in die Moldau verbannt (186). Újfalvi ist gelegentlich – auf der Basis problematischer Indizien – als Vorläufer der ungarischen Puritaner gewertet worden (187). Bei genauer Prüfung ist sein Auftreten gegen die Vermischung weltlicher und geistlicher Autorität und gegen das Vorgehen des Bischofs jedoch von eben jener Haltung des Ankämpfens gegen scholastische Praktiken getragen, die auch die sächsischen Melanchthonianer vertraten. Generell, so Keserű, sei für die Beziehung zwischen Intellektuellen des ungarischen Partium und Vertretern des sächsischen Philippismus „zu dieser Zeit ein Scheinparadoxon charakteristisch: Die Ungarn verkoppelten die Vorbereitung auf eine nationale Mission auf ideale, weil hemmungslose Weise mit dem Kosmopolitismus der humanistischen respublica litteraria". So war auch der Zusammenstoß zwischen Újfalvi und Hodászi mehr bzw. anderes als der spätere Kampf zwischen Puritanismus und Orthodoxie. Indem jedoch die Újfalvi-Partei zum Schweigen gebracht wurde, habe in Ostungarn und auch in Siebenbürgen eine letzte Phase der Konfessionalisierung begonnen.

Péter *Ötvös* beschäftigt sich am Beispiel des Matej Kabat oder Thoraconymus mit den „Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Aktivität in der Heimat" für die aus Wittenberg Heimgekehrten (199–206). Thoraconymus bekleidete 1571–77 das Amt des Schulrektors in Käsmark, war ab 1578 ein Jahr lang Schulrektor in Kauschau, das er aber nach heftigen konfessionellen Angriffen verlassen mußte, und ging nach einem Interim als Prediger in Újhely 1559 nach Sárospatak, wo er bis zu seinem Tode lehrte und weiter den Kontakt zum Humanismus zu halten suchte. Thoraconymus war nach Einschätzung Ötvös' eine der führenden Persönlichkeiten einer antiorthodoxen Gruppe an Melanchthon orientierter einstiger Wittenberger Studenten, die „gegen die ideologische und organisatorische Verstärkung der Kirche für breitere Freiheitsmöglichkeiten" eintraten (202) und vor allem auf pädagogischem Gebiet wirksam wurden. Ötvös analysiert die pädagogische Haltung des Thoraconymus und die Angriffe, die auf ihn unternommen wurden, um die Frontstellungen innerhalb der evangelischen Zipser Städte in diesem Zeitraum herauszuarbeiten. Im 17. Jahrhundert sollte ihnen die Rezeption Johannes Arndts schließlich eine andere Richtung geben.

Katalin S. *Németh*s Aufsatz über „Eine wiederentdeckte Reisebeschreibung. Veit Marchthaler, Ungarische Sachen, 1588" (207–218) belegt, daß Entdeckungen auch in den gemeinhin als bekannt und bibliographisch erschlossen geltenden Quellen immer wieder zu machen sind: Zum einen beschäftigt sich das 1632 in Straßburg erschienene „Itinerarium Gemaniae nov-antiquae. Teutsches Reyßbuch" des Martin Zeiller keineswegs – wie der Titel vermuten läßt und weswegen es als Hungaricum nicht registriert wurde – nur mit Deutschland. Zum anderen geht es – wie in der Erstausgabe noch angegeben – auf einen Bericht des Veit Marchthaler (207) über seine Reisen in Ungarn zurück. Németh konnte im Ulmer Stadtarchiv auch die zugrundegelegte Schrift, nämlich die „Ungarischen Sachen von Anno 1588" entdecken. In ihrem Beitrag rekonstruiert sie Werk und Lebensweg Marchtalers, diskutiert den Zweck seiner Schrift und verfolgt, welchen Abwandlungen die – stark dokumentarisch gehaltene – Vorlage im „Itenerarium" unterworfen wurde. Insbesondere erweist sich Marchthalers Handschrift als Fundus für Beobachtungen zum Alltagsleben der von ihm bereisten Gegenden und zu Überlieferungen und Ansichten seiner Kontaktpersonen, die der sprachbegabte Reisende interessiert und in großer Breite festhielt. –

András *Szabó* beschäftigt sich mit dem „Copernicus-Jünger Georg Joachim Rheticus in Ungarn" (219–225). 1551 mußte der Arzt und Naturwissenschaftler Rheticus, der Homosexualität bezichtigt, fluchtartig seinen bisherigen Wirkungsort Leipzig verlassen. Ab Herbst 1554 lebte er lange Jahre in Krakau und starb schließlich in Kaschau, wo er, wie Szabó rekonstruiert, bereits seit einiger Zeit tätig war. Einige Umstände seines Todes teilt das Vorwort Valenthin Othos zu dem von ihm vollendeten Werk seines Meisters über die Dreiecke (*Opus Palatinum*

de triangulis, 1596) mit. Szabó geht diesen Hinweisen nach, verfolgt auch den Lebenslauf Ot-
hos inmitten der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Lutheranern, Philippisten und Calvinisten,
bei denen Otho schließlich in Heidelberg eine dauerhafte Arbeitsmöglichkeit fand, und weist
auf weitere Quellen hin, deren Auswertung möglicherweise weitere Details des Ungarnaufent-
haltes des Rheticus klären könnte.

Robert *Seidel* wendet sich in seinem Beitrag „Der ungarische Späthumanismus und die cal-
vinistische Pfalz" (227–251) nicht wie z.B. Keserű und Ötvös dem Wirken ungarischer Stu-
denten in ihrer Heimat zu, sondern untersucht die Begegnungen in Deutschland selber und ihre
literarischen Reflexionen. Ab 1562 hielt sich eine wachsende Zahl ungarischer Studenten in
Heidelberg auf, die nach der Vertreibung der Kryptocalvinisten aus Sachsen ab 1591 noch wei-
ter wuchs. Viele von ihnen reüssierten in dem humanistischen Heidelberger Milieu, Seidel be-
legt anhand von Texten aus dem Umfeld der Dichterkrönung des Georgius Thurius und Johann
Philipp Pareus im Dezember 1600 die Denkweise und politischen Konzepte der Ungarn und
den Kontext, in dem sie an der Meinungsbildung der intellektuellen Zirkel der Pfalz mitwirk-
ten. Hervorgehoben wird, daß im Medium der Dichtung auch in der Zeit sich zuspitzender kon-
fessioneller Konflikte noch lange der *gemeinsame* Abwehrkampf gegen die Türken unter Füh-
rung des Kaisers beschworen wird (231, 242). Anders als schlesische Studenten kehrten die
Ungarn aus Heidelberg meist wieder in ihre Heimat zurück. Daß die Liebe zum leidenden Va-
terland meist der Ergänzung durch das Drängen der Mäzene bedurfte und der Abschied nicht
leichtfiel, belegt Seidel am Beispiel des Thurius, der dies in Briefen an eine der Zentralfiguren
der Heidelberger Ungarn, Albert Szenci Molnár, bekannte. Molnár, der jahrzehntelang blieb,
war damit eine Ausnahme – nur hier, im Umkreis der calvinistischen Zentren Marburg, Her-
born und Heidelberg schien ihm sein Plan einer Neuausgabe der ungarischen Bibel und der
Übersetzung der Psalmen zu verwirklichen. Und für diese Leistung, für diesen „Beitrag zur
Entwicklung der ungarischen Sprache als Medium der religiösen Unterweisung", gestanden
ihm seine Landsleute dieses lange Fernbleiben auch zu. Wiederum steht ausblickend der Hin-
weis auf die Notwendigkeit weiterer Forschungen, die den Realitätsgehalt der vielfach ange-
nommenen und hier in einigen wichtigen Verbindungen nachgezeichneten „calvinistischen In-
ternationale" weiter erhellen können.

Den Grundton mit der Formel „Tristia ex Transilvania" vorgebend, betrachtet Achim *Aurn-
hammer* abschließend „Martin Opitz' Ovid-Imitatio und poetische Selbstfindung in Sieben-
bürgen (1622/23)" (253–272, Ill.). 1622 war Opitz dem Ruf Gábor Bethlens an das Fürstliche
Gymnasium in Weißenburg gefolgt, im Sommer des folgenden Jahres kehrte er allerdings
schon wieder nach Schlesien zurück. Der kurze Aufenthalt, so die These Aurnhammers, mar-
kiere dennoch eine „werkgeschichtliche Zäsur, da Opitz sich während des 'siebenbürgischen
Exils' seiner Berufung zum deutschen Nationaldichter bewußt wurde" (253). Neben lateini-
schen Huldigungs- und Gelegenheitsgedichten und einem verschollenen wissenschaftlichen
Werk, der hier begonnenen *Dacia Antiqua,* entstanden in Siebenbürgen auch zwei bedeutende
deutschsprachige Dichtungen, an denen diese These belegt wird. Die Berücksichtigung gat-
tungsspezifischer Motive in den von Opitz vorgenommenen Betrachtungen seiner Weißenbur-
ger Existenz hilft dabei, Momente der Selbststilisierung und des Entwerfens neuer Rollen in
den auch, aber eben nicht nur autobiografischen Texten auszumachen. Das Motiv der Heimat-
losigkeit durchzieht wiederum auch andere Texte, in denen es dann zu erwartende andere Mo-
tive – etwa das Lob Pannoniens – in die Nebenrolle abdrängt. Ausgeprägter Neustoizismus und
Subjektivismus prägen alle in Siebenbürgen entstandenen Texte Opitz' und schlagen sich in ei-
ner Transgression der Gattungstradition nieder. Als Opitz eigene Frage erweist sich in diesem
Lichte die Frage eines seiner Gedichte, „Wo aber will ich hin?" (269), und der Wunsch seines –
gleichfalls auf Ovid bezug nehmenden – Programmgedichts „An die deutsche Nation", in der

er seine Rolle als deutscher Dichter in seinem „Vaterland" entwirft. Somit kommt der sieben-
bürgischen Episode – in Aurnhammers Worten: „dem siebenbürgischen Exil" – „eine für Mar-
tin Opitz' dichterische Selbstfindung entscheidende Bedeutung bei" (272).

Der vorliegende Band untersucht somit vor allem hochkulturelle Beziehungen zwischen
Deutschland und Ungarn, die sich in dem – einleitend von *Brendle* so kenntnisreich geschilder-
ten – Beziehungsgefüge politischer Art entfalteten. Schon auf dieser Ebene, das machen viele
Beiträge deutlich, sind die Quellen rar und sind sie im Laufe der Jahrhunderte dünner gewor-
den. Von ihnen her rekonstruierbar sind in erster Linie denn oft auch nur allgemeine Verläufe
auch des Schicksals der Reformation bzw. der Konfessionalisierungsprozesse im historischen
Ungarn – warum diese oder jene lokale Entscheidung getroffen wurde, wie sich konfessionelle
und soziale Identität z.B. nicht nur des magyarischen Adels und des deutschen Bürgertums
(Fata), sondern auch der magyarischen und slowakischen Bauern in Oberungarn oder Zentral-
ungarn – oder anderen Zielgruppen z.B. der von *Zach* vorgestellten Katechismen – entwickel-
te, bleibt auf dieser Ebene offen. Auch hier, auch in der Einordnung und Deutung von Entwick-
lungen auf dieser Ebene, wären solche gemeinsamen Diskussionen wie die hier dokumentierte
sinnvoll. Auf nicht endgültig geklärte Probleme bei der Deutung von Details weisen z.B. die
Deutungen „der siebenbürgischen Religionsfreiheit" oder deren Datierungen hin, die offen-
kundig von der Lesart vorliegender Gesetze mit Blick auf einzelne Gruppe getragen sind. Wie
Keserűs abschließende Frage zur Einordnung von Bethlens – immerhin etwas menschen-
freundlicheren, und zudem aus Sicht der Staatsräson nur vernünftigen – Versuch zur Schaffung
einer souveränen Fürstenmacht und reformierten Hegemonie andeutet – Keserű scheint sie
ausgehend von der vorgestellten Deutung Újfalvis als möglicherweise doch retrograd gegen-
über dieser so dynamischen Strömung (195) –, betrifft die Begriffsbildung letztlich grundle-
gende Fragen der Einordnung zentraler politischer Prozesse wie des Schaffens der vorgestell-
ten Humanisten und Reformatoren.

Die Herausgeber geben eingangs ihrer Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß der im Jahr des EU-Bei-
tritts Ungarns erschienene Band zur Befestigung und Vertiefung der „überkommenen guten
gelehrten Beziehungen zwischen ungarischen und deutschen Forschern" beitragen möge. An-
gesichts der in Deutschland zu beobachtenden Kürzungen und Schließungen von Institutionen,
die sich philologisch und historisch mit den gerade beigetretenen Ländern beschäftigen, auch
und gerade auf dem Gebiet der ungarnbezüglichen Forschung, hinterläßt der gute Wunsch ge-
mischte Gefühle. Es wird zunehmend fraglich, ob in professioneller Form an das angeknüpft
werden kann, was der vorliegende Band an neuen Herausforderungen ausgehend von einem
differenzierten Forschungsstand aufzeigt.

Juliane Brandt

Notizes

[1]   Vgl. hier aus der Sicht einer der Konstrukteure der These: Heinz Schilling: Nationale Identität
        und Konfession in der europäischen Neuzeit. In: *Nationale und kulturelle Identität. Studien
        zur Entwicklung des kulturellen Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit.* Hrsg. Von Bernhard Giesen.
        Frankfurt a.M. (Suhrkamp) 1991 (3. Aufl. 1996), 192–252. Ein Versuch der Anwendung auf
        Mitteleuropa und der Erkundung von Grenzen des Modells: *Konfessionalisierung in Ostmit-
        teleuropa: Wirkungen des religiösen Wandels im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert in Staat, Gesell-
        schaft und Kultur.* Hgg. Joachim Bahlcke – Arno Strohmeyer, Stuttgart (Steiner) 1999. Deut-
        lich skeptischer: Anton Schindling: Konfessionalisierung und Grenzen von Konfessionalisier-
        barkeit. In: *Die Territorien des Alten Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionali-*

sierung. Land und Konfession 1500–1650. Bd. 7. Hgg. Anton Schindling – Walter Ziegler. Münster (Aschendorff) 1997, 9–44.

2   Márta Fata: *Ungarn, das Reich der Stephanskrone, im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung. Multiethnizität, Land und Konfession 1500 bis 1700.* Münster 2000.

3   Jüngst hat Katalin Péter ihre bisherigen Forschungen ähnlich zusammengefaßt. Sie beobachtet eine Kontinuität grundherrlichen Desinteresses an der Lebensführung der bäuerlichen Gemeinde im Detail bis ins frühe 17. Jahrhundert. Noch der einschlägige Passus des Wiener Friedens und der Krönungsartikel von 1698 bezüglich der Dörfer sei lediglich von dem Bestreben getragen gewesen, die Einmischung der Zentralmacht in die Befugnisse der Grundherren gegenüber ihren Bauern auszuschließen. Auch wenn es lokale bzw. individuelle Unterschiede gegeben haben möge, sei die „grundherrliche Reformation" kaum zu belegen, eine Praxis der Einflußnahme, des Reformierens bzw. Rekatholisierens sei erst im 17. Jahrhundert aufgekommen. (Katalin Péter: *A reformáció: kényszer vagy választás?* [Die Reformation: Zwang oder Wahl?] Budapest (Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó) 2004.) Religiöse Konflikte, bis hin zu den Atrozitäten der Kurutzenkriege, die dann selbst spätere, die Akteure grundsätzlich als Kämpfer auf der eigenen Seite wertende Geschichtsschreiber mit Bestürzung erwähnen (Zsilinszky Mihály: *A magyar országgyűlések vallásügyi tárgyalásai* [Die Verhandlungen des ungarischen Reichstages zu Fragen der Religion]. 1.–4. Budapest 1881–1897. 3. 1647–1687. ebd., 1893, bes. 393), seien erst nach der gewaltsamen Einmischung von Staat und Militär in lokale Besitzstände aufgekommen.

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Mary H. Beech, "The Domestic Realm in the Lives of Hindu Women in Calcutta," in *Separate Worlds: Studies of Purdah in South Asia,* ed. Hanna Papanek and Gail Minault (Delhi: Chanakya, 1982), 115.

Martin Buber, *Das problem des Menschen* (Heidelberg: Lambert Scheider Verlag, 1984), 35.

Martini, Fritz: *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart.* 18. Aufl. Stuttgart: Krönet 1984 (= Kröners Taschenausgabe 196). S. 125.

Szabó, János: *„Wilhelm Tell in der Schule" oder Frischs Requiem auf die Satire.* – In: Bassola, Péter; Hessky, Regina; Tarnói, László (Hg.): *Im Zeichen der ungeteilten Philologie.* Festschrift für Professor Dr. sc. Karl Mollay zum 80. Geburtstag. Budapest: ELTE Germanistisches Institut 1993 (= Budapester Beiträge zur Germanistik 24). S. 321–332.

Köpcke, Klaus-Michael: *Die Beherrschung der deutschen Pluralmorphologie durch muttersprachliche Sprecher und L2-Lerner mit englischer Muttersprache.* – In: *Linguistische Berichte* 1987. Bd. 107. 23–43.

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